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Abstract
This thesis focuses on examination o f the impact o f international labour 
standards on freedom o f association in Bangladesh. The aim is to trace the 
influence o f the ILO Conventions on freedom o f association in the development 
o f legislation and policy on the right to freedom o f association in Bangladesh 
and to determine the effectiveness and relevance o f the ILO's effort in this 
context.
The present study undertakes to focus and analyse the impact from three 
perspectives. First, by outlining the legislative development o f the right to 
freedom o f association in Bangladesh, the thesis attempts to ascertain the impact 
o f the ILO Conventions on freedom o f association on domestic legislation and 
policy. Secondly, an assessment is undertaken o f the extent to which the 
Government o f Bangladesh has fulfilled its international obligations under the 
ILO Constitution and evaluate the role o f the ILO supervisory machinery in 
ensuring the right to freedom o f association in Bangladesh. Thirdly, an 
investigation is carried out on the awareness, views and attitudes o f the workers, 
union leaders and employers on the right to freedom o f association through an 
empirical survey carried out in Bangladesh.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
I
This thesis examines the impact o f  international labour standards on freedom of 
association in Bangladesh. The aim is to trace the influence o f the ILO 
Conventions on freedom o f association in the development o f legislation and 
policy on the right to freedom o f association in Bangladesh and to determine the 
effectiveness and relevance o f the ILO's effort in this context.
In the present thesis, the expression 'freedom o f association1 refers to the 
rights o f workers and employers to organise for the defence o f their 
occupational interests as are understood by the various Conventions on freedom 
o f association adopted by the ILO.1 In particular, it will be used to refer to the 
rights and freedoms that are guaranteed by the Freedom o f Association and 
Protection o f the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and the Right 
to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98). Thus, the 
expression will be taken in its broad sense, which means it will not only include 
the right to set up associations but also a number o f other rights without which 
the right to organise would lose much o f its meaning e.g. the right o f
1 For a conceptual analysis of freedom of association, see, Von Prondzynski, F., 
Freedom of Association and Industrial Relations: A Comparative Study. London 1987, 
pp. 10-16 and 225-26.
associations to organise their administration and activities freely.2 It is not 
suggested that Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 are exhaustive o f the concept of 
freedom o f association. They quite clearly are not.3 The fact remains, however, 
that Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 have acquired a degree o f acceptance amongst 
the international community,4 rendering them uniquely authoritative in relation 
to freedom o f association. We will therefore, consider these Conventions and 
the concomitant jurisprudence as the principal focus o f our examination of 
international protection o f freedom o f association in the domestic arena of 
Bangladesh.
Association, like other concepts, is not an absolute concept. The state 
may have a number o f valid reasons for wishing to regulate its exercise. To do 
so is not necessarily incompatible with the idea o f freedom o f association, 
provided the restrictions chosen leave the basic substance o f the right intact. 
However, Governments do sometimes succumb to the temptation to confuse 
justification with expediency, and the substance o f fundamental rights cannot 
always be preserved by relying on the benevolence o f state administrations. It 
is important therefore to inquire into the limits imposed by the ILO upon the
2 For the provisions of the right to freedom of association as laid down in various 
Conventions adopted by the ILO, see below, chapter 2, pp. 39-59.
3 They do not, for example, make any express reference to the right to strike. They 
are entirely silent on issues such as right not to associate, protection o f trade union 
funds, inviolability o f trade union premises.
4 As at December 1994 Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 have been ratified by 112 and 
124 states respectively. For the lists o f states that have ratified the Conventions, see, 
ILO, Lists o f Ratifications by Convention and By Country, Report III (Part 5), Geneva 
1995, pp. 110-11 and 127-28.
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discretion o f a Government to restrict the exercise of freedom o f association.
The adoption o f international labour standards is not an academic 
exercise. Its object is to bring about effective and harmonised progress in the 
national law and practice.5 One o f the factors influencing the effectiveness o f 
standards is the degree to which they are formally accepted by member states.
Whatever effect the unratified Conventions can have in the absence of 
binding obligations,6 it is in connection with the formal act o f ratification that 
their impact is likely to be tangible and lasting. This is due to the fact that 
ratification involves the formal commitment o f states to give effect to the 
Conventions within their territory and it sets in motion the regular supervisory 
machinery o f the ILO.7
A state which ratifies a Convention gives an undertaking that it will 
make its provisions effective as from the date o f its entry into force for the 
country concerned, which is twelve months after the registration o f its formal
3 Valticos, N., "The Future Prospects for International Labour Standards" in 
International Labour Review. Vol. 118, 1979, p. 690.
6 On the influence of unratified Conventions, see, Landy, E. A., "The Influence of
International Labour Standards: Possibilities and Performance", in International Labour
Review. 1970. Vol. 101, pp. 561-570; ILO, The Impact of International Labour 
Conventions and Recommendations. Geneva 1976, pp. 11-26.
7 For a detailed account of the supervisory machinery of the ILO, see, Valticos, N., 
International Labour Law. Deventer 1979, pp. 225-261; Tikriti, A., Tripartism and the 
International Labour Organisation. Stockholm 1982, pp. 274-333; Samson, K.T., "The 
Changing Pattern of ILO Supervision", in International Labour Review. Vol. 118, 
1979, pp. 569-587.
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ratification with the Director-General o f the International Labour Office.8 The 
assumption o f obligations under a Convention will have noticeable repercussions 
at the national level whenever the law or practice o f the country needs to be 
modified in order to ensure compliance with the terms o f the instrument. Such 
modifications may occur in four circumstances: they may precede the decision 
to ratify; they may be concurrent with it; they may occur during the period 
between ratification and entry into force; or they may take place when the 
Convention is already binding. The last mentioned alternative, although 
unsatisfactory from a legal point o f view, none the less represents a case of 
influence, and one where the effect o f ILO standards is liable to be particularly 
clear-cut.
The ILO Conventions were the first multilateral treaties to go beyond 
regulating inter-state relations.9 They took up a more ambitious task: that o f 
regulating state-citizen relations and also citizen-citizen relations.10 This type o f 
regulation raised problems of implementation which had never been faced in 
international law. Accordingly, the ILO invented new techniques o f supervision
8 International Labour Office is the permanent secretariat o f the ILO, and is expressly 
provided for in the Constitution o f the ILO which in Article 2 stipulates: "the 
permanent organisation shall consist o f ... an International Labour Office ...". For a 
detailed study on the structure o f the ILO, see, Osieke, E., Constitutional Law and 
Practice in the International Labour Organisation. Dordercht 1985, pp. 79-141.
9 See, Leary, V. A., International Labour Conventions and National Law: The 
Effectiveness o f the Automatic Incorporation of Treaties in National Legal Systems. 
The Hague 1982, pp. 6-7.
10 Id.
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which was new in international law .11 Now a fundamental question may be 
posed as to the effectiveness o f these modes o f implementation i.e., are they 
adequate to the task? Second, there are questions about international standards 
in a socially diverse world. Sometimes there may be a tendency to voice doubts 
as to the possibility o f having universal standards in view o f the diversity which 
exists between countries in the economic, social and political fields. Perhaps, 
nothing could be more dangerous than this sceptical relativism and it is not 
suggested that there should be "sub-standards for sub-hum ans".12 But yet can the 
Conventions on freedom of association be applied universally as the ILO 
advocates? Might there be an argument that some aspects o f the right of 
association as specified in the Conventions and upheld by the supervisory bodies 
are not the actual concern o f the workers o f Bangladesh in their exercise o f 
right o f association and as such have little relevance in the context o f 
Bangladesh? Third, there are questions concerning the impact o f ILO standards 
on the life chances o f the people in Bangladesh. Does it really matter to the 
workers and employers that the ILO standards on freedom of association exists?
11 States are of course expected to carry out their obligations in good faith and the 
principle pacta sunt servanda has long been considered as a fundamental rule of 
international Law. But mere reliance on this rule, however generally it may be 
accepted, still represents a frail basis on which is to be found a durable system of 
global rights and duties. As the system has grown in complexity, therefore, procedures 
have had to be developed in order to verify governmental compliance with ratified 
treaties.
12 An expression used at the Third Session o f the African Advisory Committee, Dakar, 
October, 1967, see, Minutes o f the 170th session o f the Governing Body of the ILO, 
1967, p. 85.
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It might be easy to underestimate the impact o f such standards: what would be 
different in Bangladesh today if the ILO and its Conventions on freedom of 
association did not exist?
The decision to undertake study on Bangladesh is based on the fact that 
the territory now comprising Bangladesh is one o f the states which has been 
linked with the ILO since the inception o f the organisation in 1919, first as part 
o f British India, then as part o f  Pakistan and finally as an independent state. 
Moreover, it is one o f the third world countries which has ratified the basic 
Conventions on freedom o f association13 and the Conventions have been in 
operation for several decades in its territory.14 Further, a systematic investigation 
o f the right to freedom o f association as is existing in Bangladesh, the ILO 
standards in this regard and the ILO's effort in ensuring the right to freedom o f 
association would not only be helpful in creating awareness amongst the 
workers and union leaders but also contribute to the advancement o f their 
exercise of right o f association. Moreover, as it appears to be the case that no 
research has been undertaken in this area to this date, so the present study hopes
13 O f the eight Conventions so far adopted by the ILO on freedom of association, 
Bangladesh has ratified three. These are: Right of Association (Agriculture) 
Convention. 1921. (No. 11); Freedom of Association and Protection o f the Right to 
Organise Convention. 1948. (No. 87) and Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention. 1949. (No. 98).
14 Bangladesh has ratified Convention No. 11 on 22.6.1972 when it became a member 
o f the ILO, but this Convention has been in force in its territory since 11.5.1923, 
when India and subsequently Pakistan ratified it. Similarly, Conventions Nos. 87 and 
98 have been ratified by Bangladesh on 22.6.1972 but these have been in force in its 
territory since 14.2.1951 and 26.5.1952 respectively, as being ratified by Pakistan. For 
the issue of succession to the ILO Conventions, see below, chapter 2, pp. 36-38.
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to offer some research literature to fill this gap.
II
The present study plans to focus and analyse the impact o f international 
labour standards on freedom o f association in Bangladesh from three 
perspectives. First, by outlining the legislative development o f the right to 
freedom of association in Bangladesh, the thesis attempts to ascertain the impact 
o f the ILO Conventions on freedom o f association on domestic legislation and 
policy. Secondly, an assessment is undertaken o f the extent to which the 
Government o f Bangladesh has fulfilled its international obligations under the 
ILO Constitution and evaluate the role o f the ILO supervisory machinery in 
ensuring the right to freedom o f association in Bangladesh. Thirdly, an 
investigation is carried out o f the awareness, views and attitudes o f the workers, 
union leaders and employers on the right to freedom o f association through an 
empirical survey. The following paragraphs elaborate the research design and 
outlines the organisation o f the thesis.
Chapter 2, entitled "International Labour Standards on Freedom of 
Association and the International Obligations o f Bangladesh" outlines the 
relationship o f Bangladesh with the ILO by elaborating its membership history. 
Then it goes on to present an overview o f the ILO Conventions on freedom o f 
association adopted by the ILO and the international obligations o f Bangladesh 
with regard to these standards.
Chapter 3 documents the development o f legislation and policy on the
13
right to freedom o f association in pre-independence Bangladesh, while chapter 
4 traces the development in independent Bangladesh. In these two chapters 
while outlining the development o f legislation and policy on the right of 
association attempts will be made inter alia', (a) to trace briefly the legislative 
history o f the Trade Union Act, 1926 dealing with the right o f association, (b) 
to ascertain whether the establishment o f the ILO had any bearing on the 
legislative recognition o f the right o f  association, (c) to focus on what was the 
status o f the right o f association immediately after achieving independence in 
1947, (d) to depict the promise and performance o f various successive 
constitutional Governments and Martial Law regimes in incorporating the 
provisions o f the ILO Conventions in domestic law in order to fulfil the 
international obligations arising out o f ratification o f Convention on Freedom 
o f Association, (e) to consider whether the political independence o f Bangladesh 
in 1971 resulted in elevating the workers' right to freedom o f association in 
conformity with the ILO Conventions in comparison to what was prevalent 
during Pakistani rule, and (f) to ascertain the conformity and compatibility o f 
the legislation and policy in Bangladesh today with that o f the ILO standards 
on freedom of association.
Chapter 5 seeks to determine to what extent the ILO supervisory 
mechanism has been able to procure compliance with the international labour 
standards on freedom o f association. This will demonstrate the impact o f the 
ILO supervision on the legislative actions o f the Government o f Bangladesh.
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For this purpose attempts will be made: (a) to indicate to what extent the 
Government o f Bangladesh has fulfilled its obligation to supply reports to the 
ILO under article 22 o f the Constitution; (b) to ascertain the extent to which the 
Committee o f Experts of the ILO addressed critical comments to the 
Government for enacting laws which were/are not in conformity with the 
Conventions on freedom o f association which it has ratified; (c) to reveal 
whether such comments eventually led to compliance or not and (d) to examine 
the cases against the Government o f Bangladesh filed before the Committee on 
Freedom o f Association, highlighting the nature o f the complaints and the 
outcome o f the procedure.
By tracing and analysing the comments o f the supervisory Committees 
from year to year, it will be shown to what extent the ILO supervision has 
failed or succeeded in its task. If the concept o f impact is defined in such 
specific terms it would be easier to identify a causal relationship between 
international advice and national action.15 This is so because it is not easy to 
measure the influence o f an international organisation on events in an individual 
country, because the connection between the two cannot always be clearly 
seen.16
Pure academic analysis o f the development o f the legislation and policy 
on freedom o f association and evaluating the supervisory role o f the ILO in
13 See, Landy, E. A., The Effectiveness o f International Supervision: Thirty Years of 
ILO Experience. London 1969, pp. 5-6.
16 Price, J., ILO: 50 Years On. London 1969, p. 4.
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ensuring its protection on the basis o f secondary data cannot by itself be 
sufficient to show the whole picture o f the impact o f  international labour 
standards on freedom of association in Bangladesh. So it was considered 
essential to reveal the actual perspectives o f the beneficiaries o f the right by 
undertaking field research in Bangladesh. Chapter 6 presents the findings o f the 
field research. The primary purpose o f the field investigation was to enquire 
into: (a) the awareness, opinion and attitude o f the workers, union leaders and 
employers on the ILO, the ILO Conventions on the right to freedom o f 
association; (b) their opinions on the extent o f the right to establish trade 
unions; (c) their awareness and satisfaction about the provisions o f the Industrial 
Relations Ordinance, 1969, dealing with the right to freedom o f association.
The above objectives were achieved following the questionnaire survey 
m ethod.17 O f the two basic methods o f obtaining primary data, namely, a) 
questioning and b) observation, the first was followed as it was considered to 
be more appropriate in terms o f the objectives o f the study as it would lead to 
tables o f quantified direct responses. Structured questionnaires were used in 
order to yield the data for the study18 and the respondents were chosen on the 
basis o f simple and stratified method o f sampling.19 The conclusions of the 
thesis are presented in chapter 7.
17 For a detailed account o f survey methods, see below, chapter 6, pp. 240-248.
18 For questionnaires, see, Appendix I, II and III.
19 For sample size and sampling frame o f the study, see below, chapter 6, pp. 242-246.
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I ll
It is apparent from the discussion o f the preceding sections that the 
present study does not deal with the general influence o f the ILO standards on 
the labour law and practice o f Bangladesh, nor does it concern itself with the 
role o f these standards, or o f the ILO as a whole. Thus, instead o f attempting 
to assess the general impact o f  the ILO and its standards from a broader 
perspective, this thesis confines itself only to the study o f the impact of 
international labour standards on freedom of association in Bangladesh.
Freedom o f association is the basic feature o f any pluralist society. If it 
is accepted that decisions on economic and labour issues should not be 
monopolised by the state but that workers and employers should also play an 
important role in this respect, it is self-evident that the latter must be given the 
right to set up organisations for the defence o f their occupational interests and 
that these organisations must be granted the rights which are necessary for them 
to act effectively. Although the basic principles of freedom of association apply 
to workers and employers alike, in practice usually problems arise in connection 
with labour unions rather than with employers' organisations. The main reason 
for this is probably that many Governments are more concerned about the 
potential influence o f trade unions on national life and have therefore attempted 
to control them more closely. Bangladesh is not an exception to this pattern and 
the present thesis therefore limits itself only to the study o f the workers' right 
o f association.
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The thesis further limits itself basically to the study o f industrial workers 
right o f association as trade unionism in Bangladesh is essentially an urban and 
industrial movement and has not yet spread to the agricultural sector. As in 
most countries, agricultural workers cannot be easily organised into trade unions 
since they usually work on semi-isolated farms scattered throughout the country. 
In Bangladesh the task has rendered particularly difficult because o f the 
inadequate means o f communication and the seasonal character o f  agricultural 
employment. A large number o f agricultural workers are tenant-farmers and 
consider their social position higher than that o f the landless agricultural 
labourers which is an impediment to unity and solidarity among them. Further 
the migratory character o f the latter and the unstableness o f employment makes 
organisation among them impossible.20 The problems and issues arising out o f 
agricultural workers' right o f association and the devices and strategies to 
organise them is in itself a vast subject-matter o f  study and does not fall within 
the aims and objectives o f the thesis as described above.21 Thus, any detailed 
study o f the agricultural workers right o f association in Bangladesh is beyond 
the scope o f the thesis.
The subject-matter o f the present study makes it unnecessary to discuss
20 See, D'Costa, R., The Role o f Trade Union in Developing Countries. Louvain 1963, 
p. 92.
21 For the problems o f agricultural labourers and the strategies to organise them, see, 
Aziz, A., Organising Agricultural Labourers in India: A Proposal. Calcutta 1980.
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the origins and history o f the ILO22 or to review its efforts over several decades 
to formulate standards o f labour.23 Further, a study o f history o f trade union 
movement in Banghladesh is beyond the scope o f this thesis.24
22 For the history of the establishment of the ILO and its functioning, see, Shotwell, 
J. T., (ed.), The Origins o f the International Labour Organisation. (2 Vols.), New York 
1934; Wilson, F. G., Labour in the League System. California 1934; ILO, The 
International Labour Organisation: The First Decade. London 1931; Alcock, A., 
History of the International Labour Organisation, London 1971.
23 For a comprehensive description and analysis o f the various aspects of standard- 
setting activities, see, Valticos, N., "Fifty Years of Standard Setting Activities by the 
International Labour Organisation", in International Labour Review. Vol. 100, Geneva 
1969, pp. 201-237.
24 For studies on the history o f the trade union movement, see, Mathur, A. S., Trade 
Union Movement in India. Allahabad 1957; D'Costa, R., The Role o f Trade Unions 
in Developing Countries: A Study of India. Pakistan and Ceylon. Louvain 1963; 
Khalid, M., Trade Unionism in Pakistan. Lahore 1958; Ahmed, K., Labour Movement 
in Bangladesh. Dhaka 1978.
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CHAPTER 2
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS ON FREEDOM OF 
ASSOCIATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
OF BANGLADESH
2.1 MEMBERSHIP OF BANGLADESH IN THE ILO AND SUCCESSION TO 
CONVENTIONS
The emergence o f Bangladesh as an independent state was one o f the 
most important events in the history of South Asia since the withdrawal of 
British rule from this region. Before its inception as a sovereign independent 
state, Bangladesh was first part o f  British India and then part o f Pakistan known 
as East Pakistan. Hence, in order to discuss the membership o f Bangladesh, we 
must first go back to India's membership in the ILO in 1919, followed by 
Pakistan's membership in 1947.
The International Labour Organisation was established by virtue of part 
XIII of the Treaty o f Versailles.1 At the first plenary session o f the Paris Peace 
Conference a Commission on Labour was set up to inquire into the conditions 
o f employment from the international aspect, to consider the international means 
necessary to secure common action on matters affecting conditions of 
employment and to recommend the form o f a permanent agency to continue 
such inquiry in co-operation with and under the direction of the League of
1 For text of the Treaty, see, ILO, Official Bulletin. Geneva 1919, Vol. 1, p. 332.
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Nations.2 The Commission's report was discussed in some detail in the British
Empire Delegation and it was agreed that the model o f the Covenant o f the
League o f Nations should be followed for the membership o f the Labour
Organisation. A plenary session o f the Conference accepted this view and
authorised its Drafting Committee "to make such amendments as may be
necessary to have the Convention conform to the Covenant o f the League of
Nations in the character o f its membership and in the method o f adherence".3
Accordingly Article 387 o f the Treaty o f Versailles provided:
The original members of the League o f Nations shall be the original 
members of this organisation, and thereafter membership of the League 
of Nations shall carry with it membership o f the said organisation.4
Hence in order to explain India's membership in the ILO we have to discuss
India's membership in the League o f Nations. India's membership in these
organisations is o f special interest since it was at that time not a sovereign state
nor a self-governing territory, but a part o f British empire.
The W orld War I had a profound effect on the attitude o f His Majesty's
Government towards India. Before 1917 the composition o f the Imperial
Conference was confined to the members o f His Majesty's Government and the
Governments of the Dominions. But in view of her war effort, India was
represented at the special war Conferences o f 1917 and 1918 and in the Imperial
2 W heare, K. C.,"The Empire and the Peace Treaties 1918-21", in The Cambridge 
History of British Empire". Cambridge 1959, Vol. Ill, p. 660.
3 Ibid, p. 661.
4 See above, note 1, at p. 332.
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W ar Cabinet. The Conference o f 1917 expressed the view that India should be 
represented at all future conferences. A resolution o f the Imperial W ar 
Conference, 1917, referred to the Dominions as "autonomous nations o f an 
Imperial Commonwealth" and to India as "an important portion o f the same".5 
The decision that India should be represented at all future Imperial Conferences, 
the great assistance rendered by her during the war, the resolution just quoted 
above, all had influence on the next step in the evaluation of her international 
status. Thus, when at the Paris Peace Conference special representation was 
given to the four chief Dominions6 in the British Empire delegation, the same 
treatment was accorded to India.7
In the very first meeting of the League o f Nations Commission o f the 
Peace Conference, President Wilson proposed amendment to Article VI o f the 
Hurst-Miller Draft regarding membership o f the proposed world organisation 
and suggested that the Covenant should contain the following: "only self- 
governing states shall be admitted to the membership in the League; Colonies 
enjoying full powers o f self-Government may be admitted.8
The debate on Wilson's proposal took a very wide range. His amendment 
had admitted the self-governing colonies but India had been left out. Lord
5 Report of the Indian Statutory Com m ission. Vol. V, London 1930, p. 1634.
6 Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa.
7 See above, note 5, at p. 1634.
8 Miller, D. H., The Drafting o f the C ovenant New York 1928, p. 157.
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Robert Cecil emphasised the special position o f India and asked that India's
claim for membership should be recognised. He argued:
The President's (Wilson) amendment admits self-governing colonies; 
but what about the Indian Empire? She mobilized a million men and 
made a valuable contribution to the Allied armies... . If the League of 
Nations were to employ words which would arbitrarily exclude India, 
it would be taken by those people as bitter insult. I am free to tell you 
that there is a spirit of unrest abroad in India o f a serious character.
The British Government is trying just as rapidly as possible to advance 
India into a self-governing colony; and for any thing to happen which 
would exclude India would be unfortunate indeed.9
President Wilson admitted that it was indeed hard to define self-Government 
and stated:
For m yself I have great admiration for India's performance. The sprit 
she has shown is fine. Nevertheless, the impression of the whole world 
is that she is not self-governed.10
The difficulty in admitting India, President Wilson pointed out, was that if India
was admitted on any principle, that principle would have to be extended to other
dependent territories, such as Philippines. At the same time he argued that it
would be unwise to admit territories like Philippines to the League.11
At this stage General Smuts, Prime Minister o f South Africa, intervened
in the discussion and pointed out that it was unnecessary to discuss India's case
in such detail for "the Covenant itself takes care o f India".12 He cogently argued
that India could become a member of the League by virtue o f her being a
9 Ibid, p. 164.
10 Ibid, p. 165.
11 Ibid, p. 166.
12 Id.
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signatory to the Peace Treaty (which also included the Covenant o f  the League 
o f Nations) independent o f any condition which might be laid down concerning 
subsequent members and it would not affect her.13
While President Wilson hesitated as to the membership o f India, he did 
not finally object, as Miller observes "no one else seemed to care".14 In this 
manner, in a fit o f virtual absent-mindedness, India became a member o f the 
League o f Nations and an anomaly in international law was created.15
It must always be remembered that India was an original member and not 
an admitted member o f the League. This is not just a distinction without a 
difference; it was o f practical importance in the case o f India. Original members 
acquired membership in the League under Article I, paragraph 1 o f the 
Covenant. This paragraph did not prescribe any specific qualification for 
membership. It merely admitted that "the original members o f the League shall 
be those o f signatories which are named in the Annex to the Covenant". India 
was so named and therefore was an original member o f the League. Mr. David 
Hunter Miller summed up India's membership in the League o f Nations as "an 
anomaly among anomalies".16 And it was indeed so. It was a striking paradox 
without parallel that India enjoyed in theory at least and as a matter o f course,
13 Id.
14 Ibid, p. 165.
13 Sethi, L. R., "India in the Community o f Nations", in Canadian Bar Review, Vol. 
14, 1936, p. 40.
16 See, Miller, D. H., above note 8, at p. 493.
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the sovereign rights o f the Dominions, notwithstanding the fact that it had not 
reached a condition o f complete autonomy even in its internal affairs.
Thus, being a member o f the League o f Nations India became a member 
o f the International Labour Organisation under Article 387 o f the Treaty of 
Versailles in 1919. In spite o f being a political dependency o f Britain, India's 
membership o f the League and the ILO was indeed the first step towards 
elevating its international status in the assemblies o f  the w orld.17 It can be 
argued that India's admission to the League and to the ILO was in a nature of 
a reward for the help it gave in the First W orld War to the Allies.18 It also has 
been said that British Government was motivated by selfish interest, when she 
struggled for India's membership in the ILO, for this would secure the collateral 
support o f India for Britain in her struggle for leadership at Geneva.19
Until 1947, India continued to be a member o f the ILO under British 
colonial rule. But the Indian Independence Act, 1947 passed by the British 
Parliament on 12 July, 1947 which provided that from the fifteenth day of 
August, 1947 two independent Dominions were to be set up in India to be 
known respectively as India and Pakistan.20 The Indian Independence Act raised
17 See, Dhyani, S. N., International Labour Organisation and India. New Delhi 1977,
p. 121.
18 See, Puri, M. M., India in the International Labour Organisation. The Hague 1958, 
p. 29.
19 See, Dhyani, S. N., above note 17, at p. 122.
20 For the Indian Independence Act, 1947, see, The Public General Acts and the 
Church Assembly Measures o f 1947. Vo. 1, Chapter 30, London 1947, pp. 236-255.
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questions o f far-reaching implication from the view point o f international law. 
The Act had brought about the division o f British India into two Dominions, 
India and Pakistan. In the case o f the division o f India, there was no act of 
international law to which India was a party in her international capacity. Nor 
was there anything in the Act, even remotely suggesting that the Dominion o f 
India was a continuation, pure and simple o f India's juristic personality. On the 
contrary, it is manifest from the provisions o f the Act that the territory o f 
British India in its entirety had been partitioned between two Dominions. There 
was no express or implied reservation in the Act that the juristic personality o f 
India would continue. Hence it could reasonably be argued that India had ceased 
to exist in international law and its place had been taken by the Dominions o f 
India and Pakistan.
However, before the date set for this change (15 August, 1947), the 
Secretariat o f the United Nations was obliged to consider the legal consequences 
with regard to membership and representation in the United Nations. In 
substance the following questions were presented: a) Did the division o f India 
result in the extinction o f the member state? Was it, in legal effect, a 
'dismemberment' or merely a succession or breaking away o f a part o f state? b) 
What consequences did the constitutional change, the transfer o f sovereignty, 
have on the status and representation o f the member state? c) What was the 
status o f the new state o f Pakistan? Did it succeed to the rights and obligation 
o f a member under the charter? These questions were answered in a brief legal
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opinion o f the Assistant Secretary-General in charge o f the legal department
which reads as follows:
From the view point o f international law, the situation is one in which 
part o f an existing state breaks off and becomes a new state. On this 
analysis, there is no change in international status o f India; it continues 
as a state with all the treaty rights and obligations, and consequently, 
with all the rights and obligations o f membership in the United 
Nations. The territory which breaks off, Pakistan, will be a new state; 
it will not have the treaty rights and obligations o f the old state, and it 
will not, o f course, have membership in the United Nations.
In international law, the situation is analogous to the 
separation o f the Irish Free State from Great Britain, and o f 
Belgium from the Netherlands. In these cases, the portion which 
separated was considered a new state; the remaining portion 
continued as an existing state with all the rights and duties which 
it had before.21
The opinion did not analyse the facts in the Indian situation but merely 
drew attention to what it considered the analogous situation involved in the 
separation o f the Irish Free State from Great Britain and Belgium from the 
Netherlands.22 It could be argued that the analogy o f the Irish Free State would 
be inapplicable since it came into existence as a result o f a treaty concluded by 
Great Britain in 1921. This was an act o f international law done by Great 
Britain in her capacity as an international person, and there was nothing in the 
Act to prejudice the continuance o f her international personality.23
The position was entirely different in the case o f India. The Dominion
21 United Nations Press Release PM/473, 12th August, 1947.
22 Schachter, O., "The Development o f International Law Through the Legal Opinions 
of the United Nations Secretariat", in British Year Book of International Law, Vol. 
25, 1948, p. 102.
23 Sen, S. D. K., "The Partition o f India and Succession in International Law", in 
Indian Law Review. Vol. 1, 1947, p. 197.
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of Pakistan did not set itself up as an independent state by virtue o f an 
agreement with India. There had been no act o f international law to which India 
had been a party and which was the source o f independence o f the Dominion 
o f Pakistan. The situation would have been totally different if India had become 
a Dominion before the partition and had thereafter agreed to the succession o f 
those areas which were included in the Dominion o f Pakistan. Similar results 
would have followed, if before the passing o f the Indian Independence Act, 
1947 India had with the approval o f  the British parliament, concluded a treaty 
with the seceding areas for the constitution o f a separate state. However, that 
was not the case. Two separate Dominions had been created by virtue o f a 
Statute o f the British Parliament and not by an international agreement to which 
India was a party.
Whatever criticism may be centred against the legal opinion o f the
Secretariat, nevertheless India and Pakistan had considered themselves the
problem o f the devolution o f the international rights and obligations, and arrived
at an agreement. The agreement was promulgated by the Governor-General in
the Schedule to the Indian Independence (International Arrangements) Order,
1947 which provided inter alia:
2 (a) Membership of all international organisations together with the 
rights and obligations attaching to such membership, will devolve 
solely upon the Dominion o f India.
b) The Dominion of Pakistan will take such steps as may be necessary 
to apply for membership o f such international organisation as it
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chooses to jo in .24
Under these provisions it is significant that Pakistan did not succeed to
the membership o f international organisations or the rights and obligations
attaching to such membership but had to apply to become a member o f any
organisation it chose to apply. Thus, it did not become a member of the UN or
the ILO, nor did it succeed to the rights and obligations attached to India by
reason o f its membership in those Organisations.
However, Pakistan applied for membership in the UN immediately on 15
August, 1947 and in accordance with the provisions o f the Charter was admitted
to the United Nations. Similarly on 29 October, 1947, the Foreign Secretary o f
Pakistan applied for the membership in the ILO under paragraph 3 o f Article
1 o f the ILO Constitution.25 The Foreign Secretary in his letter stated:
Pakistan hereby formally accepts the obligations of the Constitution o f 
the International Labour Organisation in accordance with paragraph 3 
o f Article 1 o f the Constitution o f the Organisation and solemnly 
undertakes fully and faithfully to perform each and every of the 
provisions thereof ... . I am to state that the Government of Pakistan 
recognises that the obligation resulting from the International Labour 
Conventions ratified by India prior to 15 August, 1947 continue to be 
binding upon Pakistan in accordance with the terms thereof.26
24 For the Text o f the Agreement see, The Gazette o f India Extraordinary. 1947. pp. 
911-12.
25 Article 1(3) o f the ILO Constitution reads as follows: " Any original member o f the 
United Nations and any state adm itted to membership o f the United Nations by a 
decision of the General Assembly in accordance with the provisions of the Charter 
may become a member of the International Labour Organisation by communicating 
to the Director General of the International Labour Office its formal acceptance o f the 
obligations of the Constitution o f the International Labour Organisation".
26 ILO, Record o f Proceedings. ILC, 30th session, Geneva 1947, p. 529.
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Hence, in accordance with para 3 o f Article 1 o f the Constitution o f the ILO, 
Pakistan became a member o f the Organisation on 31 October, 1947, the date 
o f  the receipt o f the above communications.27
In one sense, the admission o f Pakistan to the ILO was not one o f 
admission o f a new member. Until 15 August, 1947 Pakistan and India 
continued as one entity. On 15 August they agreed to constitute themselves into 
two sovereign states. One chose to continue to call itself by the old name of 
India, which had applied to the whole o f the country and the other elected to 
call itself by the name o f Pakistan. Inasmuch as Pakistan had been a part of 
India, it was in effect under the latter name, a signatory to the Treaty of 
Versailles and an original member o f the ILO. Therefore it can be argued that 
Pakistan was not a new member o f the ILO, but a co-successor to a member 
state which was one o f the founders o f the Organisation.
In 1971, East-Pakistan28 in the name o f Bangladesh declared itself 
independent and after a war of liberation achieved its independence in the same 
year.29 Within a short time of its independence, on 30.5.1972, Bangladesh 
applied to the ILO for membership under Article 1(4) o f the ILO Constitution
27 Id.
28 The State of Pakistan comprised two parts, i.e., East Pakistan and West Pakistan.
29 For independence of Bangladesh see, Chowdhury, S. R., The Genesis of 
Bangladesh. London 1972; Chowdhury, A. K., Independence o f East-Bengal. Dhaka 
1984; Zaheer H., The Separation o f East Pakistan: The Rise and Realization of 
Bengali Muslim Nationalism. Karachi 1994.
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through its foreign minister Mr. Abdus Samad Azad.30 Under Article 1, 
paragraph 3 and 4 o f the ILO Constitution, the procedure for admission o f new 
members differs according to whether a state is, or is not, a member o f the UN. 
In the former case a country may become a member o f the organisation merely 
by communicating to the Director-General its formal acceptance o f the 
obligations o f the Constitution, while in the latter a country is admitted by a 
two-thirds majority vote o f the International Labour Conference. Since the 
People's Republic o f Bangladesh was at that time not a member o f the UN, its 
admission was to be governed by paragraph 4 o f Article 1 o f the Constitution 
o f the Organisation.31
In its letter o f 30 May, 1972 the Government o f Bangladesh 
communicated to the Director General o f International Labour Office the formal 
acceptance by that Government o f the obligations o f the Constitution o f the 
ILO. In the same letter the Government o f Bangladesh recognised that the 
People's Republic o f Bangladesh would remain bound by the obligations o f the 
international labour Conventions which were in effect for its territory at the time 
o f its declaration o f independence.32
30 See above, note 26, 57th Session, Geneva 1972, at p. 301.
31 Article 1(4) of the ILO Constitution reads as follows: "The General Conference of 
the ILO may also admit members to the organisation by vote concurred in by two 
thirds of the delegates attending the session, including two thirds of the Government 
delegates present and voting. Such admission shall take effect on the communication 
to the Director General of the International Labour Office by the Government o f the 
new member o f its formal acceptance o f the obligations o f the Constitution o f the 
organisation".
32 See above, note 26, 57th Session, Geneva 1972, at pp. 301-302.
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In accordance with prescribed procedures, the Selection Committee o f the 
ILO appointed a sub-committee o f two Government members, two employers' 
members and two workers' members to examine the application. After 
consultation with the duly accredited representative o f the People's Republic o f 
Bangladesh the sub-committee recommended to the Selection Committee that 
the People's Republic o f Bangladesh should be admitted to membership.
Thereafter, the report o f  the Selection Committee concerning the 
application o f the Government o f  Bangladesh for admission to membership o f 
the ILO was presented to the Conference by its Chairman who commended the 
resolution for adoption. The report was then open for discussion in the 
Conference.33 The discussion began with the Government delegate o f Pakistan 
who declared that his Government has not recognised the authorities in Dhaka 
and his president Mr. Z. A. Bhutto was making serious and determined efforts 
to find solutions to the problems facing Pakistan and the other peoples o f the 
South-East Asian continent. In these circumstances he requested the Conference 
to kindly appreciate that his delegation was unable to associate with the 
Resolution.34 The Government delegate o f the Libyan Arab Republic endorsed 
the statement made by the Pakistani delegate and proposed to postpone 
consideration o f this matter until the General Assembly o f the United Nations
33 Ibid, at pp. 421-422.
34 Ibid, at p. 422.
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had taken a decision on the Bangladesh issue.35
The Government delegate o f Turkey made the following observation on 
the issue:
I should like first of all to state that the Turkish Government has no 
objection to the admission o f Bangladesh to the organisations belonging 
to the United Nations family. Nor does it question, in principle, its 
admission to the ILO. Nevertheless, the m atter we have to settle now 
is essentially a political issue, and its implications, with no doubt 
whatsoever, go far beyond what is within the competence o f the ILO.
My Government has always held the view that matters relating 
to admission into the UN system, where such admission may have 
political implications should be a matter to be settled by the General 
Assembly o f the United Nations, which by its very nature is the 
political forum par excellence o f this inter governmental system.
Consequently the Government delegation of Turkey believes 
that the question of admission of Bangladesh as a member state of 
organizations in the United Nation system should first o f all be subject 
to a decision by the General Assembly o f the United Nations.36
Despite the observations made in the Conference by the Government delegates
o f Pakistan, the Libyan Arab Republic and Turkey; the Government delegates
o f Australia, Belgium, France, India, Japan, New Zealand, USSR and
Yugoslavia all recommended the admission to membership o f the People's
Republic o f Bangladesh. The Government advisers o f Poland and Venezuela and
the employers' delegate of India and workers' delegate o f Canada also supported
the admission o f Bangladesh.
When the discussion was over, the president o f the 57th session o f the
International Labour Conference, proceeded to a record vote on the adoption
o f the resolution submitted by the Selection Committee. The result o f the vote
35 Ibid, at p. 424.
36 Ibid, at pp. 423-424.
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was as follows: 313 votes in favour, 0 against, with 53 abstentions. The
resolution was therefore adopted on 22 June, 1972 and consequently the
People's Republic o f Bangladesh became a member o f the ILO.
Now the question arises whether Bangladesh's immediate application for
membership was motivated by a wish to respond to labour issues promptly or
by a desire to confirm its standing as a sovereign nation-state? As mentioned
earlier, at the time o f application for membership, the Government o f
Bangladesh notified to the ILO that it would remain bound by the International
Labour Conventions which were in effect for its territory at the time o f
declaration o f independence.37 From this statement can we conclude that the
Government really wished to respond to labour issues promptly? Irrespective o f
the then Government's attitude about labour issues, at this juncture we may take
the view that in applying for membership and committing itself to abide by the
Conventions which were in force at the time o f declaration o f independence, the
then Government was motivated by a desire to confirm its standing as a
sovereign nation-state. The above contention concretises through the statement
which the Director-General o f the International Labour Office registered with
the Secretariat o f the UN reads as follows:
Part o f the regular procedure of admission o f new states to the ILO is 
a declaration by them to the Director General that they recognise that 
they continue to be bound by the obligations arising from the 
provisions o f the International Labour Conventions which their
37 Ibid, at pp. 301-302.
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predecessors have made applicable to their territories.38 
In the case o f International Labour Conventions, which presuppose that 
their contracting parties will be members o f the ILO, membership has been used 
by the organisation as a means o f bringing about succession to Labour 
Conventions. Beginning with Pakistan in 1947, a practice has grown up under 
which every newly independent state makes a declaration recognising that it 
continues to be bound by obligations entered into in respect o f its territory by 
its predecessor.39 This practice, initiated through the Secretariat o f the ILO in 
its early stages, had few exceptions. Sri-Lanka40, Viet-Nam41 and Libya42, 
preferred to declare that they would give early consideration to the formal 
ratification o f the Conventions. But the practice has now become so invariable 
that it has been said to be almost inconceivable that a new state should ever in 
future become a member without recognising itself to be bound by the Labour 
Conventions previously applicable in respect o f its territory.43 This prompts the 
conclusion that the hasty application made by Bangladesh for membership in the 
ILO may well have been motivated by its desire to achieve international
38 Yearbook o f International Law Commission. Vol. II, New York 1962, p. 122.
39 Yearbook o f International Law Commission. Vol. II, Part 1, New York 1974, p.
179.
40 ILO, Official Bulletin. Vol. XXXI, No. 3, 1948, p. 223.
41 Ibid, Vol. XXXIII, No. 5, 1950, pp. 248-51.
42 Ibid, Vol. XXXV, No. 2 , 1952, p. 85.
43 See, United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties.
United Nations 1979, Vol. Ill, p. 10.
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recognition and acceptance rather than to respond to the labour issues promptly.
From the above discussion it is also apparent that given the nature of
colonial rule and Pakistani rule, the then Government o f Bangladesh had no
scope to express its concern about the appropriateness o f the obligations which
it undertook without any reservations and further could not give any thought of
renouncing any o f the ILO Conventions which were in force at the time of
independence as it could be detrimental to her membership and even could
make it impossible.
Having discussed the membership o f Bangladesh in the ILO, we will
now proceed to discuss the issue o f succession44 to the ILO Conventions which
were in force in the territory o f Bangladesh before its independence. The treaty
practice appears to confirm that, on making a notification o f succession a newly
independent state is to be considered as a party to the treaty from the date of
independence.45 The Secretariat (UN) memorandum on 'succession o f states in
relation to general multilateral treaties' o f which the Secretary-General is the
depository comments on this point as follows:
In general, new states that have recognised that they continue to be 
bound by treaties have considered themselves bound from the time of 
their attainment o f independence. With regard to International Labour 
Conventions, however, it is the custom for new states to consider 
themselves bound as o f the date on which they are admitted to the
^For state succession see, O 'Connell, D. P., State Succession in Municipal Law and 
International Law. Vol. I & II, Cambridge 1967; United Nations, M aterials on 
Succession o f States. New York 1967, Crawford, J., The Creation of States in 
International Law. Oxford 1979.
45 See above, note 39, at p. 233.
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International Labour Organisation.46 
The statement in the Secretariat memorandum quoted above regarding the 
Labour Conventions needs a word o f explanation. Notifications o f succession 
to Labour Conventions take the form o f declaration o f continuity which are 
made in connection with the new state's acceptance of, or admission to, the 
membership o f the ILO and the date o f their registration with the United 
Nations Secretariat is that o f its acquisition o f membership. Equally, the date o f 
the entry into force is the date o f its acquisition o f its membership, since that 
is the date on which its declaration o f continuity takes effect and establishes its 
consent to be bound by the Convention. However, in the practice o f the ILO,
a state which makes a declaration o f continuity is thereafter considered as a
party to the Convention concerned as from the date o f its independence.47
It appears that the ILO, deeply committed to the promotion o f social 
justice as embodied in the Preamble to its Constitution, recognises that an 
abrupt discontinuity o f relevant Labour Conventions in the territory o f a new 
state on account o f its newly acquired sovereignty would indeed be detrimental 
to the concept o f human rights.48 Strangely enough, when the ILO Constitution 
was amended in 1946, no provision was made regarding the admission o f new 
states to which International Labour Conventions had been applied, despite the
46 See above, note 38, at p. 126.
47 See above, note 39, at p. 234.
48 Udokang. P .. Succession of New States to International Treaties. New York 1972, 
p. 244.
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fact that some colonial territories were already on the verge o f achieving full
independence. However, in 1951 the International Labour Office emphasised:
In a number o f cases Conventions are regarded as binding on Members 
o f the Organisation in virtue of the principle o f state succession; ... In 
so far as they may involve any qualifications o f the ordinary rules in 
regard to state succession they tend to suggest that there are special 
considerations which give international labour Conventions a more 
durable character than treaty engagements o f a purely contractual 
nature.49
Although this statement in itself had no obligatory force, it seems to represent 
the growing concern o f the organisation with the pressing problem o f state 
succession as a result o f the creation o f a large number o f new states after the 
Second W orld War.
However, in the process o f membership in the ILO and acceptance o f 
international obligations thereof, the Government o f Bangladesh succeeded to 
all the Conventions that were in force in the territory at the time o f 
independence. It is apparent that the newly independent Government o f 
Bangladesh, in order to become a member o f the Organisation, had to accept the 
obligations in respect o f Conventions that existed before independence. Though 
the acceptance o f prior obligations was in a nature o f succession to Conventions 
but under the practice and procedure o f the ILO, the obligations were 
undertaken by the Government by means o f submitting new instrument o f 
ratification. Thus, the Government inter alia ratified Conventions Nos. 11, 87
49 ILO, "Explanatory Note", in The International Labour Code 195L Geneva 1952, 
Vol. I, p. XCVIII.
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and 98 dealing with right o f association which will be detailed in the discussion 
below.
2.2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE ILO CONVENTIONS ON FREEDOM OF 
ASSOCIATION
The development o f a system o f international labour standards was the 
principal purpose behind the creation o f the ILO.30 The significance o f ILO 
standard-setting stems from the organisation's aims and purposes. The problem 
of freedom o f association is vital to the very existence and functioning o f the 
ILO and has been in the forefront o f its activities ever since its foundation. The 
reasons which have caused the ILO to concern itself from the very beginning 
with the problem o f freedom o f association are fundamental to its very 
Constitution.31
The part played by associations o f workers and o f employers, both in the 
settlement o f wages and conditions o f labour and in the economic and social 
organisation o f modern states, appeared so essential to the authors o f Part XIII 
o f the Versailles Peace Treaty that they based the Constitution o f the ILO not 
only on states - in accordance with traditional diplomatic practice o f treaty
30 ILO, Report of the Director General. ILC, 70th session, 1984, p. 3.
2,1 For the history o f the establishment o f the ILO and its functioning, see, Shotwell, 
J. T., (ed.), The Origins o f the International Labour Organisation. (2 Vols.), New York 
1934; Wilson, F. G., Labour in the League System. California 1934; ILO, The 
International Labour Oruanisation: The First Decade. London 1931; Alcock, A., 
History of the International Labour Organisation. London 1971.
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making - but also on the autonomous organised forces o f labour and industry.52 
Moreover, they took the view that the accomplishment o f the task which thus 
devolved on the employers' and workers' organisations, not only on the national 
but also on the international plane, required full and complete recognition of 
freedom o f association.33
It is for these reasons that the Preamble to the Constitution o f the ILO 
expressly declares recognition o f the principle o f freedom o f association to be 
one o f the means o f improving the conditions o f the workers and o f securing 
peace. Article 41 paragraph 2 o f the Constitution in its original form included 
among the principles o f special and urgent importance "the right o f association 
for all lawful purposes by the employed as well as by the employers".34 When 
the aims and purposes o f the ILO were restated in the Declaration o f 
Philadelphia in 1944, the International Labour Conference reaffirmed as one o f 
the fundamental principles on which the ILO is based that "freedom of 
expression and association are essential to sustained progress". Among the 
programmes which it is the solemn obligation o f the ILO to further, the 
Declaration referred in Article III, paragraph (e) to "the effective recognition of
52 ILO, Freedom of Association and Industrial Relations. Geneva 1947, p. 13.
53 Id.
34 See, The Constitution and Rules of the International Labour Organisation. Montreal 
1944, p. 19. The Constitution o f the ILO was amended in 1946. For details, see, 
Jenks, C. W., "The Revision o f the Constitution of the International Labour 
Organisation", in British Year Book of International Law, Vol. XXIII, 1946, pp. 402- 
428.
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the right o f  collective bargaining". The terms o f  the Declaration o f Philadelphia 
were incorporated in the Constitution o f the ILO in 1946.55
The affirmations o f principle contained in the Constitution o f the ILO 
have since been echoed in a num ber o f international and regional instruments 
relating to human rights. Provisions on freedom o f association are included in 
several UN instruments, i.e., the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights, 1948 
(Article 20 and 23 paragraph 4); the International Covenant on Economic Social 
and Cultural Rights, 1966 (Article 8) and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, 1966 (Article 22). Among the regional instruments 
containing provisions on freedom o f  association are the American Declaration 
o f the Rights and Duties o f Men, 1948, adopted at the Ninth International 
Conference o f American states in Bogota (Article 22); the American Convention 
on Human Rights, 1967, (Article 16); the European Convention for the 
Protection o f Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950 (Article 11) and 
the European Social Charter, 1961 (Part II, Article 5 and 6), both o f which were 
adopted within the Council o f Europe. A number o f instruments mentioned 
above refer the right to strikes (e.g. the International Covenant on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights and the European Social Charter) or to other matters 
related to freedom o f association such as collective bargaining (e.g. the 
European Social Charter). The most recent o f  regional human rights instruments 
i.e., the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights also contains provisions
55 See, Jenks, C. W., above note 54, at pp. 402-428.
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on the right to freedom o f association (Article 10).56
While the terms o f various instruments referred to above are by no means 
identical, they are all expressions o f the same fundamental conviction expressed 
with memorable simplicity in the Declaration o f Philadelphia, that "freedom of 
expression and o f association are essential to sustained progress". According to 
C.W. Jenks:
The principle o f freedom of association must therefore be regarded as 
having taken its place among "the general principles o f law recognised 
by civilised nations" which, together with "international Conventions, 
whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognised 
by the consenting states" and "international custom, as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law" are indicated in Article 38 of the 
Statute o f the International Court o f  Justice51 among the sources of law 
to be applied by the Court.38
The first formal recognition o f the principle o f freedom of association in 
an international labour Convention is the Right o f Association (Agriculture) 
Convention, 1921 (No. 11) which we will discuss later in this chapter.
There were several attempts to adopt a more comprehensive instrument 
on freedom o f association in the course o f the 1920s, but these foundered on the 
rocks o f disagreement between the employer and worker groups as to whether
56 Although the above mentioned international and regional instalm ents recognise the 
right o f association, they are less detailed than that o f the ILO Conventions on 
freedom of association. In addition, the machinery for supervising their application, 
if  any, is less well developed than the ILO machinery. For an account of the ILO 
Conventions on the right to freedom of association and its supervisory machinery, see 
below, pp. 45-59 and pp. 182-189 respectively.
57 Italics added.
38 Jenks, C. W., "The International Protection o f Freedom of Association for Trade 
Union Purposes", in Recueil Des Cours. Vol. 87, 1955, pp. 30-31.
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the right to form and join a trade union should be accompanied by a correlative 
right not to join.59 According to John Price,60 ’’with the growth o f totalitarianism 
it was not possible to secure a Convention applicable to all workers in general 
until after the second W orld W ar".61 The aftermath o f the second World W ar 
provided a rather more propitious environment for the international recognition 
o f trade union rights.62 Thus in 1947, the ILC adopted the Right o f Association 
(Non-M etropolitan Territories) Convention (No. 84). This was followed in 1948 
by the Freedom o f Association and Protection o f the Right to Organise 
Convention (No. 87), and in 1949 by the Right to Organise and Collective 
Bargaining Convention (No. 98). O f all international and regional instruments 
ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 provide more comprehensive protection for 
the right to organise and to engage in collective bargaining than any other 
instrument. Since 1949, the International Labour Conference has adopted a 
number o f further standards dealing with various aspects o f freedom o f 
association. These include: the Workers' Representatives Convention, 1971 (No. 
135); the Rural Workers' Organisations Convention, 1975 (No. 141); the Labour 
Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978 (No. 151) and the Collective
39 Creighton, W. B.,"Principles and Procedures of the ILO Relating to Freedom of 
Association" in Interights Bulletin, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1991, p. 3.
60 John Price acted as special assistant to the Director-General o f the ILO between 
1959-62 with special responsibility for conducting studies of the trade union situation 
in the member countries.
61 Price, J., ILO: 50 Years O n. London 1969, p. 7.
62 See, Creighton, W. B., above note 59, at p. 3.
43
Bargaining Convention, 1981 (No. 154). In general terms these measures do not
break new ground, rather they complement the standards already embodied in
Conventions Nos. 87 and 98.
Guy Caire, Professor o f Economics at the University o f Paris, while
ascertaining the role o f international standards stated:
As a legal standard, an international Convention must fulfil certain 
conditions if  it is to ensure the promotion o f a universal set o f values: 
the right to be protected must reflect a widely shared set of 
expectations among significant actors, Governmental and non- 
Govemmental, although these expectations need not be identical; it 
must be general in nature so as to be capable o f triggering activity and 
demands in social and economic fields close to, but not identical with, 
the original area of concern; the right to be protected must nevertheless 
be specific to permit investigation and rational evaluation o f charges of 
violations; it must be important enough to be valued by its constituency 
apart from and beyond the particular political context o f the time and 
place; and it must be protected by international machinery. Freedom of 
Association fulfils all these conditions.63
It is a right which broadly reflects the expectations o f the social actors since the
two basic Conventions on the subject were adopted by very large majorities
(127 votes to 0, with 11 abstentions, in the case o f Convention No. 87; 115
votes to 10, with 25 abstentions, in the case o f Convention No. 98) and are
currently those which have been most widely ratified.04 Thus, freedom of
association has a unique place among the basic human rights and freedoms o f
concern to the ILO. It is an essential pre-requisite for progress towards social
justice; it enables the workers to give expression to their aspirations; it
63 Caire, G., Freedom of Association and Economic Development. Geneva 1977, p. 
135; See, also, Haas, E. B., Human Rights and International Action: The Case of 
Freedom of Association. California 1970, pp. 20-23.
64 See above, chapter 1, note 14 , p. 12.
44
strengthens their position in collective bargaining by re-establishing a balance 
in the strength o f the parties; it constitutes a healthy counter-weight to the 
power o f the state by enabling labour to participate in the framing and carrying 
out o f economic and social policies.65
We will now proceed to outline the basic provisions o f the international 
labour Conventions on freedom o f association.
The Right o f Association (Agriculture) Convention, 1921 (No. 11)
The first international Convention specifically concerned with freedom
of association was the Right o f Association (Agriculture) Convention, 1921. The
Convention in Article 1 provided:
Each m ember o f the International Labour Organisation which ratifies 
this Convention undertakes to secure to all those engaged in agriculture 
the same rights o f association and combination as to industrial workers 
and to repeal any statutory provisions restricting such rights in the case 
o f those engaged in agriculture.
While prohibiting discrimination against agricultural workers, as compared with
industrial workers, it did not contain any substantive definition of the rights o f
association and combination o f agricultural workers. The object o f the
Convention was obviously to remove an inequality, yet it can be said that the
Convention did not by itself guarantee any basic freedom, since 'the same rights'
might be no rights at all, or rights that were severely circumscribed.66 Put
63 See, ILO, International Labour Standards. Geneva 1980, p. 73.
66 ILO, International Labour Standards: A W orkers Education M anual, Geneva 1990, 
p. 19.
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simply, if municipal law denied full freedom o f association to industrial 
workers, it would be perfectly compatible with the Convention also to deny 
such freedom to agricultural workers so long they were not placed in any worse 
position than their colleagues in industry.
However, this Convention proved in certain cases to be o f considerable 
practical importance as it resulted in extending the workers in agriculture trade 
union rights which were previously recognised only to those in industry.
The Freedom o f Association and Protection o f the Right to Organize 
Convention, 1948 (No. 87)
At its Fourth session (February-March, 1947) the Economic and Social 
Council o f the UN was called upon to examine the question o f guarantees of 
the exercise and development o f trade union rights which had been referred to 
it by the W orld Federation o f Trade Unions67 and the American Federation o f 
Labour.68 The Economic and Social Council referred this question to the ILO, 
under the terms o f the Agreement between the United Nations and the 
International Labour Organisation.69 Accordingly, the question of'freedom  of 
association and industrial relations' was put in the agenda o f the 30th session o f
67 For the text o f the Memorandum, see, Economic and Social Council: E. C. 2/21, 
28th February, 1947 (original in French), p. 2.
68 For the text o f the Memorandum, see, Economic and Social Council: E.C. 2/32, 
13th March, 1947 (original in English), pp. 5-8.
69 For text o f the Agreement, see, ILO, Official Bulletin. Vol. XXIX, No. 4, 15th 
November, 1946, p. 293.
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the Conference which opened in Geneva on 19th June, 1947, ultimately leading 
to the adoption by the International Labour Conference o f the Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87).
The Freedom o f Association and Protection o f the Right to Organise 
Convention, 1948 (No. 87) is the basic instrument for the international 
protection o f the freedom o f association. It deals, on the one hand, with the 
rights o f  employers and workers to establish trade organisations and, on the 
other, with rights and guarantees which such organisations should enjoy. The 
Convention in Article 2 provides that the workers and employers without 
distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the 
rules o f the organisation concerned, to join organisations o f their own choosing 
without previous authorisation. The scope o f this provision is very wide, as it 
refers in particular to workers 'without distinction whatsoever'. It is clear beyond 
any doubt that the right to organise applies to all employers and workers, public 
or private, and therefore to public servants and official and to workers in 
nationalised industries, who are all entitled to defend their right by becoming 
organised.70
The 1947 Conference Committee, during the discussion o f what 
subsequently became in 1948 this provision o f the Convention, stressed in its 
report that according to this provision 'freedom o f association was to be 
guaranteed not only to employers and workers in private industry, but also to
70 ILO, Freedom of Association: A Workers Education M anual. Geneva 1987, p. 23.
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public employers and without distinction or discrimination o f any kind as to 
occupation, sex, colour, race, creed, nationality or political opinion.71 The armed 
forces and the police are under Article 9 the only category in respect o f  which 
the Convention leaves countries free to determine the extent to which the 
Convention shall apply.
By virtue o f Article 2 o f the Convention, workers and employers have 
the right to establish organisations 'without previous authorisation'. The 
Convention thus guarantees to the founders o f a trade union the right to 
establish their organisations without being required by the public authorities to 
obtain previous authorisation. The more or less detailed formalities usually 
prescribed by the law for the establishment o f occupational organisations have 
to be considered in the light o f this principle.72
It may be recalled that Article 2 o f the Convention states that employers 
and workers have the right "to establish and, subject only to the rules o f the 
organisation concerned, to join organisations o f their own choosing". W hen it 
refers to 'organisations o f their own choosing' the Convention requires that there 
should be freedom o f choice as to the organisations which workers, in 
particular, may wish to establish or which they may wish to join. Any legal 
provision which would limit or refuse such freedom o f choice at the plant or at 
the occupational or national level would be at variance with the basic principle
71 See above, note 26, at p. 570.
72 See above, note 70, at p. 29.
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o f the Convention.73
The reference to 'organisations o f their own choosing' was intended to 
take account o f the fact that in a number o f countries where there are several 
organisations representative o f workers and employers among which those 
concerned are able to choose on occupational or political grounds; it was not 
intended to express any view on the question whether trade union unity or a 
plurality o f unions is preferable in the interests o f workers and employers.74 
Although it is not the purpose o f the Convention to make trade union diversity 
an obligation, the Convention requires this diversity to remain possible.75 The 
term 'organisation' in Article 2 is defined in Article 10 as meaning any 
organisation o f workers and employers for furthering and defending the interests 
o f workers and employers.
Having dealt with the rights o f the workers and employers to establish 
organisations, the Convention defines the rights and guarantees which these 
organisations should enjoy and specifies in Article 3 (2) that "public authorities 
shall refrain from any interference which would restrict this right or impede the 
lawful exercise th ereo f'. The Convention provides in Article 3(1)  that "workers' 
and employers' organisations shall have the right to draw up their Constitutions
73 See, Valticos, N., International Labour Law . Deventer 1979, p. 82.
74 See, Jenks, C. W., The International Protection o f Trade Union Freedom, London 
1957, p. 25.
75 See, ILO, Report o f the Committee o f Experts. 1973, (Vol. 4B), paras 68-78, pp. 
29-33; and 1977, paras 63-64, p. 22.
and rules, to elect their representatives in full freedom, to organise their 
administration and activities and to formulate their programmes".
The right o f organisations to function freely is stated in the Convention 
in very general terms; it makes no attempt to list the basic elements of such 
freedom in detail or to indicate the forms o f interference by the public 
authorities which would restrict the right or impede the lawful exercise thereof. 
Among the questions not particularised in the Convention on which this general 
provision has an important bearing may be mentioned as the financial and 
administrative control o f  organisations, freedom o f meeting and publication and 
freedom from arbitrary arrest and search.
The most difficult question to be dealt with in the Convention was that 
o f the relationship between freedom o f association and the obligation to respect 
the law o f the land. The difficulty o f the matter is apparent; on the one hand, 
no state could be expected to accept right o f association which is not qualified 
by an obligation to respect the law o f the land; on the other hand, there ceases 
to be any international obligation or guarantee o f freedom of association if the 
extent of the right o f association is determined by the national law. The 
difficulty was overcome by Article 8(1)  which provides that "in exercising the 
rights provided for in this Convention, workers and employers and their 
respective organisations, like other persons or organised activities, shall respect 
the law o f the land" but at the same time Article 8 (2) lays down that "the law 
shall not be such as to impair, nor shall not be so applied as to impair the
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guarantees provided for in this Convention".
The Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98)
In 1946, the Third Conference of the American States members o f the 
ILO adopted a resolution in Mexico setting out the acts o f discrimination by an 
employer that should be prohibited by national law: making the hiring of a 
worker subject to a particular trade union status, or exerting pressure to ensure 
this, and prejudicing, injuring or dismissing a worker because o f his union 
membership or activity.76
These basic aspects o f the right to organise were confirmed three years 
later at the worldwide level by the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention, 1949 (No. 98), which in Article 1 set out the essential principle in 
terms almost identical with those o f the Mexico resolution but making a 
distinction between union activities outside working hours and those within
76 The Mexico Resolution Concerning Protection of the Right to Organise and to 
Bargain Collectively, 1946 reads as follows:
"In view o f the fact that the individual worker's right to organise may be put in 
jeopardy by discriminatory measure directed against him at the time o f hiring or 
during tenure of em ployment, the law should particularly prohibit on the part o f the 
employer or his agents all acts designed to -
(a) make the hiring of the worker subject to the expressed condition that he does not 
join a certain trade union or withdraws from a trade union o f which he is already a 
member;
(b) prejudice or injure in any manner whatsoever a worker on account of his being a 
member, agent or official o f a certain trade union;
(c) dismiss a worker for the sole reason that he is a member, agent or official o f a 
certain trade union;
(d) in general, exert any kind o f pressure upon the worker with the object of 
compelling him to join or not to join a certain trade union".
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working hours. The Convention provides that workers shall enjoy adequate 
protection against acts o f anti-union discrimination in respect of their 
employment. Such protection, as Article 1 details, is to apply more particularly 
in respect o f acts calculated to make the employment o f a worker subject to the 
condition that he shall not join a union or shall relinquish trade union 
membership, or to cause the dismissal o f  or otherwise prejudice a worker by 
reason o f union membership or because o f participation in union activities out 
side working hours or, with the consent o f the employer, within working hours. 
This provision aims at protecting workers and trade union leaders against 
victimisation by the employers both at the time o f taking up employment and 
in the course o f their employment relationship.
Another aim o f the Convention is protection, primarily o f trade unions, 
against acts o f interference, although the matter is mentioned in respect o f both 
workers' and employers' organisations. According to Article 2, "workers' and 
employers' organisations shall enjoy adequate protection against any acts o f 
interference by each other or each other's agents as members in their 
establishment, functioning or administration". In particular, acts designed to 
promote the establishment o f workers' organisations by financial or other means, 
with the object o f placing such organisations under the control o f employers or 
employers' organisations are described as constituting such acts o f interference.
To ensure respect for the above provisions, Article 3 provides that 
machinery appropriate to national conditions shall be established where
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necessary. Moreover, in order to create conditions for successful voluntary 
negotiation between employers and workers, it is provided in Article 4 o f the 
Convention, that "measures appropriate to national conditions shall be taken, 
when necessary, to encourage and promote the full development and utilisation 
o f machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers and employers' 
organisations and workers' organisations, with a view to regulation o f terms and 
conditions o f employment by means o f collective agreements".
Unlike Convention No. 87 which applies to workers in both the private 
and public sectors, without distinction, and also to public servants, Convention 
No. 98 does not deal with the position o f public servants engaged in the 
administration o f the state and specifies in Article 6 that it is not to be construed 
as prejudicing their rights or status in any way. At the time o f adoption o f 
Convention No. 98, it was agreed that this instrument should not be interpreted 
as authorising or prohibiting union security agreements, such questions being 
matters for regulations in accordance with national practice.77 In consequence, 
the legal systems which permit the conclusion o f union security clauses are not 
to be deemed to be contrary to the Convention no. 98 and nor are those which 
prohibit such practices in pursuance o f the principle o f freedom o f non­
association.78 The Convention contains the same provisions as the 1948 
Convention (No. 87), leaving it to national laws or regulations to determine the
77 See above, note 26, 32nd Session, Geneva 1949, p. 468.
78ILO, ILO Principles, Standards and Procedures Concerning Freedom of Association, 
Geneva 1989, p. 4.
53
extent to which the guarantees provided by the Convention would apply to the 
armed forces and the police.79
The W orkers’ Representative Convention, 1971 (No. 135)
Freedom o f Association can not be fully implemented if it is not 
recognised at the plant level as well as the national or occupational level. This 
explains the adoption in 1971, o f this Convention which is supplementary to the 
terms o f the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949. The 
Convention in Article 1 provides that workers' representative in the undertaking 
shall enjoy effective protection against any act prejudicial to them, including 
dismissal, based on their status or activities as a workers' representative or on 
union membership or participation in union activities, in so far as they act in 
conformity with laws or collective agreements or other jointly agreed 
agreements.
The term workers' representatives is defined in Article 3 as meaning 
persons who are recognised as such under national law or practice, whether they 
are trade union representatives or elected representatives, and adds in Article 4 
that national laws or regulations, collective agreements, arbitration awards or 
court decisions may determine the type and types o f workers' representatives 
which shall be entitled to the protection and facilities provided for in this 
Convention.
79 See, Article 5 of Convention No. 98.
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The Rural Workers' Organisations Convention, 1975 (No. 141)
This Convention was adopted to take account o f the difficulties 
experienced by rural workers in exercising their trade union rights. In principle, 
the workers should be able to join trade unions o f their own choosing, but in 
practice this is not always the case; more or less overt restrictions are often 
imposed in case o f rural workers. The Convention provides that the principles 
o f freedom o f association shall be fully respected and reaffirms the main 
principles o f Convention No. 87. It adds that it shall be an objective o f national 
policy concerning rural development to facilitate the establishment and growth, 
on a voluntary basis, o f strong and independent organisations o f rural workers 
as an effective means o f ensuring the participation o f rural workers, without 
discrimination, in economic and social development and in the benefits resulting 
therefrom.80 The main purpose o f Convention No. 141 is to strengthen the role 
of rural workers' organisations in economic and social development.
The Convention further provides that in order to enable organisations o f 
rural workers to play their role in economic and social development, each 
member which ratifies this Convention shall adopt and carry out a policy o f 
active encouragement to these organisations, particularly with a view to 
eliminate obstacles to their establishment, their growth and the pursuit o f their 
lawful activities, as well as such legislative and administrative discrimination
80 See, Article 4 o f Convention No. 141.
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against rural workers' organisations and their members as may exist.81
The Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978 (No. 151)
The right o f association which is embodied in Article 2 o f the 
Convention No. 87 is seldom refused; but is often subject to restrictions, 
especially to the detriment o f public servants. This shortcoming led to the 
adoption o f the Convention concerning protection o f the right to organise and 
procedures for determining conditions o f employment in the public service. The 
Convention contains provisions on the protection o f public servants against acts 
o f anti-union discrimination in matters o f employment and measures by public 
authorities designed to place these categories o f workers under their control. It 
thus dealt with the problem occasioned by the exclusion from the ambit o f 
Convention No. 98 o f public servants engaged in the administration o f state.
The provisions o f this Convention concerning anti-union discrimination 
are analogous to those o f the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention, 1949 (No. 98). The Convention in Article 4 provides in particular 
that such protection shall apply more particularly in respect o f acts calculated 
to: a) make the employment o f public employees subject to the condition that 
they shall not join or shall relinquish membership o f public employees' 
organisation; b) cause the dismissal o f or otherwise prejudice a public employee 
by reason o f membership o f a public employees' organisation or because o f
81 See, Article 5 o f Convention No. 141.
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participation in the normal activities o f such an organisation. The Convention 
further provides that public employees’ organisations shall enjoy complete 
independence from public authorities and shall enjoy adequate protection against 
any acts o f interference by a public authority in their establishment, functioning 
or administration.82
The Convention also deals with appropriate facilities which should be 
afforded to the representatives o f recognised public employees' organisations to 
enable them to carry out their functions promptly and efficiently, both during 
and outside working hours. The granting o f such facilities should not impair the 
efficient operation o f the administration or service concerned.83 The Convention 
also provides with procedures for determining terms and conditions o f 
employment and with the settlement o f disputes through negotiations between 
the parties, or through independent and impartial machinery, such as mediation, 
conciliation and arbitration, established in such a manner as to ensure the 
confidence o f the parties involved.84 Finally it provides that public employees 
shall have, as other workers, the civil and political rights which are essential for 
the freedom o f association, subject only to the obligations arising from their 
status and the nature o f their functions.85
82 See, Article 5 o f Convention No. 151.
83 See, Article 6 o f Convention No. 151.
84 See, Article 8 o f Convention No. 151.
85 See, Article 9 o f Convention No. 151.
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The C ollective Bargaining C onvention, 1981 (No. 154)
The most recent instrument on the subject o f collective bargaining is the 
Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981. The reasons for adoption o f this 
Convention as the Preamble says is to make greater efforts to achieve the 
objectives o f these standards and particularly the general principles set out in 
Article 4 o f the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949. 
For the purpose o f this Convention the term 'collective bargaining' extends to 
all negotiations which take place between an employer, a group o f employers 
or one or more employers' organisations, on the one hand, and one or more 
workers' organisations on the other, for a) determining working conditions and 
terms o f employment; b) regulating relations between employers and workers; 
c) regulating relations between employers or their organisations and the workers' 
organisation or workers organisations.86
Article 5 o f the Convention specifies that measures adapted to national 
conditions should be taken with a view to: a) making collective bargaining 
possible for all employers and all groups o f workers in the branches o f activity 
covered by the Convention; b) extending collective bargaining progressively to 
all matters relating to working conditions, terms o f employment and relations 
between employers and workers or their organisations; c) encouraging the 
establishment o f rules o f procedure agreed between employers and workers 
organisations; d) not hampering collective bargaining by the absence o f the rules
86 See, Article 2 of Convention No. 154.
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governing the procedure to be used or by the inadequacy or inappropriateness 
o f  such rules; e) ensuring that bodies and procedures for the settlement o f labour 
disputes are so conceived as to contribute to the promotion o f collective 
bargaining.
2.3 INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF BANGLADESH UNDER THE ILO 
CONSTITUTION
The Constitution o f the ILO is binding on all member states including 
Bangladesh through creating certain obligations, irrespective o f whether or not 
the Government has ratified a particular Convention. These are, the obligation 
to submit the Conventions and Recommendations before the national 'competent 
authority'; the obligation to submit reports on ratified Conventions and the 
obligation to supply reports on un-ratified Conventions and Recommendations.
Submission o f Conventions and Recommendations to National Competent 
Authorities
When the system o f international labour standards was set up in 1919, 
a general desire to make the ILO Conventions particularly effective and to give 
them a greater impact than traditional diplomatic treaties led to the introduction 
in the Constitution o f the ILO (now Article 19, paras 5 to 7) o f a rule which 
was new to international law. This rule represented a compromise between the 
position o f those delegations who wanted the Conventions to have a mandatory
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character as soon as they were adopted and those who argued in favour o f 
national sovereignty and the competence o f parliaments.87 Under this rule 
whenever the International Labour Conference has adopted any new Convention 
or Recommendation, any member state must bring the Convention and 
Recommendation before the authority or authorities within whose competence 
the matter lies, within a time limit o f one year or, in exceptional circumstances 
18 months88. There is a further obligation to inform the Director General o f the 
ILO o f the measures taken to bring the Convention or Recommendation before 
the authority or authorities regarded as competent and o f the action taken by 
them.89
The obligation o f submission is, however, unequivocal and unqualified 
and the extent to which it is satisfactorily discharged is regularly reviewed by 
the International Labour Conference during its annual examinations o f 
information concerning such submission received from Governments.90 This 
provision is reinforced by the provisions o f Article 30 o f the ILO Constitution 
which authorises a member to report to the Governing Body the failure o f  any 
other member to bring a Convention or recommendation before its competent 
authorities.91 It should be mentioned that Conventions and recommendations
87 Valticos, N., above note 73, at p. 225.
88 See, Article 19, paras 5(b) and 6(b) o f the ILO Constitution.
89 See, Article 19, paras 5(c) and 6(c) o f the ILO Constitution.
90 See, Jenks, C. W., above note 70, at p. 144.
91 See, Article 19(5)(c), 19(6)(c), 19(7)(b)(iii) o f the ILO Constitution.
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should be submitted to the competent authorities in all cases and not only when 
the ratification o f a Convention appears possible or when it is deemed advisable 
to give effect to the provisions o f a recommendation.
A memorandum prepared by the Governing Body o f the ILO defines92 
the term 'competent authority' as meaning the authority which has legislative 
power in the matters dealt with by the Convention in question, and which is 
obviously the legislative authority, defined most often as the National Assembly 
in the Constitution or Fundamental Law o f the country concerned. It invites 
member states to make known which authority is to be considered the 
'competent authority' pursuant to their national legislation, and states that a clear 
distinction should be drawn between 'submission' and 'ratification'. The 
provisions in Article 19 do not oblige the Governments to ratify the 
Conventions. The purpose o f this provision is to ensure that effect is given to 
the Conventions by bringing these instruments before the competent authorities 
and consequently also before public opinion.93
Further, the purpose o f this rule appears to be that it would avoid the 
danger o f Conventions and Recommendations being buried or rejected without 
due consideration or even being simply forgotten by Governments. It should be 
noted that if Conventions and Recommendations are thus put before the
92 See, in this connection the memorandum on 'The Nature o f the Competent Authority 
Contemplated by Article 19 o f the Constitution o f the International Labour 
Organisation', in ILO, Official Bulletin. 1944, pp. 205-221.
93 Bokor-Szego, H., The Role of the United Nations in International Legislation, New 
York 1978, p. 160.
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legislative authority capable o f authorising the necessary measures to give effect 
to them, public attention is drawn to the matter, which may in turn act as a spur 
to those required to take a decision.
This obligation, independent o f the fact o f ratification is an innovation 
differing from the classical rules o f international law.94 It is beyond question 
that this innovation has found followers. A rule corresponding in part to the one 
just described appears in the last sentence o f Article IV, paragraph 4, o f the 
Constitution o f United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO) which provides that Conventions and Recommendations adopted by 
the General Conference shall be submitted to the competent national authorities 
within one year after their adoption.95 As to the Constitution o f the W orld 
Health Organisation (WHO), the first part o f  Article 20 requires member states 
to take such measure regarding the acceptance o f Convention within eighteen 
months after the date o f their adoption.96
The Obligation to Supply Reports on Ratified Conventions
Since ratification is an act through which a Convention creates binding
94 Id.
95 See, Constitution o f the UNESCO, in International Organisation and Integration. 
Hague 1982, Vol. I. B., p. 1.4.a(3). The text o f the passage in question reads as 
follows: "Each o f the Member States shall submit Recommendations or Conventions 
to its competent authorities within a period o f one year from the close o f the session 
o f the General Conference at which they were adopted".
96 Ibid, p. 1.5.a(5). Article 20 states "Each Member undertakes that it will, within 
eighteen months after the adoption by the Health Assembly of a Convention or 
agreement, take action relative to the acceptance o f such Convention or agreement".
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legal obligations for member states, one o f the main purposes o f the system o f 
International Labour Standards is their ultimate ratification.97 However, it is 
within the discretion o f the competent authority o f the member states to grant 
or withhold its approval o f any Convention. But if the consent o f the 'authority' 
is obtained it has obligation to communicate the formal ratification o f the 
Convention to the Director General and to take such action as may be necessary 
to make effective the provisions o f the Convention.98 The constitutional 
obligation o f a country with respect to a Convention does not terminate with the 
ratification o f the Convention and its undertaking to make the Convention 
effective. It is required to submit annual reports on ratified Conventions, in such 
form and containing such particulars as the Governing Body may request.99
When the ratification required to bring a Convention into force has been 
registered, the ILC submits to the Governing Body for its approval a draft form 
of annual report for the Convention. When approved by the Governing Body, 
this form becomes the standard form o f the annual report for the Convention 
prescribed by the Governing Body under Article 22 o f the Constitution and 
Bangladesh being bound by the Convention is under a legal obligation to furnish 
the particulars o f the measures which it has taken to give effect to its obligation 
which are specified in the form. Each report form contains both general
97 Wolf., F., "Human Rights and the International Labour Organisation", in Human 
Rights in International Law. Meron, T., (ed.), New York 1984, pp. 277-278.
98 See, Article 19(5)(b) o f the ILO Constitution.
99 See, Article 22 o f the ILO Constitution.
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questions, which it is customary to include in identical language on all forms 
in use at the same time, and more detailed special question relating to points 
arising in connection with the particular Convention concerned. The general 
questions ask for: a list o f the laws and regulations by which effect is given to 
provisions o f the Convention, accompanied by the text where these are not 
already communicated to the ILC; particulars o f  judicial decisions, extracts from 
factory inspectors reports and statistics which relate to the application o f the 
Convention; information as to legal effect o f  ratification and manner in which 
effective compliance is secured in any case in which there would appear to be 
a discrepancy between national law and the requirements o f the Convention; and 
the general appreciation o f the manner in which the Convention is applied, 
mentioning any difficulties which have occurred in connection with its 
application and any observations relating to its application which have been 
received from employers' and workers' organisations. The special questions ask 
for more detailed information concerning the manner in which particular 
provision o f the Convention are applied and frequently relate to the manner in 
which matters which the Convention leaves to the discretion o f members are 
dealt with. Both general and specific questions are revised from time to time in 
the light o f experience.100
In order to comply with the constitutional requirements that states report 
annually on the measures taken to give effect to the ratified Conventions,
100 See, Jenks, C. W., above note 74, at p. 145.
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Governments are required to supply a general report each year on those 
Conventions for which detailed reports are not required that year. When a 
detailed report is not sent in the year for which it is due or when the report does 
not reply to the comments made by the supervisory bodies, a detailed report 
would be due the following year. In cases in which there are serious problems 
of application, the Committee o f Experts on the Application o f Conventions and 
Recommendation may require that a detailed report be supplied earlier than the 
year in which it would normally be due. When observations on the application 
of a ratified Convention are made by a national or international organisation o f 
workers or employers, the Committee o f Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations or the Conference Committee on the 
Application o f Conventions and Recommendations is able to request, in the light 
of any explanation given by the Government in reply to the observations, that 
a detailed report be supplied earlier than the year in which it would normally 
be due.
The reports received from any state in the above manner are examined 
with great thoroughness and these arrangements are highly effective for the 
purpose o f ascertaining whether its laws are in compliance with its obligations 
under the Conventions.101 Such reporting procedure is also found in Article 20
101 For Government's extent o f compliance with the reporting obligation, see below, 
chapter 5, pp. 190-193.
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i
o f W HO Constitution102 and Article VIII o f  the UNESCO Constitution.103
The methods evolved within the United Nations itself with regard to the 
application o f international treaties are basically different from those used by the 
ILO. The fact is that the UN Charter contains no provision to this effect. 
Therefore the legal basis for the application o f treaties are furnished by the 
relevant provisions o f  the particular instruments. Some o f the human rights 
Conventions adopted under the UN auspices have introduced a certain obligation 
to report with a view to securing the application o f those instruments. Thus in 
accordance with Article 8 o f the Convention on the Abolition o f Slavery (1956), 
the contracting parties undertake to communicate to the Secretary General o f  the 
United Nations copies any laws, regulations and administrative measures 
enacted to put into effect to implement the provisions o f  the Convention.104 A 
similar obligation to submit reports is laid down in Article 16 o f the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.105 The 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains more substantive provisions to
102 The last sentence o f Article 20 reads as follows: "In case of acceptance each 
member agree to make an annual report to the Director General in accordance with 
chapter XIV." It may be mentioned that chapter XIV of the Constitution o f WHO 
comprises Articles 61-65 and provides the reporting procedure.
103 Article, VIII reads as follows: "Each member shall submit to the organisation at 
such times and in such manner as shall be determined by the General Conference, 
reports on the Laws, regulations and statistics relating to its educational scientific and 
cultural institutions and activities, ... ."
104 For the text o f the Convention see, Brownlie, I., (ed.), Basic Documents on Human 
Rights. New York 1992, p. 58.
105 For the text o f the Convention see, Ibid, p .114.
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ensure the fulfilment o f obligation under the Covenant. Article 28 provides for 
the establishment o f a human rights Committee. Pursuant to Article 40 the 
contracting states undertake to submit reports on the measures they have 
adopted to give effect to the rights recognised in the Covenant and on the 
progress made in the enjoyment o f those rights; these reports shall also indicate 
the difficulties affecting the implementation o f the Covenant.106
The Obligation to Supply Reports on Unratified Conventions and on 
Recommendations
Although the Government has no substantive obligation in respect o f 
Conventions which it has not ratified, any more than in respect o f 
recommendations which are not open for ratification, it is under an obligation 
to report on them according to Article 19, para 5(c) and 6(d) o f the ILO 
constitution. This provision requires the Government to make such reports on 
Conventions it has not ratified and on Recommendations as may be requested 
by the Governing Body o f the ILO. In these reports the Governments should:
a) indicate the position o f its law and practice with regard to the matters 
dealt with in these instruments;
b) show the extent to which effect has been given as is proposed to be 
given to any o f the provisions o f the said instruments and
c) state the difficulties which prevent or delay the ratification o f the
106 For the text o f the Covenant see, Ibid, p. 125.
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Convention or the application o f the Recommendation.
The practice in the application o f these provisions is that every year the
Governing Body chooses the Conventions and recommendations for which such
reports are to be requested, taking into account the importance o f the current
interest o f the instruments concerned. In doing so the Governing Body has in
the past given a preponderant place to Conventions and recommendations
relating to human rights.107 Professor Roberto Ago takes the view that:
Through this rule the Conventions gain the benefit o f some measures 
o f de fa c to  implementation by states to reconsider the situation 
periodically; and it some times happens that, faced with the choice 
between submitting a report specifying in writing the causes o f 
delaying or preventing the ratification, and initiating the ratification 
procedure, even belatedly, a Government will opt for the second 
alternative.108
The obligation to state in writing the reasons for non ratification is also laid 
down in Article 20 o f the WHO Constitution.109
The adoption o f international labour standards was the principle means 
of action constitutionally assigned to the ILO when it was set up in 1919. 
Although the activities o f the ILO have undergone development,110 the standard-
107 Wolf, F., "Human Rights and the International Labour Organisation", in Human 
Rights and International Law. Meron, T., (ed.), New York 1984, p. 279.
108 Ago, R., "The Final Stage o f Codification o f International Law", in Year Book o f 
International Law Comm ission. 1968, Vol. 2, pp. 173-74.
109 Article 20, second sentence: "Each Member shall notify the Director General o f the 
action taken and if it does not accept such Convention or agreement within the time 
limit, it will furnish a statement o f the reasons for non-acceptance".
110 See, ILO, The ILO Role in Technical Cooperation. Geneva 1977; Rens J., "The 
ILO and Technical Cooperation", in International Labour Review. Vol. LXXXIII, 1961 
pp. 413-435; Dufty, N. E., "Technical Assistance and the ILO", in Journal o f Industrial
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setting work is still widely recognised as one o f the principle concerns o f the
Organisation. However, it is evident from our above discussion that the adoption
o f standards, strictly speaking, is only a first stage in the whole legislative
procedure o f the ILO. The intention is that these standards should be embodied
in the law o f the member countries is the second stage. To quote David Morse,
the Director-General o f the ILO (1948-70):
Adoption by the Conference o f the Convention and Recommendation 
is merely the first stage in a lengthy process. The practical value of 
international labour standards depends on their application in the law 
and practice o f the m ember countries.111
The development o f the right to freedom of association in Bangladesh is 
therefore analysed in the following two chapters in order to assess the domestic 
application o f the Conventions.
Relations (Sydney), Vol. 9, No. 3, 1967, pp. 245-257; Ghebali, V., The International 
Labour Organisation: A Case Study on the Evolution o f U.N. Specialised Agencies. 
Dorderecht, 1989, pp. 242-267.
111 Morse, D. A., The Origin and Evolution o f the ILO and Its Role in the World
Community. New York 1969, p. 60.
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CHAPTER 3
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF 
ASSOCIATION IN PRE INDEPENDENCE BANGLADESH: AN 
ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATION AND POLICY
In order to explore and understand the character o f right o f association 
prevailing now in Bangladesh one should begin with highlighting the state o f 
right o f association and the Government policy and legislation on the subject 
from the colonial period. This chapter seeks to trace the main outlines o f 
Government policy and legislation affecting the right o f association and labour 
relations since 1919, including the chief points o f controversy, the new 
departures and modifications that have marked its evolution. For the 
convenience o f the study we propose to discuss the development in two periods 
i.e., the colonial period (1919-1947), and the Pakistani period (1947-1971).
3.1 THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1919-1947)
In outlining the development o f right o f association during the colonial 
period, we propose to begin our discussion by focusing on the status o f right o f 
association that was prevalent at the time of establishment o f the ILO, followed 
by recounting the impetus o f the creation of the All India Trade Union Congress 
and recognition o f the right o f association under a legislative framework.
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3.1.1 CONFUSION OVER THE STATUS OF RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION
After its establishment in 1919 when the International Labour
Organisation adopted its first Convention on Freedom o f Association i.e., the
Right o f Association (Agriculture), Convention 1921 (No. 11), it presupposed
the existence o f such a right among the industrial workers in member states. At
this juncture we shall not proceed to debate the question how far the ILO was
right in such a presumption but proceed to submit that so far as India was
concerned, previous to the passing o f the Trade Unions Act, 1926,1 the legal
position as regards workers' right o f association was uncertain. The following
passage from a speech delivered in the Indian Legislative Assembly by Mr.
Joshi,2 the mover o f the resolution which eventuated in the adoption o f the
Trade Unions Act, 1926, clearly illustrated this general uncertainty:
What is important is that the status of the trade unionists and the trade 
union officials and trade union organisations must be determined and 
fixed in the eyes of the law. At present the position is very doubtful.
In England some years back the trade union organisations were illegal.
I do not know what the position in India is. I am not a lawyer; but I 
take it that here a trade union is a legal organisation.3
Mr. Joshi correctly observed that the position was doubtful but in the absence
of any positive sanction behind the formation o f associations it is debateable
how far he was correct to assert that a "trade union is a legal organisation".
There did not exist any express legal provisions on the requirements and
1 Act No. XVI o f 1926.
2 Member of the Legislative Assembly.
3 The Legislative Assembly Debates, Delhi 1921, Vol. 1, Part 1, p. 487.
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formalities in establishing an association but the definition o f the term 
'association' and 'unlawful association' were laid down in the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act, 1908. Section 15 o f the Act provided:
(1) 'association' means any combination or body o f persons, whether 
the same be known by any distinctive name or not; and
(2) 'unlawful association' means an association-
(a) which encourages or aids persons to commit acts o f violence or 
intimidation or o f which the members habitually commit such acts, or
(b) which has been declared to be unlawful by the State Government 
under the powers hereby conferred.
The term association as defined in the Act was very wide and could virtually
cover any combination o f even two or more persons acting in any capacity
either formally or informally. Similarly, the definition of'unlaw ful association'
was very wide which inter alia meant and included any association which had
been declared to be unlawful by the State Government under Section 16 o f the
Act. Section 16 o f the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908 empowered the
State Government to declare an association as unlawful in the following terms:
If the State Government is o f opinion that any association interferes or 
has for its object interference with the administration of the law or with 
the maintenance of law and order, or that it constitutes a danger to the 
public peace, the State Government may, by notification in the official 
Gazette declare such association to be unlawful.
The above restrictive provision had four features, namely: a) it conferred
arbitrary powers on the State Government to ban an association on its subjective
satisfaction b) no machinery had been provided for revision or any other mode
o f review of action taken by the Government c) it provided no provision for
hearing the association before taking the action and d) there was no fixed period
for the ban, the ban being virtually absolute and permanent. An association apart
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from being declared unlawful as described above could also be subject to the 
charge o f criminal conspiracy under Section 120A and 120B of the Indian Penal 
Code, 1860. Section 120A defined criminal conspiracy as follows:
When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done,-
(1) an illegal act or
(2) an act, which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is 
designated a criminal conspiracy.
Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an 
offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides 
the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in 
pursuance thereof.
In view o f the above provisions an agreement by any two members o f an 
association to pursue other workmen to break their contract with their employer 
could be considered as a criminal conspiracy punishable with imprisonment 
under Section 120B of the Penal Code.4
The question o f civil liability o f persons engaged in associations arose 
in 1920 out o f a labour dispute in Madras. In October 1920, Mr. B. P. Wadia, 
who was the President o f the Madras labour union was put under injunction by 
the court for his inducement o f some workers o f the Buckingham Mills to 
commit a breach o f their contract.3 The dispute which will be discussed later in
4 Section 120B reads as follows:
Punishment fo r  criminal conspiracy- (1) W hoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy 
to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous 
imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision 
is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same 
manner as if  he abetted such offence.
(2) W hoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to 
commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of 
either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.
5 See, Lokanathan, P. S., Industrial Welfare in India. Madras 1929, pp. 183-84; Das, 
R. K., History on Indian Labour Legislation. Calcutta 1941, p. 245.
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this chapter6 suggested that trade union activities were not free from civil 
liabilities.
From the above discussion it is apparent that at the time o f the 
establishment o f the ILO, the workers o f India did not have any positive 
guarantee o f the right o f association but were subject to the restrictive 
provisions o f criminal and civil law. Thus it can be concluded that the state did 
not prevent any individual from establishing and joining an association provided 
the association and its members conformed to the ordinary law o f the country. 
In other words an association o f persons was not illegal merely because it was 
an association. Apart from this, the position was not at all clearly defined. 
However, despite confusion and uncertainty as to legality o f formation o f 
association, the workers o f India exercised their right o f association as will be 
evident in the discussion below.
3.1.2 EXERCISING THE RIGHT: CREATION OF THE ALL INDIA TRADE 
UNION CONGRESS
From the Indian view point the establishment o f the ILO was o f special 
importance. Under the 1919 Treaty o f Versailles (Article 389), the labour 
organisations in member countries were given the power to select their 
representatives on the ILO Conference, subject only to the confirmation o f the 
Government o f those countries. In the absence o f such organisation, the Treaty
6 See below, pp. 77-78.
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o f Versailles gave Governments the power to nominate labour representatives.
Since at that juncture there was no central labour organisation in India, the
Government nominated representatives o f labour to the first International Labour
Conference without consulting the workers.7 This was much resented by the
workers as unconstitutional.8 The Government argued that it was justified in
nominating the workers' delegate without consulting any o f the labour leaders,
in as much as there did not exist at that time any organisation truly
representative o f the workers.9
However, the workers o f India did not fail to realise the importance o f
the right that was bestowed upon them and the harm that would be done if they
did not organise in order to exercise that right. Therefore, the immediate
impetus for the formation o f the All India Trade Union Congress came when
the nomination o f workers representatives to the ILO was disputed. Thus, it was
in 1920 that India's first central organisation o f labour namely, the All India
Trade Union Congress (AITUC) was formed to:
Coordinate the activities o f all labour organisations in all trades and in 
all the provinces in India, and generally further the interests o f Indian 
labour in matters economic, social and political.10
Thus, the AITUC had, no doubt, a greater aim than sending representatives to
the ILO. The creation o f the AITUC was a hasty step in order to secure
7 Giri,V. V., Labour Problems in Indian Industry. London 1959, p. 496.
8 Id.
9 Revri, C., The Indian Trade Union M ovement, New Delhi 1972, p. 85.
10 Report o f the All India Trade Union Congress. 5th Session, 1925, p. 59.
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representation o f the Indian labour at the ILO Conference at Geneva.11 There 
was however nothing fundamentally wrong in a central organisation being 
started first and in branch associations following under its inspiration. At that 
time, however, there were some leaders who believed that the establishment o f 
an all-India organisation was premature and that the state o f labour organisations 
did not warrant its creation. On this point, Mr. V.V. Giri during the course o f 
his presidential address to the sixth session o f the AITUC spoke the following 
words:
Our distinguished patriot and countrymen, L. Lajpat Raj as the 
president o f the first session o f the AITUC considered, perhaps with 
justification then, that the time was not ripe in the year 1920 to give 
an All-India name to this organisation and he further opined that it 
would take many more years o f activity before one could possibly 
think o f having anything like a Congress which can speak with any 
semblance o f authority on behalf o f all the workers in India.12
Similarly, commenting on the activities o f the AITUC in 1929 Lokanathan
observed:
W hatever be the justification for the early establishment of a central 
labour organisation in India, there is little doubt that it has revealed the 
defects o f its quality. For the first four or five years the Trade Union 
Congress was a mere annual show and very few unions really cared to 
affiliate themselves to it. Its one purpose was to meet and recommend 
delegates to the International Labour Conference.13
Thus, the establishment o f a permanent International Labour Organisation with
its annual Conferences, to which delegates from all member countries are sent
11 Sharma, G. K., Labour Movement in India: Its Past and Present. Delhi 1963, p. 80.
12 See above, note 10, 6th Session, 1926 at p. 8.
13 See, Lokanathan, P. S., above note 5, at p. 168.
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and at which questions affecting the life o f working class come up for 
discussion is one reason why labour organisation like the AITUC once formed 
did not die.14 The increased status which the ILO has conferred on labour could 
only be maintained by keeping the association alive and the need for labour to 
recommend delegates annually to the Conference induced labour to organise 
itself and speak in a representative capacity.15
However, it may be right to conclude that the AITUC which was 
established in 1920 was not as a result o f  a genuine demand on the part o f the 
labour unions for a coordinated action but was prompted by the desire to 
recommend to the Government o f India workers' delegate to the International 
Labour Conference.
3.1.3 THE RIGHT UNDER THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
The need for legislation on trade unions became apparent in the aftermath 
of the Madras labour dispute which we have mentioned earlier.16 The Madras 
case was not proceeded with because Mr. W adia had privately settled the 
dispute.17 But the interim injunction against Mr. Wadia for his trade union 
activities, suggested that in absence o f legislation even legitimate trade union 
activity was attended by considerable peril. The interlocutory decision o f the
14 Ibid, p. 162.
15 Id.
16 See above, pp. 73-74.
17 See, Loknathan, P. S., above note 5 at p. 184.
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case rendered the position o f workers and union officials highly insecure. It was
generally felt that if the legitimate functions o f the trade unions were to be
carried on, immunity from certain civil and criminal liabilities should be
conferred on unions and their officers. Accordingly, the question o f trade union
legislation came up before the first session o f the reformed legislature,18 in
consequence o f a suit arising out o f a trade dispute in Madras and prompted Mr.
N. M. Joshi to move the following Resolution in the Legislative Assembly:
This assembly recommends to the Governor-General in Council that he 
should take steps to introduce, at an early date, in the Indian 
legislature, such legislation as may be necessary for the registration of 
the trade unions and for the protection o f trade unionists and trade 
union officials from civil and criminal liability for bona fide trade 
union activities.19
When discussion on the Resolution began, Sir Thomas Holland, the minister o f
industries, accepted that trade unions were inevitable and observed:
Trades unions are not only inevitable but our treaty conditions with 
Germany and Austria demand that we shall recognise the right of 
association for all lawful purposes by the employed as well as by the 
employer. We can not go back on our obligations, obligations incurred 
by treaties that have been ratified on behalf o f India as well as on 
behalf o f other parts o f British Empire.20
However, there were some who viewed the Resolution to be premature21 and by
18 Since the introduction of the constitutional changes under the Montague-Chelmsford 
Reforms as incorporated in the Government o f India (Amendment) Act, 1919, the 
central legislature had the power to legislate in respect of all labour subjects, while 
provincial legislatures had power to legislate only in respect of those labour subjects 
which were classified as provincial and that too only with the sanction o f the 
Governor General.
19 See above, note 3, at p. 486.
20 Ibid, at p. 491.
21 Ibid, at p. 496.
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accepting such a Resolution the Government was going to take responsibility 
o f organising strikes against capitalists.22 Mr. J. N. Mukherjea a member o f the 
Legislative Assembly moved an amendment to the effect that the words "from 
civil and criminal liability for bona fide trade union activities" be omitted.23 
Since it asked for protection o f trade unionists and trade union officials from 
civil and criminal liabilities for bona fide trade union activities, according to 
him it meant the termination o f all civil and criminal administration in the 
country.
Sir Thomas Holland went further and asserted that in the case o f trade
union activities, the so-called bona fide activities, was a source o f very great
danger. In support o f his contention he gave an example which though
exaggerated as he admitted, was as follows:
A trade union official who is protected in this manner because o f his 
bona fide activities on behalf o f the union might escape being charged 
with the murder o f his employer if  the trade union official was 
sincerely convinced that the murder would lead to a rise in wages or 
say, the conclusion o f strike, and that he had no malice whatsoever 
against the employer.24
Accordingly, he suggested the following Resolution which was adopted by the
House:
This Assembly recommends to the Governor General in Council that 
he should take steps to introduce, as soon as practicable, in the Indian 
Legislature, such legislation as may be necessary for the registration o f
22 Ibid, at p. 499.
23 Id.
24 Ibid, at p. 505.
79
trade unions.25
Hence, the adoption o f the Resolution was the first step towards 
recognising the right of association o f Indian workers. Nevertheless, it was 
suggested by one o f the members o f the Legislative Assembly26 that time has 
not arrived in India for encouraging the growth o f trade unions, by means o f 
legislation.27
The Resolution was adopted on March 1, but the Government o f India
did not publish tentative proposals for legislation until September 1921,28 and
thus provoked a large mass o f opinions.29 Discussing these later in the
Legislative Assembly Sir Bhupendra Nath Mitra, who introduced a Bill to
provide for the registration o f trade unions and in certain respects to define the
law relating to registered trade unions in British India, informed the House in
the following terms:
The opinions expressed in response to our invitation are remarkable for 
their diversity. There are some who considered the proposed legislation 
to be premature and who would prefer that we should not proceed with 
it at all. There are some others who, while recognising the need for the 
proposed legislation, apparently considered trade unions to be 
dangerous and pernicious growths whose activities should be controlled 
rigidly so that they may not eventually overwhelm the 
Com m onwealth .30
25 Ibid, at p. 506.
26 Mr. Khan Bahadur Chaudhuri W ajid Hussain.
27See above, note 3, at p. 504.
28 ILO, Freedom of Association. Vol. 5, No. 32, Geneva 1930, p. 330.
29See, Report o f the Indian Statutory Comm ission. Vol. 5, London 1930, p. 1498.
30 The Legislative Assembly Debates. Vol 5, Part 1, Delhi 1925, p. 78.
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During the course o f debate, one member o f the Assembly31 recalled India's
obligation under the Treaty o f Versailles emphasizing the need and importance
for the proposed legislation. He observed:
My contention is that you are pledged to the principle of this 
legislation. Under Article 427 o f the Peace Treaty every subscribing 
nation is pledged to the recognition o f the right of association. You 
cannot go back on that. That right is inherent and it is because that 
right is inherent that we are claiming that you should introduce this 
legislation.32
The Bill, after being debated at great length in the Legislative Assembly, was 
passed in March 1926 as the Trade Unions Act, 1926 and came into effect 
from 1 June 1927. The preamble o f the Act provided that it was an Act to 
provide for the registration o f trade unions and in certain respects to define the 
law relating to registered trade unions. It appears that the Act presupposed the 
existence o f such unions and intended to put them under a legal framework. 
Once a trade union was registered, then to define the law governing the course 
and conduct o f the said registered union was the other object achieved by the 
Act. This resulted in one inevitable conclusion, that all unregistered trade unions 
remained unaffected by the several restrictive and beneficial provisions o f the 
Act.
Explaining the standpoint o f the Government o f India, Sir Thomas 
Holland, made a rather bold statement during the course o f debate:
However, it is clear to the Government that registration should be
31 Mr. Chaman Lall.
32 See above note 30 at p. 755.
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optional, it is equally clear to the Government that unregistered trade 
unions should not be allowed to participate in the protective provisions 
o f the Bill, fo r  any other course would defeat the object o f  the Bill 
which is to fo s te r  the growth o f  trade unions on healthy lines:'3
This categorical statement leaves no doubt as to the uppermost concern o f the
Government which was to foster the development o f the Indian Trade Union on
'proper lines', as understood by the Government.
The term trade union was defined in Section 2 o f the Act as meaning:
Any combination, whether temporary or permanent, formed primarily 
for the purpose o f regulating the relations between workmen and 
employers or between workmen and workmen, or between employers 
an employers, or o f imposing restrictive conditions on the conduct of 
any trade or business, and includes any federation o f two or more trade 
unions.
An analysis o f the above definition shows that in order to constitute a trade 
union, first, there should be a combination of workmen or o f employers. 
Secondly, the purpose and object o f combination should be either to regulate 
relations between the parties as specified or to impose restrictive conditions on 
the conduct o f any trade or business. Ordinarily understood, trade unions are 
combinations o f workmen only. But the definition as provided in the Act 
extended such meaning to employers' association as well.
Formation o f trade unions under the Act was purely permissive in nature. 
Any seven or more members could apply for registration o f a trade union 
(Section 4). It did not provide for compulsory registration nor in any way 
declared that unregistered trade unions be illegal. One o f its greatest lacuna was
33 Ibid, p. 473. Italics added.
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that it did not provide any clause by which employers' would remain bound to 
recognise a union which would be registered under the Act. In a Circular Letter 
dated 12 September, 1921 addressed to local Governments and administration 
in pursuance o f the resolution adopted on 1 March, 1921, the Government o f 
India without giving any reasons expressed:
In the opinion o f the Government o f India it is neither desirable nor
possible to compel employers' to recognise all unions.34
Hence, employers could refuse recognition o f a union even when registered 
under the Act. It is very interesting to note that during the course o f debate on 
the Trade Union Bill, not a single member raised the question o f recognition 
and it appears that they accepted Government's stand on the issue.
Considering the acute shortage o f trade union leaders from the rank and 
file, the framers o f the Act made a special provision enabling non-workers to 
take part in the organisation and management o f trade unions. According to 
Section 22 of the Act, 50% o f the total office bearers o f a union could consist 
o f persons who were not actually employees or engaged in the industry with 
which the union was connected. Except for this clear-cut provision, no other 
rigid condition was imposed on outside leaders; they could be officers on a full 
time or on a part time basis; with or without remuneration from the union. It 
was at that time a good step indeed. Because a key requirement o f efficient 
unionism is a sufficient supply o f qualified leadership and this was one in which 
the Indian movement was seriously deficient from the rank and file o f workers
34See above, note 28, at p. 330.
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as many o f them were illiterate and had low levels o f education. Paradoxically, 
the qualifications needed for union leadership in India were unusually high since 
English was the principal language o f unionism and labour relations. Labour 
laws, Government reports, adjudication proceeding, employer-union 
correspondence were overwhelmingly in English though it was not the 
vernacular used by the working people.
The most important immunity conferred by the Act35 on the officers and 
members o f a registered trade union was the immunity from punishment under 
Section 120-B o f the Penal Code.36 If this provision had not been incorporated 
in the Act there would have been no immunity for trade unionists and like 
others they would have been subject to the charge o f criminal conspiracy 
punishable with six months imprisonment or with fine or with both. Section 18 
provided that no suit or other legal proceeding shall be maintainable in any civil 
court against any registered trade union or any officer or member in respect o f 
any act done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute to which a 
member o f a trade union was a party on the ground that such act induced some 
other persons to break a contract o f employment. Hence it is evident that there 
was protection for acts done in furtherance o f an industrial dispute. An 
important type o f action which this clause prevented was a suit arising out o f 
the persuasion o f others to join in a strike amounting to a breach o f contract on
35 Section 17 of the Trade Unions Act. 1926.
36 For provision o f Section 120-B, See above, p. 73.
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the part o f workmen.
The Trade Unions Act, 1926 did not contain any clause regarding or 
prohibiting strikes. As it made an important omission on the subject, so the 
position could be explained as that the workers o f a registered trade union had 
the right to strike. Even during the discussion in the Legislative Assembly on 
the Resolution which led to the adoption o f the Act, Sir Thomas Holland 
expressed:
W orkers have perfect right to strike, whether they are under 
Government or under private employer they have an absolute right to 
strike.37
However, in course o f time the Government changed its notion and passed the 
Trade Disputes Act, 1929 which under Article 15(1) provided restrictions38 for 
strikes in public utility services.39 This in fact caused a serious handicap in the 
exercise o f the right o f association as 'public utility services' covered wide range 
o f establishments. Even those leaders who were considered acceptable by the 
Government such as N. M. Joshi who was a member o f the Royal Commission 
on Labour in India, characterised the Trade Disputes Act, 1929 as "reactionary
37 See above, note 3, at p. 493.
38 Any person who, being employed in a public utility service, goes on strike in breach 
of contract without having given to his employer, within one month before so striking, 
not less than fourteen days previous notice in writing o f his intention to go on strike 
before the expiry thereof, shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend 
to one month, or with fine which may extend to fifty rupees, or with both.
39 According to Section 2(g) 'public utility service' meant: i) any railway service which 
the Govemor-General-in-Council may by notification in Gazette o f India, declare to 
be o f a public utility service for the purpose of this Act; or ii) any postal, telegraph 
or telephone service; or iii) any industry, business or undertaking which supplies light 
or water to the public; or iv) any system o f public conservancy or sanitation.
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and mischievous" contending that it would "help the employers and not 
labourers".40
Immediately after the passing o f the Trade Disputes Act, 1929 the 
Government o f India on 24 May 1929 appointed a Royal Commission on 
Labour in India under the chairmanship o f Rt. Honourable Mr. J. H. Whitley, 
known as Whitley Commission. The Commission submitted its report in June 
1931. Some considered the report to be a Magna Carta o f labour in India41 and 
it formed the basis o f the future labour policy o f the Government in the years 
to come.42
The Commission made far reaching recommendations, any detailed 
analysis o f which is beyond the scope o f this research. However, following the 
publication o f the Commission's report there was a spate o f legislation. Out o f 
24 labour enactments adopted by the Central and Provincial Legislatures during 
years 1932 to 1937 as many as 19 were in implementation o f the Commission's 
suggestions.43 However, though the Commission recommended recognition o f 
unions by employers,44 nothing was done to implement that
40 Kamik, V. B. Strikes in India. Bombay 1967, p. 176.
41 Menon, V. K. R.,"The Influence o f International Labour Convention on Indian 
Legislation", in International Labour Review, Vol. 73, 1956, p. 556.
42 Vidyarthi, R. D., Growth o f Labour Legislation in India Since 1939 and Its Impact 
on Economic Development. Calcutta 1961, p. 39.
43 See, Menon, V. K. R., above note 41, at p. 557.
44 Report o f the Roval Commission on Labour in India. London 1931, p. 326.
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recommendation.45
On the contrary, the situation was such that at the 1933 International 
Labour Conference in Geneva the Indian workers' delegate asserted that there 
was 'unmistakeable evidence' that the authorities were willing to act in 
combination with employers in order to silence the workers, and deprive them 
of their legitimate means o f protection, namely, the right o f association and of 
strike.46 However, at a Conference o f Government representatives, employers 
and workers, held at New Delhi in August in 1942, it was decided to establish 
a permanent tripartite labour organisation in India, composed o f an annual 
Conference and Standing Committee, on the model o f ILO.47 This decision 
made an important step in the evolution o f the machinery of industrial relations 
in India. No doubt it was a development which had been facilitated to no small 
extent by India's association with the ILO.
45 However, the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act, 1947 provided recognition o f unions 
by employers but it never came into force as it required Gazette Notification by the 
Government which was lacking.
46 "When the workers o f the Madras and Southern Maharatta Railway workshops went 
on strike sometime ago, as a protest against the overriding by the chief executive of 
the Railway Company the terms o f an agreement he had come with the Trade Union 
concerned as regards reduction o f staff, the Government turned down the request and 
supported the Railway executive in its action. In the Indian Textile Industries the 
employers have started a war o f attrition against the workers. The mill owners are 
making a joint and systematic attempt to reduce wages in mills individually, and the 
workers affected in each mill are prevented by police action from organising 
demonstrations or from combining with the workers in other means in a general 
strike".- Extract from Proceedings o f the International Labour Conference. Geneva 
1933, p. 203.
47 ILO, "The Institution o f Tripartite Labour Organisation in India: The Influence of 
the ILO", in International Labour Review. Vol. 47, 1943, p. 1.
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It was exactly the same year, under pressure o f increased production for 
the allies' war supplies in the second W orld War and to ensure that relations 
between employers and workers did not get strained and thereby upset the 
machinery o f production in industries engaged on war work, the Government 
o f India in January 1942 added Rule 81-A o f the Defence o f India Rules 
empowering the Central Government to prohibit strikes or lock-outs and to refer 
any dispute for conciliation and adjudication. Soon the Rule was modified by 
an order passed under the Rule in August 1942 which provided that 14 days 
notice should be given to the employer within one month before striking, and 
when a dispute referred for conciliation and adjudication the workers would be 
prevented from going on strike until the expiry o f two months after the 
conclusion o f the proceeding upon such a reference.48 Wartime experience, 
however, had led the Government to feel that Rule 81-A o f the Defence o f India 
Rules was extremely useful and that its incorporation in the permanent labour 
law o f the country would do much to quell the industrial unrest which was 
gaining momentum owing to the stress o f post-war industrial readjustments. The 
main provisions o f the Rule in regard to the public utility services were, 
therefore, retained intact in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which replaced 
the Trade Disputes Act, 1929.
The history o f the development o f labour legislation in India reveals that 
the enactment o f various labour statutes was done as and when warranted by
48 Government of India, Labour Investigation Committee. (Main Report). New Delhi 
1946, p. 68.
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circumstances or under several pressures. A consistent and planned labour 
policy was conspicuous by its absence. Under stress o f conditions created by the 
second W orld W ar and more particularly the need for greater production, that 
the Government o f India realised that the problem o f labour could be best 
tackled on the basis o f a carefully drawn plan.49 Accordingly, in 1946 the 
Central Ministry o f Labour worked out a Five Year Programme for the 
amelioration o f labour conditions through legislative and administrative 
measures.30 This Five Year Programme can be said to have formed the basis of 
future labour legislation and reform. The Programme did not get enough time 
to be implemented since the year 1947 witnessed the split o f British India. 
However, we will see in our discussion in the next Section whether the 
Programme had any influence on subsequent Pakistan Government's labour 
policy.
In order to determine the state o f right to freedom o f association in the
closing years o f the British rule in India the report o f Labour Investigation
Committee may be quoted which submitted its report in 1946 observing :
From such evidence as we were able to obtain during the course o f our 
enquiries, we found that, barring a few honourable exceptions such as 
municipal and port trust administrations and a few individual 
employers, freedom of association exists only in nam e.51
The Committee further emphasised:
49 Vaid, K. N., State and Labour In India. Bombay 1965, p. 218.
50 Government of India, The Indian Labour Year Book. Simla 1947-48, p. 95.
31 See above, note 48, at p. 372.
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It is not to say, however, that the workers in this country are not
permitted to organize themselves into trade unions and, in point o f fact, 
in the year 1943, there were in the country as many as 693 registered 
trade unions. Very few o f these unions have, however, been recognised 
by the employers and even where they are, the relations between the 
two are far from cordial. Moreover, excepting a few enlightened 
employers, most others in the country are inclined to look upon trade 
unions as no better than necessary evils.52
From the above observations it is evident that the situation had not changed
from that o f 1927 when in contradiction to the Government's claim that there
was full right o f  association enjoyed in India, the workers delegate to the
International Labour Conference Mr. V. V. Giri declared:
Speaking on the question o f freedom of association, I might just 
mention that we have not much o f it, and even organised association 
in India are practically suppressed and gagged when the real issues 
between employers and the employees arise.53
Hence, it will be right to comment that the stimulus given by the 
legislative enactments to the right to freedom association resulted, not so much 
from any right that it created, as from the enhanced status given by the 
recognition o f the trade unions in the Statute Book.
3.2 THE PAKISTANI PERIOD (1947-1971)
The decade that followed immediately after the second world war saw 
the independence o f many Asian countries from colonial rule. In 1947, the 
former British India was partitioned to form two sovereign states, India and 
Pakistan. After independence, the Government o f Pakistan adopted the entire
52 Id.
53 ILO, Record of Proceedings. ILC, 10th Session, Geneva 1927, p. 99.
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labour legislation as it existed at the time o f partition under the Pakistan 
(Continuation o f Existing Laws) Order, 1947. From the discussion o f the 
preceding Section it is apparent that when Pakistan became independent in 
1947, it did not start with a clean state in labour matters including in respect o f 
the right o f association. We will now proceed to outline chronologically the 
course and character o f right o f association as developed during the Pakistani 
period.
3.2.1 THE DECADE FOLLOWING INDEPENDENCE
We have noted earlier that during the days o f colonial rule there was no 
formal declared policy with regard to labour. The newly independent 
Government o f Pakistan carried the colonial legacy in the following years. It 
was only on 15 August, 1955 that there was a formal declaration o f labour 
policy by the Government o f Pakistan. It must however be emphasised that in 
the intervening period the attitude of the Government was not one o f non­
interference in labour matters. In February 1949, the first Pakistan Labour 
Conference, composed o f the representatives o f the Government, employers and 
workers was convened and the Five Year Programme o f work inherited from 
India34 was laid before it to decide to what extent and in what direction the 
Programme "should be taken up in the light o f the labour conditions prevailing
34 The Programme inter alia contained suggestions for suitable amendment o f the 
Trade Unions Act, 1926.
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in Pakistan".55 The Conference approved the Five Year Programme o f work.56 
Thus, in the intervening period the labour policy o f the Government comprised 
the Five Year Programme o f work in the field o f labour drawn up by the Indian 
Government before partition in October 1946. This can be said to have formed 
the labour policy o f the Government without a formal declaration.
It appears that the first Conference took some positive decisions in the 
development o f right o f association. The Conference inter alia decided that the 
Trade Union (Amendment) Bill, 1947 which was outstanding from the Indian 
Legislative Assembly should be proceeded with and enacted as soon as 
possible,37 taking into consideration any suggestions which workers and 
employers might suggest.38 It was also decided in the Conference that the ILO 
Convention No. 87 which was adopted by the ILO in 1948 should be ratified 
by the Government o f Pakistan and the proposed Convention on Right to 
Organise and to Bargain Collectively, should be supported by Pakistan at the 
next session o f the Conference.59
Hence, it can be asserted that after independence the first Tripartite 
Labour Conference genuinely took a positive stance towards protection o f the
35 Shaft, M., Eleven Years of Labour Policy. Karachi 1959, p. 1.
56 Id.
57 The Bill inter alia provided for compulsory recognition o f union by the employers 
and the elimination of unfair labour practice on the part o f the employers.
58 Eastern Pakistan Labour Journal, Vol. II, N o .l, March 1949, p. 5.
59 Ibid, pp. 5-6.
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right o f association. The Government o f Pakistan also acted positively as in 
accordance with the decision o f the Conference, supported the adoption o f the 
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98) at the next 
session o f the International Labour Conference and subsequently ratified 
Convention No. 87 on 14 February, 1951, and Convention No. 98. on 26 May, 
1952.
The Government by ratifying the Conventions undertook to abide by the 
provisions o f the Conventions. But the question arises, was the existing 
legislation in harmony with the Conventions? From our discussion in the 
previous Section, it is apparent that the Trade Unions Act, 1926 contained some 
provisions which could not be said to be compatible with the provisions o f the 
Conventions. However, it was perfectly valid for the Government to take 
necessary steps subsequent to ratification. Thus, we need to examine the 
intention and action o f the Government and determine whether the Government 
was really keen to implement the provisions of the Conventions at national 
level.
It was only two months after the adoption o f the ILO Convention No. 87, 
the Cabinet Secretariat o f the Government o f Pakistan issued a Notification on 
30 August 1948 dealing with associations o f employees o f the Central 
Government.60 The Notification provided instructions for the recognition o f 
association o f employees o f the central Government other than associations o f
60 See, Establishment Division Notification No. 6/1/48-Ests. (S. E.) of 30 August 1948.
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industrial employees. In clause 2 o f the Notification it was stated that the
Government would recognise association o f its employees, provided that each
such association consisted o f a distinct "class"61 o f Government employees. As
to the membership o f association clause 3 o f the Notification provided:
Every Government employee o f the same class actually in service shall 
be eligible for membership o f the association representing that class 
and only members o f that class actually in service shall be so eligible.
The Notification as described above was in clear contradiction o f Article 2 o f
the Freedom o f Association and Protection o f the Right to Organise Convention,
1948, (No. 87) which provides right to "join organisation o f their own
choosing"- a right which had been curtailed by the Notification.62 Actually, the
restrictions applied only to those associations which tried to seek official
recognition by the Government. Hence, the Government employees were at
liberty to establish and join unrecognised organisations o f their own choosing,
without being compelled to belong to associations representing their category.
Soon after the ratification o f Convention Nos. 87 and 98 the Government
in the year 1952 promulgated the Security o f Pakistan Act,63 which provided
that an organisation could be disbanded and wound up under Section 10, if it
61 According to clause 2 o f the Notification: "class means either one of the classes into 
which the Government servants may be broadly classified: i.e., class I, Class II, Class 
III and Class IV, or any association o f Government servants within one class whose 
special position may warrant the formation o f a separate association and which the 
Government is prepared to recognise".
62 For the ILO Committee of Experts opinion on the Notification, see below, chapter 
5, pp. 199-202.
63 The Gazette o f Pakistan. Extraordinary. 1952, p. 553.
94
acted in a manner prejudicial to the defence and security o f Pakistan or to the 
maintenance o f supplies and services essential to the community or maintenance 
o f public order. The Act did not provide any clause by which an organisation 
so charged could be asked to show cause against such action before disbanding 
nor was there any provision for appeal against such decision. Further, there was 
no provision in the Act for the revival o f the dissolved organisation. The 
Government could take possession o f any property or documents o f the 
dissolved organisation. Clause (6) o f Section 10 provided that contravention o f 
any o f the provisions would be punishable for a term which may extend to 3 
years or with fine, or with both. This leads us to the conclusion that the 
immunities to trade unionists granted under the Trade Unions Act, 1926 were 
no more than a formality that meant little in practice. If the Government decided 
to arrest a trade unionist, he could be arrested and charged without difficulty 
under the vague terms o f the Security o f Pakistan Act, 1952.
The Five Year Programme adopted by the first Pakistan labour 
Conference in February 1949 was to be completed by February 1954. But 
paradoxically having done nothing in respect o f the Programme, on 15 August 
1955, after numerous representations and strong protests by labour including the 
possibility o f a general strike in the whole country, the Government made a 
formal announcement o f its first labour policy.64 If one carefully compares this 
policy with the Five Year Programme o f labour approved in 1949, one would
64 See, Shafi, M., above note 55, at p. 4.
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find almost no difference in fundamentals, in fact almost all the items were 
common though there had been some difference in the phraseology and minor 
detail. The main content, objectives and even legislative and administrative 
measures proposed to achieve were almost identical.
It can be argued that there was no compulsion on the Government to 
adopt the Five Year Programme in 1949. It undertook this obligation o f its own 
decision. It could well refuse to be party to it. In the state o f affairs that 
followed it would have been much easier if no Five Year Programme had been 
adopted. It would have spared the Government from criticism. But having 
publicly announced a programme and subsequently failing to implement it in 
the five year period, the Government landed itself in a position almost 
impossible to defend.
The new policy began with the statement:
It is the policy o f Government to encourage growth of genuine and 
healthy trade unions in order to promote healthy collective bargaining 
on the part o f labour and to enable it to conduct negotiations with the 
appreciation of the country's economy.65
The policy further provided that "the system o f collective bargaining should be 
encouraged and developed".66 The policy seems to have suffered from a 
contradiction since from the Government's point o f view, conciliation and 
arbitration provided a superior basis for industrial negotiations than free
65 See, Labour Policy 1955 in Shafi, M., Labour Policy of the Government of 
Pakistan. Karachi 1961, p. 35.
66 Id.
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collective bargaining because o f the strikes and work stoppage which the latter
process necessarily entails. The preamble o f  the policy made this quite clear:
In this country where industrialisation is in its early stages, Government 
is anxious that, while labour should get its just rights, industry should 
not be hampered by unnecessary up-heavals and strikes. Government, 
therefore, believe in promoting the settlement o f disputes between 
employees in the interest o f industrial peace through constitutional 
means ... 61
Actually, the Government o f Pakistan had little doubt, from the outset,
concerning its priorities when presented with the choice between identifying
"rapid economic development" with the interest o f employers, and "social
justice" identified with the interest o f the workers, which was assumed to
militate against rapid economic development. The subordinate role o f labour in
the hierarchy o f interests o f the Government was stated with appropriate
rhetorical ambivalence by the Prime Minister in his address to the first Tripartite
Labour Conference in 1949 where he said.
W e must create conditions which are favourable to labour. My 
Government will take all necessary steps to see that labour gets its due 
share in all enterprises . . . .  Labour must remember that the interest of 
Pakistan comes before the interest o f any individual or class of 
individuals and must not do anything which in any way weakens 
Pakistan. If Pakistan endures and prospers the problem that Pakistan 
labour has can be solved.68
The policy provided that "provision should be made in the Trade Unions 
Act for determination o f recognition or non-recognition o f a trade union by a
67 Id.
68 See above, note 58, at pp. 13-14.
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judicial authority".69 Thus, on recognition o f trade unions the Policy departed 
from the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act, 1947 and the earlier Five Year 
Programme which provided for compulsory recognition o f unions by the 
employers. It may be pointed out that the Trade Union (Amendment) Act, 1947 
which was passed by the Indian Legislature70 and subsequently discussed in 
various Tripartite Labour Conferences provided for recognition o f unions by 
employers.
Although, at the time o f declaring the policy the Government o f Pakistan
had ratified ILO Convention Nos. 87 and 98, yet it is unfortunate that the
Government did not show its intention to abide by its international obligation
as it was expressed in the policy that "non industrial employees o f the
Government may be allowed to form Service Associations and follow the
instructions o f the Cabinet Secretariat concerning their recognition".71 Further,
with regard to civil servants the policy stated:
Since civil servants can form their own associations, they should not 
be allowed to form trade unions and since their conditions o f service 
are different from other workers, they should not be allowed to affiliate 
their associations with associations o f trade unions.72
Hence, it is apparent that ratification o f those Conventions had no influence on
the policy makers who, ignoring Article 2 o f Convention No. 87, reaffirmed its
69 See above, note 65, at, p. 36.
70 See above, note 45, p. 87.
71 See above, note 65, at p. 37.
72 Ibid, at p. 38.
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old stand on the issue.73
Though achieving independence in 1947, it was not until 1956 that the 
Government o f Pakistan adopted its first Constitution. According to the Indian 
Independence Act, 1947, the Government o f India Act, 1935 was its interim 
Constitution which did not provide any Bill o f Rights. The 1956 Constitution 
made a significant departure in this regard by providing a Bill o f Rights. Article 
10 provided:
Every citizen shall have the right to form associations or unions, 
subject to any reasonable restriction imposed by the law in the interest 
o f morality or public order.
The insertion o f this right in the Constitution was the first constitutional
recognition o f the right to freedom o f association in independent Pakistan.74
Under Article 102 o f the Constitution, the provincial Governments could
promulgate labour legislation. Accordingly, the Governor o f East Pakistan
promulgated the East Pakistan Trade Unions (Recognition) Ordinance, 1958.75
Instead o f providing for compulsory recognition o f trade unions by employers,
the Ordinance laid down recognition by agreement o f registered unions.76
Having failed to obtain such recognition, trade unions could apply to the
Registrar. Surprisingly such recognition, be it by agreement or by order o f the
73 See, discussion above pp. 93-94 and also the Establishment Division Notification 
No. 6/1/48-Ests. (S.E) o f 30 August, 1948.
74 For discussion on the constitutional perspectives o f the right of association, see 
below, pp. 108-113 and pp. 135-141.
75 Dhaka Gazette Extraordinary. 27 January 1958, pp. 561-565.
76 See, Section 3 o f the East Pakistan Trade Unions (Recognition) O rdinance. 1958.
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Registrar, was only for a period o f one year and on expiry o f the period, the 
unions could again apply for recognition.77 By providing for a limited period o f 
recognition and requiring unions to apply again, the Government expressed its 
intent to intervene regularly and directly in industrial relations. Nevertheless, it 
was the first piece o f legislation which provided some form of recognition o f 
unions. Further, the Ordinance, without using the term collective bargaining' 
provided that the executive o f a recognised union shall be entitled to negotiate 
with employers in respect o f matters connected with employment or non 
employment or the conditions o f labour o f all or any o f its members.78 This 
provision for the first time elevated the position o f workers in respect o f 
bargaining with their employers, since workers' representatives could enter into 
negotiation with employers on issues as stated above. Thus it appears that after 
ratification o f Convention No. 98, it was the first legislative step by the 
provincial Government to incorporate provisions on the right to bargaining. It 
needs to be mentioned that the legislation was supplementary to the Trade 
Unions Act, 1926 and did not amend any provisions o f the Act. However, this 
was the gift o f Provincial Legislature o f East Pakistan and applied to East 
Pakistan. Now the obvious question arises what was the role o f the Central 
Legislature?
It is apparent from our discussion that since independence, the Central
77 Ibid, Section 4.
78 Ibid, Section 3.
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Government failed to promulgate any positive legislation in respect o f workers' 
right o f association and the proposed amendment o f the Trade Unions Act, 
1926 suffered from bureaucratic statements o f  "under consideration" and "being 
revised".79 Hence, nothing was achieved during this period. It is most surprising 
that the Tripartite National Labour Conference which was held every year never 
bothered to inquire from the Government as to what action Government took 
on the discussion o f the previous session. This suited the employers but what 
about the workers? It seems that the Government was never serious about the 
outcome o f its discussions. In fact it was not seriously interested to do anything 
for labour. It had implicitly decided to take no action over a period o f years and 
the Conference was treated merely as a debating club. By ratifying Conventions 
Nos. 87 and 98 on 14 February 1951 and on 26 May respectively, the 
Government o f Pakistan entered into an international commitment to implement 
its provisions. But since ratification, more than six years passed without any 
positive action from the Central Government o f Pakistan to incorporate the 
provisions o f the Conventions in domestic legislation.
3.2.2 THE FIRST MARTIAL LAW PERIOD
In 1958, against the background of nation-wide political upsurge and 
demands for a general election,80 General Iskander Mirza, the President o f
79 See, Shafi, M., above note 55, at pp. 22-24.
80 See, Shaheed, Z. A., The Organisation and Leadership o f Industrial Labour in 
Karachi (Pakistan). Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, 1977, University of Leeds, U.K., p. 158.
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Pakistan, with the collaboration o f General Ayub Khan, the commander in chief 
o f the army, proclaimed Martial Law,81 dismantling the paraphernalia o f 
parliamentary Government and abrogating the Constitution o f 1956. The 
declaration o f Martial law was a serious set back in the development o f the right 
o f association since the constitutional guarantee ceased to exist.82 The labour 
laws o f the country remained in force after the declaration of Martial Law on 
7 October, 1958.
The failure to implement the Labour Policy o f 1955 led the Martial Law
Government to announce its revised policy in 1959. The new policy made a
significant departure from the earlier one in respect of Government's
international commitment as the policy began with the statement:
The policy o f the Government o f Pakistan in the field o f labour shall 
be based on the ILO Conventions and Recommendations ratified by 
Pakistan.83
It is of interest to note that the 1955 policy did not contain any clause having
reference to the ILO, though declared by a democratic Government. From the
ILO point o f view, in matters o f collective bargaining the policy was very
optimistic and encouraging as it was declared:
The employers and workers should negotiate with each other the terms 
and conditions o f employment and conclude collective agreements in 
fulfilling the commitment made by Government in ratifying the ILO 
Convention (No. 98) concerning Right to Organise and to Bargain
81 For, the Proclamation of Martial Law, see, Pakistan Legal Decision. (Central 
Statutes). 1958, p. 577.
82 Article 10 of the Constitution guaranteed the right o f association. See above, p. 99.
83 See above, note 65, at p. 1.
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Collectively.84
The above declaration was indeed a landmark in the annals o f industrial
relations, as it was for the first time that the Government in principle recognised
the concept o f collective bargaining having referred to Convention No. 98.
Though the term collective bargaining had not been used but "collective
agreement" as referred to above essentially indicated the essence o f the meaning
o f collective bargaining within the meaning o f Convention No. 98. Further, by
declaring as above, the Government expressed its intention to abide by and fulfil
its international obligations arising out o f ratification.
Like the Five Year Programme and the earlier labour policy o f 1955, the
new policy emphasised on recognition o f trade unions in the following terms:
In order that there is compulsory recognition o f trade unions by the 
employers, steps shall be taken immediately to set-up a machinery 
which can decide which union is worthy of recognition. The trade 
union having support o f the majority o f the workers in an establishment 
and a membership o f at least 10 percent of the total numbers in that 
establishment should be recognised.85
Following the declaration o f labour policy, on 24 April, 1960, the Martial 
Law Government promulgated the Trade unions (Amendment) Ordinance, 1960. 
This Ordinance inter alia introduced provisions for recognition o f trade unions 
by employers. Such recognition was not unconditional but subject to fulfilment 
o f conditions laid down under Article 28-B (l). Section 28-B (l) made it 
obligatory for an employer to recognise a trade union within three months o f its
84 Ibid, p. 7.
85 Id.
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application if the union fulfilled the conditions (a) to (f) specified in that 
Section.86 An employer was bound to recognise if all six conditions were 
fulfilled. If not, there was no obligation on him to recognise. Even after 
fulfilling the conditions if an employer refused to recognise, the unions could 
apply to Industrial Court for such recognition (Section, 28-C). Section 32-A 
provided that if an employer did not recognise a trade union after the Industrial 
Court had by order directed such recognition then the employer was punishable 
with a fine up to two thousand rupees. There was no other penalty. Thus the 
price to an employer o f refusal to recognise a trade union was a maximum o f 
two thousand rupees. On setting aside this sum, he could successfully defeat all 
the provisions o f the Ordinance concerning recognition. Thus if the employers 
did not change their attitude towards workers' organisations, the Ordinance was 
o f little importance as they could frustrate the object o f the Ordinance.
W hatever criticism may be centred against the provisions o f recognition
86 Section 28 B( l )  reads as follows:
An employer shall recognise a Trade Union, if  it fulfils the following conditions, 
namely:
(a) that it is a registered Trade Union and has complied with all the provisions o f this 
Act;
(b) that all its ordinary members are workmen employed in the same industry or in 
industries allied to or connected with one another;
(c) that, where there are more than one trade union, the number o f its members is not 
less than ten per cent o f the total number o f workmen employed in such industry or 
industries, and exceeds the number o f members of every other Trade Union in such 
industry or industries;
(d) that its rules provide for the procedure for declaring a strike;
(e) that its rules provide for the holding of a meeting o f the executive at least once in 
every six months and for holding a general meeting of the Trade Union once in every 
year; and
(f) that its rules do not provide for the exclusion o f any class of workmen referred to 
in clause (b)) from the membership o f the Trade Union.
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as provided in the Ordinance, there is no denying the fact that a law providing 
for recognition o f trade unions was long overdue and had been 'under 
consideration' in the hands o f central Government for the last twelve years. In 
fact a Bill to this effect had been introduced in the Legislature o f undivided 
India before partition and the central Government o f Pakistan was committed 
to continue the proceedings in respect to that Bill in its Legislature. 
Unfortunately, the Bill never came up before the legislature, although it was 
discussed about a dozen times in the Pakistan Labour Conference and the 
Standing Labour Committee.87 It was a story o f delay resulting in nothing. The 
Parliamentary Government having failed to do anything left the job to be done 
by the Martial law Government with one stroke.
If the employers in general had acted wisely and shown due respect and 
recognition o f workers' organisations, there probably would have been no 
occasion for incorporating the provisions o f recognition in the Ordinance. The 
promulgation o f the Ordinance indicated that the record o f the employers had 
not been encouraging as it was the Ordinance which aimed to satisfy the needs 
o f the situation.
Under the Ordinance, recognised unions had been given the right to 
bargain with the management, the terms and conditions o f employment - a right 
for which the workers were struggling for several decades. The rights o f the 
recognised trade unions were provided in Section 28-D in the following terms:
87 See, Shafi, M., "Recognition o f Trade Unions" in Eastern W orker. Vol. 1. No. 9, 
1960. p. 78.
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The executives of a recognised Trade Union shall be entitled to 
negotiate with the employer in respect o f matters connected with 
employment, unemployment, the terms of employment, and the 
conditions o f work o f all or any its members, and the employer shall 
receive and reply letters of, and grant interviews to, the executive in 
connection with any such matters except on issues on which as a result 
o f previous discussion or correspondence with the executive the 
employer has arrived at a conclusion.
The above provision placed the employer under an obligation to negotiate,
correspond and discuss issues with recognised trade unions except those issues
"on which as a result o f previous discussion or correspondence the employer
had arrived at a conclusion". Hence, if  there had been correspondence in respect
o f increase in wage and the employer had informed the union executive that he
had concluded not to give any increase in wages, then thereafter he could refuse
to bargain collectively. Thus, the above provision fell short o f Article 4 o f the
Convention No. 98 which provides for voluntary negotiation between employers'
and workers' organisations but nevertheless recognised the workers o f their right
of bargaining with their employers.
However, in order to protect and promote workers right o f association,
Section 28-1 specified what actions were to constitute unfair labour practice on
the part o f employers. It provided:
For the purposes o f this Act, it shall be an unfair practice on the part 
o f an employer:
(a) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce his workmen in the exercise of 
their rights to organise, form, join, or assist a Trade Union o f their 
choice to engage in concerted activities for the purpose o f mutual aid 
or protection;
(b) to interfere with the formation or administration o f any Trade 
Union or to contribute financial or other support to it;
(c) to discharge, or otherwise discriminate against, any officer o f a 
recognised Trade Union because of his being such officer.
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It appears that the above provisions gave effect to Article 1 paragraph (2)(b) and
Article 2 o f Convention No. 98 but not Article 1 paragraph (2)(a).88 Thus, the
Martial Law Government unlike the previous Governments at least began the
process o f incorporation o f the provisions o f  the Convention. But at the same
time the Government, contrary to its obligation to ensure workers' right to elect
representatives in full freedom as envisaged in Article 3 o f Convention No. 87,
restricted the right by amending Section 22 o f the Trade Unions Act, 1926
which allowed 50% o f the union officers to be outsiders. Section 22 as amended
by Section 9 o f the Trade Unions (Amendment) Ordinance, 1960 provided:
A registered Trade Union shall not elect more than twenty five percent 
o f the total number o f its officers from amongst the persons who are 
not actually employed or engaged in the industry with which the Trade 
Union is connected.
Section 3 o f the Trade Unions (Amendment) Ordinance, 1961 brought further
restrictions on the 'outsider' leadership by introducing a provision that in order
to be union executive these category o f persons must be paid as full time
workers. Actually, the appointment of'outsiders' as union executive was viewed
by Government to be contrary to the interest o f the workers.89 As such in its
labour policy o f 1959 the Government expressly declared:
In order that trade unionism develops in the country on healthy lines, 
steps shall be taken to ensure that the workers are not exploited by 
'outsiders' for their personal and political ends. The Trade Unions Act,
88 For the comments o f the Committee o f Experts on this issue, see below, chapter 5, 
pp. 203-204.
89 For trade union leaders' and workers' views on outsider leadership, see below, 
chapter 6, pp. 283-285.
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1926 should be suitably am ended in this regard.90
Similarly, the 1955 labour policy clearly indicated:
The percentage o f representation o f 'outsiders' in the union executive 
should be reduced from 50% to 25% under the Trade Unions Act.91
From the above policy statements o f successive Governments and the
subsequent promulgation o f legislation, it is clear that ratification o f Convention
No. 87 had very little influence on the policy makers and the Government did
not intend to abide by its international obligation o f allowing the workers to
elect their representatives in full freedom.
However, from our above discussion it is apparent that apart from
imposing restriction on election o f representatives, the Martial Law Government,
by amending the Trade Unions Act, 1926 for the first time gave partial effect
to Convention No. 98.
3.2.3 THE POST MARTIAL LAW PERIOD
The Martial Law declared on 7 October 1958 was withdrawn on 8 June 
1962 with the adoption of the Constitution o f Pakistan 1962. When President 
Ayub Khan decided to restore constitutional Government and a new Constitution 
was in the process o f being framed the demand for incorporation o f a Bill o f 
rights was all most unanimous. The Constitution Commission found that 
preponderance o f opinion (98.39%) was in favour o f a Bill o f Rights being
90 See above, note 65, at p. 6.
91 See above, note 65, at p. 37.
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incorporated in the new Constitution and being made enforceable by the courts 
as in the previous Constitution.92 When the Report o f the Commission was 
examined by the Cabinet Sub-Committee, a suggestion was made that the 
substance o f fundamental rights should be laid down within the Constitution as 
'principles o f law-making', but they should not be enforceable by the Courts. 
Ultimately this suggestion was approved by those who finally drafted the 
Constitution. The 'principles o f law-making' sought to maintain most o f the 
fundamental rights guaranteed under the 1956 Constitution including freedom 
o f association.93
These 'principles o f law-making' were merely pious declarations and there 
was no remedy provided should these principles be violated. It was perhaps 
meaningless to formulate and declare a long list o f  rights without providing a 
machinery to enforce them. The framers o f the Constitution tried to justify the 
new method by citing the case o f Britain where Parliament is the custodian o f 
these rights. But in the absence o f an English tradition the people could not 
safely rely on the English method for protecting the basic rights of the 
citizens.94 As soon as the Constitution was published there was vehement 
criticism o f the curtailment o f the powers o f the court in protecting the 
fundamental rights o f the citizen. The issue created a storm o f controversy and
92 Choudhury, G. W., Constitutional Development in Pakistan. London 1969, p. 240.
93 See, Paragraph 4 o f Chapter I, Part II of the 1962 Constitution.
94 See, Choudhury, G. W., above note 92, at p. 241.
109
insistent demands were made on behalf o f the people to make these 'principles 
o f law-making' enforceable by the law courts. President Ayub Khan responded 
to the wishes o f the people and a Bill was introduced by the central Government 
in the National Assembly during its Dhaka session in March, 1963 and the Bill 
was assented to by the President in January 1964 and came into force under the 
name o f the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1963. It brought an important 
change in the very concept o f the Constitution by making fundamental rights 
justiciable. It conferred substantially the same terms as in the previous 
Constitution o f 1956, a broad range o f rights o f individuals and groups subject 
in most cases to reasonable restriction in the public interest. Thus, paragraph 7 
of chapter I part II o f the Constitution guaranteed freedom o f association in the 
identical terms o f Article 10 o f the 1956 Constitution restoring the right which 
was abrogated by the proclamation o f Martial Law on 7 October 1958.
The Constitution having come into force, the Supreme Court o f Pakistan 
was called upon to uphold the constitutional guarantee o f the right in the case 
o f Abu A 'la Maudoodi v. Government o f  Pakistan,95 The matter came before the 
Court after two petitions being moved on behalf o f the Jamat-e-Islami of 
Pakistan under Article 98 o f the Constitution, one in West Pakistan High Court 
at Lahore96 and the other in the High Court o f  Dhaka97- calling in question the
95 See, Pakistan Legal Decisions (SC). Vol. XVI. 1964, p. 673.
96 See, Pakistan Legal Decisions (Karachi) Vol. XVI, 1964, p. 472.
97 See, Pakistan Legal Decisions (Dacca). Vol. XVI, 1964, p. 795.
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Notifications issued by the two provincial Governments on 6 January 196498 
extending the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908 to the two provinces, 
declaring the Jamat-e-Islami to be unlawful association under Section 16 o f the 
said A ct."  The petition filed at the High Court o f Lahore was dismissed but that 
presented to the High Court at Dhaka succeeded and it was declared that the 
Notification issued under Section 16 o f the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 
1908, had no longer any binding effect and the provincial Government was 
directed to rescind, cancel or withdraw the Notification. In the appeal before the 
Supreme Court, the most important question that fell for determination was 
whether Section 16 o f the Criminal Law Act, 1908 was in conflict with the 
exercise o f fundamental right No. 7 guaranteed by the Constitution.100 Further 
the point that arose for consideration was whether the Act imposed reasonable 
restrictions on the right to form an association, possessed by every citizen, in 
the interest o f morality or public order.101
The vires o f the Act were attacked on the ground that it conferred
98 The notification issued by the Governor of East Pakistan was as follows: 
"W hereas the Governor o f East Pakistan is of opinion that the association known as 
Jamat-e-Islami has for its object interference o f law and order, and that its activities 
are such as to constitute a danger to the public peace.
Now, therefore, in exercise o f the powers conferred by subSection (i) of 
Section 16 o f the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908 (Act XIV 1908), the Governor 
is pleased to declare the Jamat-e-Islami to be an unlawful Association within the 
meaning o f Part II o f the said Act".
99 For the provisions o f Section 16 o f the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, see 
above, p. 72.
100 See above, note 95, at p. 729.
101 Ibid, at p. 730.
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unguided discretion on the Provincial Government to declare an association as
unlawful, on the opinion formed subjectively with regard to objective facts and
which opinion was not open to judicial review. Secondly, it was urged that this
involved condemning an association unheard. There was no provision in that
Act for hearing the persons concerned either before or after the declaration o f
an association as unlawful, so that at no stage the point o f view of the persons
affected could be presented to relevant authorities. Thirdly, there was no
provision for appeal from the order o f the Provincial Government, whether o f
an executive or judicial kind. Fourthly, it was urged that the Notification issued
was to last indefinitely. These aspects o f the impugned Act, it was argued by
the appellants, were enough to condemn it as imposing unreasonable restrictions
on fundamental right o f citizens to form an association.102
The Supreme Court was in agreement with the above submission and
accordingly the decision o f East Pakistan High Court was upheld. To quote
Justice S. A. Rahman:
After considering the m atter in all its aspects I have reached to the 
conclusion that the impugned Act o f 1908 imposes restrictions on the 
exercise o f the fundamental right o f forming associations which can not 
be described as reasonable.103
His lordship further emphasised:
I am therefore, firmly o f the opinion that the provisions o f Act XIV o f 
1908 violative as they are, o f the exercise of the fundamental right of 
forming associations, must be condemned as imposing unreasonable 
restrictions on that right. The Act must consequently be declared to be
102 Ibid, at p. 730.
103 Ibid, at p. 734.
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void to the extent of its inconsistency with fundamental right No. 7.
The above decision was indeed a landmark in the annals of exercise o f right o f 
association which curtailed the powers o f Provincial Government to declare an 
association as unlawful under Section 16 o f the o f the Act. The impugned Act 
conferred an arbitrary power on the Provincial Government to put an end o f the 
existence o f an association. This unguided discretion was subject to no check, 
judicial or otherwise and had the potentialities o f becoming an engine o f 
suppression and oppression o f functioning any association at the hands o f the 
Government.
In 1965, the Government o f East Pakistan enacted the East Pakistan 
Trade Unions Act, 1965 repealing the Trade Unions Act, 1926. The object was 
to re-enact the Trade Unions Act, 1926 with certain amendments to provide for 
a more realistic manner o f registration and recognition o f trade unions in the
104province.
A reading o f the provisions o f the Act showsthe other side o f the coin. 
It was far from being 'more realistic' and did not intend to facilitate healthy 
growth o f trade unions and was more restrictive than the repealed Act. The 
registration o f trade unions was made more difficult by imposing new and 
additional conditions. For example, in order to be registered and recognised, a 
trade union needed to have a minimum membership o f one hundred workers or 
ten per cent o f the total strength o f workers employed in the establishment or
104 For the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act, see, Dhaka Gazette 
Extraordinary. 26 July 1965, p. 1109.
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industry, or which ever was less.105 On the contrary, under the repealed Act,106 
any seven or more members could apply for registration o f a union.
The new Act further limited the scope o f 'outsider' participation in the 
union executive as in Section 24 (1) (c) it was provided that such category o f 
persons must be from amongst those "whose principal advocation is trade 
unionism". Thus there was an absolute bar on the election o f 'outsiders' as 
officers o f trade unions. Only those persons who were employed in the industry 
or those whose principal advocation was trade unionism (not exceeding 25%) 
could be elected as officers o f the union. The enactment o f this provision was 
in clear violation o f Article 3 o f Convention No. 87 which advocates for 
election o f representatives in full freedom.
The present Act provided that a union could be required to disclose any 
financial or other assistance received by it from any source whatsoever either 
from inside or outside the country.107 This provision was in clear contradiction 
to Article 3(2) o f Convention No. 87 which provided "public authorities shall 
refrain from any interference which would restrict this right o f associationl0S or 
impede the lawful exercise thereof'. With regard to recognition o f unions the 
present Act represented a retrograde step in the development o f right of
103 See, East Pakistan Trade Unions Act. 1965. Section, 6(2)(a).
106 Trade Unions Act. 1926. Section 4.
107 East Pakistan Trade Unions. Act 1965. Section 17.
108 Italics added.
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association since unlike the repealed Act (Trade Unions Act, 1926) as amended 
by the Trade Union (Amendment) Ordinance, 1960, it did not provide any 
sanction for non-recognition o f unions by employers.109
Immediately after the promulgation o f the East Pakistan Trade Unions 
Act, 1965, the conflict between India and Pakistan began and on 6 September 
1965 President Ayub Khan, in exercise o f the powers conferred by Article 30(1) 
o f the Constitution o f Pakistan, 1962, issued a Proclamation o f Emergency 
throughout Pakistan on the plea that a grave emergency existed in which 
Pakistan was in imminent danger o f  being threatened by w ar.110 With reference 
to this Proclamation o f Emergency and in exercise o f power conferred by 
Article 30(1) o f the Constitution the President promulgated an Order which inter 
alia provided that the right to move the Courts for fundamental rights provided 
for in chapter I o f part II o f the Constitution dealing with the right to freedom 
o f association and all proceeding in Courts for the enforcement o f the said right 
were to remain suspended for the period during which the Proclamation of 
Emergency was in force.111 The Emergency was not lifted even after the 
Tashkent Agreement o f January, 1966, which had formally terminated the 
conflict with India. Hence, the suspension of enforcement o f the right of 
association continued under the Proclamation o f Emergency. Thus, the
109 See above, p. 104.
110 Gazette o f Pakistan. Extraordinary. 6 September, 1965.
111 For the Order under Article 30 o f the Constitution o f Pakistan, 1962, see, Gazette 
of Pakistan, Extraordinary. 6 September, 1965.
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constitutional guarantee o f the right as upheld by the Supreme Court in the case 
o f Abul A'la Maudoodi was o f little practical value and importance.
Further, from the above discussion it is apparent that the Government 
while promulgating the Trade Unions Act, 1965, did not take into consideration 
o f its obligations under the ratified Conventions on freedom o f association. It 
is also apparent that during this period the workers' right o f association fell 
short o f  trade union legislation that existed under the Trade Unions Act, 1926.
3.2.4 THE SECOND MARTIAL LAW PERIOD
Immediately after the India and Pakistan War in 1965, the political 
situation o f the country took a different direction and an anti-Ayub movement 
was being concretised under the leadership o f Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Z.A. 
Bhutto in the East and West Pakistan respectively. Under their leadership in the 
face o f a nation-wide popular upsurge, the Emergency was lifted on 17 
February, 1969 and ultimately President Ayub Khan had to resign and hand 
over power to General Yahya Khan, Chief o f Army Staff, who proclaimed 
Martial Law on 25 March, 1969. The direct impact was that the Constitution o f 
1962 was abrogated."2 On 4 April, 1969 the Provisional Constitution Order was 
passed which revived the Constitution but inter alia abrogated paragraph 7 o f 
chapter I o f Part II o f the Constitution dealing with freedom o f association.113
112 For the Proclamation o f Martial Law, 25 March, See, Pakistan Legal Decisions
(Central Statutes) ,1969, p. 42.
113 Ibid, p. 41.
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Further, a Martial Law Regulation114 prohibited strikes, lockouts and agitations
in educational institutions, public utility works and installations, services and
industrial concerns.
The imposition o f Martial Law was the response to a profound political
crisis which was rooted in a deep economic and social crisis as well as political
discontent. According to Shaheed:
None o f the established political leaders opposed its imposition. In fact, 
they welcomed it at a time when the political situation had rapidly 
moved beyond their control with the masses, though leaderless, making 
a shattering impact on the Pakistan political scene.115
The turbulent period preceding the imposition o f Martial Law had brought an
unprecedented degree o f working class militancy to the surface o f the labour
movement which prompted the Government to offer a new organisational
framework to contain this m ilitancy.116
In view o f the above situation, a Labour Conference was convened by the
Martial Law regime on 4 May 1969 and as a result o f its deliberations a new
labour policy was announced on 5 July, 1969 by Air Marshal M. Nur Khan.117
The policy118 made a bold admission that the previous policies had failed due
to the lack o f adequate machinery for their implementation and promised that
114 Ibid, p. 48, Regulation No. 18.
113 See, Shaheed, Z.A., above note 80, at p. 433.
116 Ibid, p. 433.
117 Amjad, R. and Mahmood, K., Industrial Relations and Political Process in Pakistan 
1947-77. Geneva 1982, p. 19.
118 See, Labour Policy 1969, in Shafi, M., Labour policy of Pakistan. Karachi 1969.
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the policy would be supported by the necessary machinery for its
implementation. It also recognised that it was only through his membership o f
a trade union that a worker could safeguard his rights and further his interests.
The main reasons for the slow growth o f trade unions had been enumerated by
the policy. They were, first, the acceptance o f a mode o f tenant-landlord
relationship in industrial life by the workers. Secondly, the attitude o f the
employer in looking upon the trade unions as instruments for extortion rather
than as institutions for peaceful relations o f conflicts and higher productivity.
Thirdly, the attitude o f the Government in discouraging and prohibiting
expression o f industrial conflict rather than trying to solve it and its failure to
realise that conflict could not be dissolved by suppression, but only through a
process o f mutual give and take which was possible through strong trade union
institution. While emphasising the need for trade unions the policy stated:
The objective o f an Industrial Relations system is to provide a 
framework within which the conflicts inherent in a worker-employer 
relationship may be peacefully resolved. The key to a successful system 
o f industrial relations, particularly in a country with large surplus 
labour force, lies in the growth and functioning o f a strong and 
representative trade union m ovem ent.119
It was further emphasised in the policy:
If a successful system o f industrial relations is to operate in Pakistan, 
it will be necessary to give every encouragement to the growth o f a 
strong trade union movement. To do so, it will be necessary to make 
our laws, particularly those relating to the formation and working o f 
trade unions far less restrictive than they are at present.120
119 Ibid, pp. 2-3.
120 Ibid, p. 4.
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Thus, the Government admitted that the existing laws were restrictive. It is 
however, important to note that the policy did not specify that the Government 
was going to remove the restrictions but only make 'less restrictive'.
Like the policy o f 1959, the new policy did not make any reference to 
the ILO Conventions and Recommendations, though frankly admitted the 
retarded position o f right o f association and the failure o f earlier Governments 
in this regard. Now the question arises what was the motive behind the 
declaration o f such 'radical' policy immediately after promulgation o f Martial 
Law. According to G. W. Choudhury, the explanation lies in the power 
ambitions o f Nur Khan within the ruling junta. He "wanted to create an image 
as against Yahya, by introducing 'radical' reform s".121 As a result o f  that Nur 
Khan was soon divested o f his position o f Deputy Chief Martial Law 
Administrator.122 According to Amjad and Mahmood, "the aim o f the Martial 
Law Government had been mainly to blunt the militant stance o f the workers 
and to try to placate them ".123
However, once the policy was announced the demand for its immediate 
implementation became widespread and led to unrest and agitation amongst 
workers. As a result, the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 was promulgated 
on November 3, 1969 repealing the laws on trade unions and industrial deputes.
121 Choudhury, G.W., The Last Days o f United Pakistan. London 1974, p. 51.
122 See, Shaheed, Z. A., above note 80, at p. 439.
123 Amjad, R. and Mahmood K., Industrial Relations and the Political Process in 
Pakistan 1947-1977. Geneva 1982, p. 22.
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It is remarkable to note that in the realm o f labour law, the term freedom o f 
association was used for the first time in this Ordinance.124 In framing workers' 
right o f association, the framers o f the Ordinance theoretically relied heavily on 
the ILO Convention concerning Freedom o f Association and Protection o f the 
Right to Convention, 1948 (No. 87), as almost all the provisions o f the 
Convention were incorporated in the Ordinance. Below, we will see how it had 
been reflected.
Following Article 2 o f  Convention No. 87, Section 3(a) and (b) provided 
that workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right 
to establish, and subject only to the rules o f the organisation concerned, to join 
association o f their own choosing without previous authorisation. This provision 
did not make any departure from Article 2 o f  the Convention, except using the 
words 'join associations' instead o f using the Convention words 'join 
organisations'. This virtually made no difference in guaranteeing the right.
Following Article 3 o f the Convention, Section 3(c) provided that trade 
union and employers' association shall have the right to draw up their 
Constitution and rules, to elect their representatives in full freedom, to organise 
their administration and activities and to formulate their programmes. It is of 
interest to note that unlike Article 3(2) o f the ILO Convention, it did not contain 
any clause that public authorities shall refrain from any interference which 
would restrict this right or impede the lawful exercise thereof. Further, it did not
124 See, Section 3 of the Ordinance.
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contain any clause following Article 4 o f Convention No. 87 that workers' and 
employers' organisations shall not be liable to be dissolved or suspended by 
administrative authority.
Following Article 5 o f Convention No. 87, Section 3(d) provided that 
workers' and employers' organisation shall have the right to establish and join 
federations and confederations and any such organisation, shall have the right 
to affiliate with international organisations and confederations o f workers' and 
employers' organisations. However, no legal provisions or regulations were 
provided in the Ordinance for such affiliation. Hence, in order to form a 
federation or confederation or to affiliate themselves with international 
organisations, the workers' and employers' organisation had complete freedom. 
The Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, unlike Article 6 o f Convention No. 
87 did not make it clear whether the above provisions granting freedom of 
association would apply to federation or confederation o f workers' and 
employers' organisations.
Like Article 8 o f Convention No. 87, Section 4 o f the Ordinance stated 
that the rights provided in Section 3 concerning freedom o f association were 
subject to the condition that workers and employers must respect the law o f the 
land in exercising the right. But the framers o f the Ordinance did not take into 
consideration that clause 2 o f Article 8 o f Convention No. 87 provided that the 
law o f the land shall not be such as to impair nor shall it be applied as to 
impair, the guarantees provided for in this Convention.
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For the first time, in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, the
concept o f recognition o f trade union was changed to a concept o f collective
bargaining agent.125 Section 2(v) o f the Ordinance defined collective bargaining
agent as follows:
Collective bargaining agent, in relation to an establishment or industry, 
means the trade union o f workmen which, under Section 22, is the 
agent o f the workmen in the establishment or, as the case may be, 
industry in the m atter o f collective bargaining.
Under Section 22, two methods were described for forming collective
bargaining agents. In the first case, where there was only one trade union
(registered) in an establishment, then that union was to be deemed to be the
collective bargaining agent for that establishment. In the second case, if there
were more than one union (registered) then there was to be a secret ballot, and
the union obtaining highest number o f votes was to be declared collective
bargaining agent by the registrar. Section 22(6)(b) o f the Ordinance laid down
rights o f the collective bargaining agent in the following manner:
The executive o f a trade union ... which is a collective bargaining agent 
... shall be entitled to undertake collective bargaining with the employer 
or employers on matters connected with employment, non-employment, 
the terms o f employment or conditions o f work of any person.
Thus, it appears that the above provisions o f the Ordinance according to Article
4 o f Convention No. 98 introduced machinery for voluntary negotiation between
125 It may be recalled that the Provincial Government o f East Pakistan enacted the 
Trade Unions (Recognition), Ordinance, 1958 making provision for recognition of 
registered trade unions by employers (Section 3). The Central Government in the year m o  
amending the Trade Unions Act o f 1926 incorporated with modification these 
principles o f recognition o f trade unions in Section 28-B. Further, the East Pakistan 
Government, in the Trade Unions Act o f 1965 with little modification, introduced the 
same provision for recognition of trade unions (Section 33).
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employers and workers organisations. While the ILO advocates collective 
bargaining as a general principle and while Governments which have ratified 
Convention No. 98 are under the obligation to promote and encourage collective 
bargaining, it is left to each country to decide what is the best machinery to be 
established in order to put this principle into practice. No set pattern has been 
fixed in this regard and the methods and practices followed in the various 
countries o f the world vary greatly as regards the conclusion, the contents and 
the effects o f collective bargaining, as well as the level at which they are 
concluded.126
In the realm o f industrial relations the real concept o f institutionalised 
collective bargaining was introduced in Pakistan in 1969, which according to 
Rizvi was "as a direct offspring o f labour unrest and a general demand for 
ameliorating the lot o f w orkers".127 It was also a manifestation o f the 
Government's policy aimed at giving a new momentum to the relationship o f 
workers' and employers. The pre-requisite o f a successful system o f collective 
bargaining included a strong and representative trade union movement, 
responsible and responsive organisations o f employers and a clear definition o f 
the Government's role in the operation of the system o f industrial relations. 
Collective bargaining in its new form and content conferred a large measure o f
126 ILO, Report of the ILO/SIDA Mission on Workers' Participation in Management 
in Banuladesh. Geneva 1973, p. 53.
127 Rizvi, S. A., Industrial Relations and Development in Pakistan. Bangkok 1979, p. 
24.
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industrial freedom and democracy and demanded maturity and increased
responsibility on the part o f trade union, employers and Government.
Like the earlier laws128 it provided for registration o f trade unions which
was optional.129 However, the serious set back was that following the earlier
laws it also accorded rights and privileges only to registered unions, so if a
union decided not to register it would not be immune from criminal and civil
liability which registered unions would enjoy under the Ordinance.130 Regarding
'outsider' participation in the union executive, following the repealed Act, the
new Ordinance under Section 7 allowed 25%, but persons in this category, as
in the earlier laws131 were not required to be full time paid trade union workers
having trade unionism as their principle advocation. Though, it was less
restrictive than the earlier laws, yet it was contrary to the requirements o f
Article 3 o f the ILO Convention No. 87 as full freedom to elect the
representatives o f unions was not provided.
However, an important guarantee o f the workers' right o f association was
outlined in Section 15(1) o f the Ordinance. It provided:
No employer or trade union o f employers and no persons acting on 
behalf o f either shall:
(a) impose any condition in a contract o f employment seeking to
128 The Trade Unions Act. 1926 and the Trade Unions Act. 1965.
129 The Industrial Relations Ordinance. 1969. Section 5.
130 Ibid, Sections 17 and 18.
131 See, Section 22 of the Trade Unions Act. 1926 as amended by Section 3 o f the 
Trade Unions (Amendment) Ordinance. 1961 and Section 24 o f the Trade Unions Act. 
1965.
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restrain the right o f a person who is a party to such contract to join a 
trade union or continue his membership o f a trade union; or
(b) refuse to employ or refuse to continue to employ any person on the 
ground that such person is, or is not, a member or officer o f a trade 
union; or
(c) discriminate against any person in regard to any employment, 
promotion, condition o f employment or working condition on the 
ground that such person is, or is not, a member or officer of a trade 
union; or
(d) dismiss, discharge, remove from employment or threaten to dismiss, 
discharge or remove from employment a workman or injure or threaten 
to injure him in respect o f his employment by reason that the 
workman-
(i) is or propose to become, or seeks to persuade any 
other person to become, a member or officer o f a trade 
union; or
(ii) participates in the promotion, formation or activities 
of a trade union;
(e) induce any person to refrain from becoming, or cease to be a 
member or officer of a trade union, by offering to confer any advantage 
on, or by procuring or offering to procure any advantage for such 
person or any other person.
The above provision has its source in Article 1 o f Convention No. 98. Unlike
earlier legislative efforts,132 the present provision completed the task o f
incorporating the essence o f Article 1 o f Convention No. 98, providing adequate
safeguards for the workers against acts o f anti-union discrimination in respect
o f their employment.
In summary, the IRO, 1969 passed by the second military regime of
Pakistan which came to power not through armed rebellion but as a result o f
political unrest, on the whole offered a progressive piece o f legislation in the
spectrum o f exercise o f the right o f association. This legislative gesture may be
132 See, Section 28-1 of the Trade Unions Act. 1926 as amended by Section 11 o f the 
Trade Unions (Amendment) Ordinance. 1960 and Section 40 o f the Trade Unions Act. 
1965.
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said to have embarked on a laudable journey towards compliance with the 
Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 which was overdue since the Conventions stood 
ratified.
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CHAPTER 4 
THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN 
INDEPENDENT BANGLADESH: AN ANALYSIS OF 
LEGISLATION AND POLICY
Having outlined and analysed in the last chapter the development o f legislation 
and policy on freedom of association in pre independence Bangladesh, the 
present chapter attempts to explore the development o f the right to freedom o f 
association in independent Bangladesh i.e., since 1971. This chapter will 
investigate whether the political independence o f Bangladesh resulted in 
elevating the workers' right to freedom o f association in conformity with the 
ILO Conventions in comparison to what was prevalent during Pakistani period. 
Attempts will be taken further to assess the compatibility o f the legislation and 
policy with that o f the ILO standards.
4.1 THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA
After emerging as an independent state, the Government o f the People’s 
Republic o f Bangladesh adopted the entire body o f labour legislation that was 
in force in the territory before the Declaration o f Independence on 26 March,
127
1971.' With regard to international obligations in relation to the ILO 
Conventions, when the Government o f Bangladesh applied to the ILO for 
membership,2 it formally accepted the obligations o f the Constitution o f the ILO 
and pledged to be bound by the Conventions which were in effect in its territory 
at the time o f declaration o f independence. Thus, the citizens of this newly 
independent state were assured, inter alia, o f  the full enjoyment o f the right to 
freedom o f association in conformity with the Right o f Association (Agriculture) 
Convention, 1921 (No. 11), the Convention Concerning Freedom of Association 
and Protection o f the Right Organise Convention, 1948, (No. 87) and Right to 
Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949, (No. 98).
Having achieved independence, the year 1972 began with much 
expectation and enthusiasm amongst all sections o f the society, particularly the 
working class. The workers were directly involved in the liberation struggle for 
political independence3 and thousands o f them went through a process o f 
psychological and ideological transformation. They knew how to handle
1 See, Laws Continuance Enforcement Order. 1971, in Dhaka Law Reports. 
(Bangladesh Statutes). Vol. 24, 1971-72, p. 3; Bangladesh (Adaptation o f Existing 
Laws) Order. 1972. in Dhaka Law Reports (Bangladesh Statutes) Vol. 24, 1971-72, 
p. 135.
2 For membership o f Bangladesh in the ILO, see above, chapter 2, pp. 30-34.
3 The contribution o f the working class in the war o f liberation has been recognised 
by the Government in its labour policy declared on 27 September, 1972, which reads 
as follows: "Government and people are grateful to the working class population of 
the country for their indomitable support during the war o f liberation movement. It is 
also gratifying to note that a large number o f workers crossed over and took part in 
the liberation movement and fought valiantly for the liberation and those who 
remained inside also rendered active support to the liberation movement". See, Labour 
Policy. 1972.
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weapons, how to fight and lastly they were also assured by the political leaders
that the future Bangladesh would ensure their material and social development.
All these naturally raised their level o f expectation to a certain extent which was
difficult to reach in a war-devastated country within a very short period o f time.
Thus, before entering into the subject o f right to freedom o f association,
it is necessary to recall briefly the situation that prevailed in Bangladesh after
the independence o f the country. The atmosphere in independent Bangladesh
was well summarised by the Report o f  the ILO/SIDA Mission, headed by Mr.
Givry, Chief o f the Social Institutions Development Department o f the ILO,
who visited Bangladesh in 1973. He reported in the following terms:
The Government was faced with a war-torn economy, disrupted 
communication system, social dislocation due to the return of hundreds 
o f thousands o f industrial workers from the refugee camps in India 
after about nine months. They were driven out from the factories by the 
'settlers' with the help o f Pakistani Army in 1971. When they returned 
home, they found their houses either destroyed or burnt down.
Industrial undertakings, most o f which were owned and managed by 
W est Pakistani employers were suddenly abandoned by these owners 
and managers and left uncared.
Many workers, during their refugee life suffered privations, hunger and 
some o f them took part in guerilla activities. They returned with the 
liberation forces and found that the settlers' fled away along with the 
Pakistanis. They were thus inclined to take over the enterprises in 
which they worked. Some Bengali owners were thrown away from 
their establishment and their industries were also taken over by the 
workers on the plea that a step towards socialism.The local Bengalee 
middle class people who were still serving in the enterprises during the 
war o f liberation were regarded as 'collaborators' and the workers had 
no respect for them which resulted in complete indiscipline in the rank 
and file.4
This state o f affairs, it appears, had contributed towards the imposition of
4 ILO, Report o f the ILO/SIDA Mission on Workers' Participation in M anagement in 
Bangladesh. Geneva 1973, pp. 6-7.
certain restrictive laws by the Government immediately after independence. 
Accordingly, one o f the first restrictive measures was the Presidential Order No. 
55 o f 29 May, 1972,5 which banned all strikes and unfair labour practices in the 
nationalised industries.6 It was provided in that Order that no workmen or trade 
union o f workmen and no person acting on behalf o f such trade union shall in 
any nationalised industries resort to strike from the date o f commencement of 
the Order and such further period, which in the opinion o f the Government was 
warranted in the interest o f the national economy, as would be notified in the 
official Gazette from time to time.7 It was further provided that no workmen or 
trade union o f workmen and no person acting on behalf o f such trade union by 
using intimidation, coercion, pressure, threats, confinement to a place, physical 
injury, disconnection o f phone, water or power facilities and such other methods 
compel or attempt to compel the employer to sign a memorandum o f settlement 
or agreement, to make any payment or other benefits.8 It may be recalled that 
Convention No. 98 has been designed to ensure and promote voluntary
3 See, Bangladesh Nationalised Enterprises and Statutory Corporations (Prohibition of
Strikes and Unfair Labour Practice) Order. 1972. in Dhaka Law Reports. Vol. 24,
1972, p. 146.
6 For a detailed account of the background, circumstances and scope o f the 
nationalisation programme, see, Sobhan, R. and Ahmad, M., Public Enterprise in an 
Intermediate Regime: A study in the Political Economy o f Bangladesh. Dhaka 1980 
chapter 8; See also, Bangladesh Industrial Enterprises (Nationalisation) Order. 1972. 
in Dhaka Law Reports. Vol. 24, 1972, p. 24.
7 For the text o f the Order, see, Dhaka Law Reports. Vol. 24, 1972, p. 146.
8 See, Section 3, Bangladesh Nationalised Enterprises and Statutory Corporations 
(Prohibition o f Strikes and Unfair Labour Practice) Order. 1972. in Dhaka Law 
Reports. Vol. 24, 1972, p. 146.
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negotiation and collective agreement,9 not agreement through intimidation, 
coercion, pressure, threats etc. Thus, the imposition o f agreement by the above 
means was beyond the scope o f Convention No. 98. The prohibition o f strikes 
in nationalised enterprises undoubtedly violated workers' right o f association as 
the Committee on Freedom of Association10 has always regarded the right to 
strike as constituting a fundamental right o f workers and their organisations if 
undertaken in furtherance o f defending their economic interests.11 The ban on 
strikes only existed for six m onths.12 However, even if it is argued that in view 
o f the national interest13 to increase production, the interim measure may have 
been justified to reconstruct the national economy, one has to bear in mind that 
according to the ILO Committee on Freedom o f Association, a general 
prohibition o f strikes seriously limits the means available to Trade Unions to 
further and defend the interests o f their members and the right to organise their
9 Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949. Article 4.
10 For details about the Committee, see below, chapter 5.
11 ILO, Committee on Freedom of Association. 27th Report, Case No. 156, Para 287; 
172nd Report, Case No. 885, Para 384; 214th Report, Case No. 1067, Para 208.
12 The ban on strikes was automatically lifted on 29 November, 1972, as it was not 
subsequently extended by Government Gazette Notification.
13 The Prime M inister in a press statement on 9 February, 1972, urged the workers to 
maximise the production and to entrust themselves in the task o f nation reconstruction. 
He particularly referred to the following: (a) The workers should not allow any 
consideration to stand in the way o f putting the wheels o f industry for production; (b) 
They should exert themselves to the utmost production; (c) For the time being the 
workers should accept the existing wage rates and other benefits. See, Ahmad, K., 
Labour movement in Bangladesh, Dhaka 1978, pp. 100-101.
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activities.14 Accordingly, protest came from the workers and one trade union 
federation namely, Bangladesh W orkers Federation lodged a complaint (Case 
No. 729)15 to the ILO Committee on Freedom o f Association against 
promulgation o f the Order, details o f which will be discussed below in chapter
5 .16
4.2 A NEW POLICY FOR LABOUR
The independence o f Bangladesh brought some changes in the context
Government's policy towards labour. Immediately after independence, the Prime
Minister made a press statement on 9 February, 1972, which reads as follows:
I assure our workers that the basic goal o f the socialist economy, which 
we are committed to achieve, will be securing the rights o f workers and 
ensuring their welfare. A plan is being prepared where by measures o f 
nationalisation would be combined with new arrangements to ensure 
workers participation in the management o f industries.17
Within this framework o f reference, on 19 February, 1972, the Government 
appointed a committee, known as the Kamruddin Com m ittee18 to prepare a 
report on 'W orkers Participation in Management'. Based on the
14 See above, note 11, 149th Report, Cases Nos. 676 and 803, para 79; 218th Report, 
Case No. 1115, para 259; 233rd Report, Case No. 1219, para 653.
15 See, ILO, Official Bulletin. Vol. LVII, Series B, No. 1 (Supplement), 1974, pp. 288- 
90.
16 See below, chapter 5, pp. 221-223.
17 Quoted by Khan, M. M., and Ahmed, M., Participative M anagement in Industry. 
Dhaka 1980, p. 56.
18 The Committee was headed by Mr. Kamruddin Ahmed who was at that time 
president o f Bangladesh Employers' Association.
132
recommendations o f the Committee, on 27 September, 1972, Mr. Zahur Ahmed,
Minister in charge o f labour announced a new labour policy.
The policy significantly departed from the earlier policy o f 196919 on the
basis o f which the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, was promulgated. The
new policy differentiated between private and public sector workers in respect
o f industrial relations. The right to collective bargaining was allowed to private
sector workers but such rights were not granted to public sector workers. In
relation to public sector industries, the policy proposed the constitution o f
Management Board20 and Management Council21 to resolve differences between
labour and management through joint consultations instead o f collective
bargaining. The policy further envisaged as follows:
Government feel that as there will be greater participation o f workers 
in the management o f nationalised industries, the differences will be 
resolved through joint consultative methods in the M anagement Board.
In the circumstances there will be no necessity for collective bargaining 
by workers employed in industries nationalised or taken over by 
Government.22
Convention No. 98 is in no way limited to the private sector. It also applies to
19 For a detailed discussion o f the Labour Policy. 1969. see above, chapter 3, pp. 117- 
119.
20 The policy described M anagement Board as follows: "There shall be a top 
M anagement Board in nationalised/taken over industries consisting o f two 
representatives each from employers and workers and one from Financial Institution 
for smooth functioning o f industries".
21 The policy described Management Council as follows: "There shall also be workers 
Management Council at each industrial plant with equal number o f management and 
workers to deal with the day to day problems and also disciplinary cases relating to 
the workers".
22 See, Labour Policy, 1972.
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the public sector o f the economy with the exception o f public servants engaged
in the administration o f the state.23
Further, the right to strike as a means o f settling disputes was not
recognised in the policy but it was emphasised that differences between labour
and management would be settled by peaceful means. It is nothing short o f
saying that industrial strike and collective bargaining is not a peaceful and
constitutional method o f settling disputes between labour and management. In
order to justify the strategy o f curtailing the right to strike and collective
bargaining the Government adopted an idealistic approach by stating:
... as the fruits o f the nationalised industries will be fully utilised for 
benefits o f the entire population o f the country ... there should not be 
any conflicts o f interests between management and workers.24
Soon after the declaration o f the policy there was serious resentment o f 
and opposition to the policy amongst the workers, mainly due to the fact that 
the collective bargaining in matters o f wages and fringe benefits was taken 
away.25 Further, the policy was not accepted by the workers as it brought down 
the activities o f trade unions to the state o f a welfare organisation.26 According
23 See, Article 6 o f Convention No. 98.
24 See, Labour Policy. 1972.
25 Mortuza, G., "Labour Laws: Policies and Principles with Particular Reference to 
Bangladesh", in Industrial Relations Laws Policies and Principles. Dhaka 1982, p. 
A 14.
26 The policy read as follows: "The absence o f collective bargaining by workers in 
nationalised or taken over industries will not mean cessation o f trade union activities. 
The functions o f the trade unions will be: (i) In relation to ... nationalised and taken 
over industries, to promote measures for well-being of the working class, take care o f 
safety and protection o f labour at work place, provide training, education and other
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to Ahmed "even the Jatio Sramik League, the labour front o f the ruling party 
bitterly criticised it, as it was not in conformity with the ILO Conventions Nos. 
87 and 98".27 Against this restrictive policy Bangladesh Workers Federation 
filed a complaint (Case No. 729)28 to the ILO Committee on Freedom of 
Association.29 After the Constitution o f the People's Republic o f Bangladesh had 
come into force on 16 December 1972, the Government decided that the 
implementation o f the labour policy should be deferred till it was reviewed in 
the light o f the Constitution and the Government was satisfied that the policy 
was not in violation o f any provision o f the Constitution.30
4.3. CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF THE RIGHT
Soon after the declaration o f the labour policy, the People's Republic o f 
Bangladesh adopted its new Constitution. Following the modem trend, the 
Constitution contains in Part III a justiciable Bill o f Rights.31 It may be recalled 
that in respect o f the right to freedom o f association, the Pakistan Constitution
welfare facilities to the workers and thereby create conditions for higher productivity 
in the over-all interest o f the country ... ."
27 Ahmed, M., "Labour Policy and Collective Bargaining", in National Seminar on 
Trade Union Developm ent. Dhaka 1980, p. 18.
28 See above, note, 15.
29 For discussion o f the case, see below, chapter 5, pp. 221-223.
30 ILO, Report o f the ILO/SIDA Mission on W orkers’ Participation in M anagement in 
Bangladesh. Geneva 1973, p. 15.
31 Article 44 o f the Constitution guarantees the right to move to the Supreme Court 
in accordance with Article 102(1) for enforcement o f the fundamental rights.
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o f 1956 guaranteed this right in Article 10 o f part II and exactly the same
provision was also incorporated in right No. 7 o f Part II o f the Pakistan
Constitution, 1962, which read as follows:
Every citizen shall have the right to form associations or unions, 
subject to any reasonable restriction imposed by law in the interest of 
morality and public order.
Exactly the same provision has also been incorporated in Article 38 o f the
Constitution o f Bangladesh, 1972. But in order to make this provision consistent
with one o f the fundamental principles o f state policy, i.e., the principle of
'secularism' as provided in Article 12 o f the Constitution, a proviso was added
to Article 38 which limited this right in the following manner:
Provided that no person shall have the right to form, or be a member 
or otherwise take part in the activities of, any communal or other 
association or union which in the name or on the basis o f any religion 
has for its object, or pursues, a political purpose.
Thus, the framers o f the Constitution, had not only laid down the principle of 
right to form association but also provided the grounds and the extent of 
restriction o f the right.
The principle o f free choice o f trade unions is an essential element of 
freedom of association which has been denied by the proviso to Article 38. This 
is clearly incompatible with Article 2 o f Convention No. 87.32 The Committee 
on Freedom o f Association33 has emphasised that it attaches importance to the 
fact that workers and employers should in practice be able to form and join
32 See, Convention on Freedom of Association and Right to Organise Convention. 
1948.
33 For details about the Committee on Freedom o f Association, see below, chapter 5.
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organisations o f their own choosing in full freedom.34 The Committee also 
observed that workers should have the right, without distinction whatsoever - 
in particular without discrimination o f any kind on the basis of political opinion 
- to join the organisation o f their own choosing.35
However, with the change o f Government on 15 August, 1975,36 the 
restrictive clause o f the right to freedom o f association, i.e., the proviso to 
Article 38 o f the Constitution, was omitted by the Second Proclamation Order 
No. Ill o f 1976. The restrictive clause being omitted, the constitutional 
guarantee o f the right to freedom o f association has been brought in conformity 
with the ILO Convention No. 87 as Article 8 o f the Convention envisaged that 
in exercising the rights the workers and employers and their representatives shall 
respect the law o f the land and the law of the land shall not be such as to 
impair the guarantees provided in the Convention.
The expression 'reasonable ' used in Article 38 implies intelligent care 
and deliberation, that is, the choice o f a course which reason dictates. 
Legislation which arbitrarily or excessively invades the right cannot be said to 
contain the quality o f reasonableness and unless it strikes a balance between the
34 ILO, Committee on Freedom of Association. 6th Report, Case No. 3, Para 1024; 
157th Report, Case No. 827, Para 216.
35 ILO, Committee on Freedom of A ssociation. 126th Report, Case No. 636, Para 25; 
187th Report, Case No. 857, Para 268.
36 The constitutional Government under Seikh Mujib was overthrown on 15 August, 
1975 by a military coup d'etat.
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freedom granted and the social control permitted by the Constitution, it must be 
held to be wanting in that quality. Reasonableness is itself a relative term. W hat 
is reasonable in one given set o f  circumstances may well be unreasonable in 
another different set o f circumstances. Thus, there can be no hard and fast rule 
for determining the matter which may be considered for testing the 
reasonableness applicable to all cases. In the opinion o f Justice Hamoodur 
Rahman:
It will certainly depend upon the nature and extent o f the restrictions 
sought to be imposed, the nature o f the circumstances in which the 
restriction is to be imposed, the evil to be prevented or remedied, the 
necessity o f urgency o f the action proposed to be taken and the nature 
o f the safeguards, if any, provided to prevent possibilities of abuse of 
power.37
The use o f the word 'restriction' in Article 38 by itself indicates that the
primary and initial test is that the restrictions cannot amount to a complete
denial or total profcibifc* o f the right for all times to come or for an indefinite
period. According to Justice Hamoodur Rahman:
By its very nature, the use o f the word 'restriction' makes the extent of 
the encroachment a relevant factor in determining the reasonableness 
thereof. This again cannot be divorced from the nature of the right 
sought to be restricted and the nature o f the restriction itself, for, 
under certain circumstances even the total provision, if  it is for a 
limited period or to meet a specific well defined mischief, may be 
upheld as a reasonable restriction. Thus both the nature of the 
restriction imposed and its extent would be relevant for determining the 
validity o f a law encroaching upon a fundamental right.38
This means that under certain circumstances it would be legitimate for
37 Abul A 'la Maudoodi V. Government o f  Pakistan , in Pakistan Legal Decisions (SC). 
Vol. XVI, 1964, p. 788.
38 Ibid, p. 787.
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Government to regulate the right in order to protect other rights, because no one 
has a fundamental right to immorality, obscenity, commission o f offence, or 
doing o f other illegal and unlawful acts. The right to freedom o f association is, 
therefore, subject to this important qualification that reasonable restriction on its 
exercise may be imposed by the law in the interest o f  morality or public order. 
Hence, the right to freedom of association, like other rights, is a qualified 
freedom and is available within the limits prescribed by the Constitution. Thus 
Governmental measures bearing upon the right to freedom o f association must 
ultimately pass the judicial test o f reasonableness and the Constitution did not 
leave everything to the discretion o f the legislature.
The right under Article 38 implies that several individuals having a 
community o f interests can join together to form a voluntary association for the 
furtherance o f a common lawful object. This right along with other rights, 
described as fundamental rights under Part III o f the Constitution, have been 
guaranteed by declaring that the state shall not make any law inconsistent with 
any provision o f part III o f the Constitution, and any law so made shall to the 
extent o f inconsistency be void.39 Thus, it implies that so long as the purpose 
for which an association or union is formed is lawful, law imposes no restriction 
on the association or union. In this sense the right to form an association is a 
Constitutional right.
Regarding formation o f an association the Supreme Court o f Bangladesh
39 See, Article 26 o f the Constitution o f Bangladesh.
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in the case o f Asaduzzaman v. Bangladesh40 has emphasised that:
The word 'form' in Article 38 does not limit the exercise o f that right 
to the formation o f an association. The right to form an association 
must o f necessity imply the right to continue and carry on the activities 
o f the association as well.41
But at the same time the court clearly specified:
Article 38 cannot, however, be involved for support, sustenance or 
fulfilment o f every object o f an association.42
Accordingly, it has been held in the case o f Abu Hossain v. Registrar o f  Trade
Unions:
The constitutional provisions do not guarantee the right o f 
registration o f Trade Unions43 for the purpose o f working as a 
bargaining agent under the labour laws which thus can be 
regulated as it is not so guaranteed under the provisions o f Article 
38 o f the Constitution.44
It must be emphasised that the Constitution does not give the unions any
privileged position in the labour-employer relationship. A member o f a union
is on the same footing so far as the law is concerned as any other person
seeking employment and there is no compulsion on the employer to treat a
member o f a union on a footing different from non-members o f a union. It is
for the union to protect the interests o f its members, the Constitution does not
give any direct protection to them.
40 See, Dhaka Law Reports (AD). Vol. 42, 1990, p. 144.
41 Ibid, p. 151.
42 Id.
43 Italics added.
44 See, Dhaka Law Reports. Vol. 45, 1993, p. 196.
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4.4 LIMITATION OF THE RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
PUBLIC SECTOR INDUSTRIES
The liberation o f Bangladesh marked a new phase in the socio-politico- 
economic milieu of the country. In anticipation o f establishing a socialistic 
economy,45 the Government o f Bangladesh nationalised 85% o f industries. This 
step ultimately ushered in a new dimension in the field o f labour management 
relations in general and collective bargaining in particular in the public sector 
industries.
The Government, being the largest owner o f industries, preferred to bring 
some sort o f uniformity in wages and fringe benefits o f  the nationalised 
industries.46 To this end, the Industrial W orkers' Wages Commission was 
constituted on 1 June, 1973, in order to review the wage structure, including 
fringe benefits, and to make suitable recommendations for them. In September 
1973, the Commission submitted its recommendations fixing wages, bonuses, 
medical allowances, house rent allowances, conveyances allowances etc. for 
workers o f public sector manufacturing industries.47 It is apparent from the
45 Article 10 o f the Constitution o f the Peoples' Republic of Bangladesh read as 
follows: "A socialist economic system shall be established with a view to ensuring the 
attainment of a just and egalitarian society, free from the exploitation o f man by man". 
Further, Article 13 read as follows: "The people shall own or control the instruments 
and means of production and distribution, and with this end in view ownership shall 
assume the following forms: (a) State ownership, that is ownership by the state on 
behalf o f the people through the creation o f an efficient and dynamic nationalised 
public sector embracing the key sectors o f the economy".
46 Alam, F., "Collective Bargaining in Bangladesh's Jute Industry", in Paniab 
University Management Review. Vol. IV, Nos. 1-2, 1981, p. 66.
47 For details, see, Report o f the Industrial Workers' Wages Comm ission. 1973.
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Report that the Commission took care o f most o f the terms and conditions o f
service o f workers which are generally considered as subject-matter o f collective
bargaining by workers.
The recommendations o f the Committee were accepted by the
Government and for implementation o f the new wage scales, a new law, the
State-Owned Manufacturing Industries W orkers (Terms and Conditions o f
Service) Ordinance, 1973, was promulgated.48 Section 3(1) o f the Ordinance
reads as follows:
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Industrial Relations 
Ordinance, 1969, (xxiii of 1969), or in any other law or any rule, 
regulation, by-law, agreement, award, settlement, custom, usages or 
terms and conditions of service for the time being in force, the 
Government may, with a view to implementing such recommendations 
o f the Commission as may be accepted by it, by notification in the 
official Gazette, determine the wage, bonus, medical allowance, house 
rent allowance, conveyance allowance and leave which shall be payable 
or admissible to any worker employed in any State-Owned 
M anufacturing industry, and no such worker shall receive or enjoy, and 
no person shall allow to such worker any wage, bonus, leave, medical 
allowance, house rent allowance and conveyance allowance in excess 
o f what is so determined.
Further, it provided that all agreements, settlements and awards, whether made 
before or after the commencement o f this Ordinance, in respect of any matter 
determined by the Government under Section 3(1) shall be void.49 Accordingly, 
it was a punishable offence for any person to receive or enjoy any wage, bonus, 
medical allowance, house rent allowance, conveyance allowance in excess o f
48 For the text o f the Ordinance, see, Dhaka Law Reports. Vol. 26, 1974, p. 134.
49 Ibid, Section 4.
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what was determined by the Government.50
Later, on 5 February, 1974, the 1973 Ordinance was repealed by another 
piece o f legislation which was named the State-Owned Manufacturing Industries 
W orkers (Terms and Conditions o f Service) Act, 1974. The new Act covered 
all the provisions o f the repealed Ordinance except the clause relating to 
punishment and declared that the Act has been promulgated to give effect to the 
Fundamental Principles o f State Policies set out in Article 10 o f the Constitution 
o f the People's Republic o f Bangladesh.51
It appears that the provisions o f the State-Owned Manufacturing 
Industries W orkers (Terms and Conditions o f Service) Ordinance, 1973, 
followed by the State-Owned Manufacturing Industries W orkers (Terms and 
Conditions o f Service) Act, 1974, were not in accordance with the provisions 
o f Convention No. 98, as both restricted the right o f collective bargaining with 
regard to wages and fringe benefits in the state-owned manufacturing industries 
and thus curtailed what is considered to be a basic trade union right. The 
question may, however, be raised as to whether the power given by the 
Ordinance o f 197332 and the Act o f 197453 to the Government to determine 
unilaterally the wages and terms o f employment o f industrial workers in the
50 Ibid, Section 5.
51 For the text o f Article 10, see above, p. 141.
32 State-Owned Manufacturing Industries W orkers (Terms and Conditions o f Service) 
Ordinance. 1973.
53 State-Owned M anufacturing Industries W orkers (Terms and Conditions o f Service)
Act. 1974.
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state-owned manufacturing industries was considered as a 'temporary measure' 
dictated by the circumstances o f Bangladesh at that juncture,54 or as a 
'permanent feature' o f the new labour policy o f 1972, based on the assumption 
that under a system o f public ownership o f undertakings, in the management o f 
which the workers will be called upon to participate, there is no need for 
collective bargaining.55
If the first option o f the alternative is chosen, i.e., if it was a 'temporary 
measure', it can be argued that there were a number o f reasons which might 
have justified temporary suspension o f collective bargaining with regard to 
wages and fringe benefits in the prevalent circumstances o f Bangladesh at that 
time. The ILO/SIDA Mission Report o f 197356, depicted the situation o f post­
independent Bangladesh in the following terms:
M anagement people were wrongfully confined and forced to enter into 
agreements which were binding on management under the law and by 
that way made them pay much more money than the companies could 
offer.57
The armed struggle which resulted in the independence o f Bangladesh not only 
attributed to the destruction o f economic potential o f the country but also caused 
social problems such as change o f attitude and conduct o f some people which 
may be inherent to the situation o f a newly independent country having won its
54 See above, pp. 128-129.
55 See, Labour Policy. 1972.
56 ILO, Report o f the ILO/SIDA Mission on Workers Participation on M anagement 
in Bangladesh. Geneva 1973.
57 Ibid, p. 7.
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independence through armed struggle. Therefore, recourse to coercion and
physical violence was considered by some as the best means to obtain economic
advantages. For many workers, collective bargaining seemed to be exclusively
looked at as a means o f submitting to the owners a 'charter o f demands' and
exercising intimidation, threats or even physical pressure on them until they
accepted to meet the demands.
In such a situation, it may well be argued that in order to restore the very
possibility o f promoting an appropriate system o f collective bargaining based
on rational dialogue and suited to the needs o f a developing country like
Bangladesh, it was first necessary to clear the ground and put an end to unfair
practices which have nothing to do with true collective bargaining by
withdrawing temporarily from the sphere of negotiations between management
and workers at the industrial unit level the subject o f wages and other fringe
benefits which is the most likely to give rise to such practice.
In its General Survey on the Application o f the Convention on Freedom
of Association and on the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining made in
1973, the ILO Committee o f Experts38 on the Application o f Conventions and
Recommendations noted:
In view o f the serious problems that can arise in certain circumstances 
in the economy o f a country, it would be difficult to lay down absolute 
rules concerning voluntary collective bargaining, and Governments 
might feel in certain cases that the situation calls at times for 
stabilisation measures during the application o f which it would not be 
possible for wages rates to be fixed freely by m eans o f collectively
58 For details about the Committee of Experts, see below, chapter 5.
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negotiations. Such a restriction, however, should be imposed as an 
exceptional measure and to the extent necessary, without exceeding a 
reasonable period, and it should be accompanied by adequate 
safeguards to protect workers' living standard.59
Thus, it is apparent that if the suspension o f the right to collective bargaining 
in respect o f wages and fringe benefits was a temporary measure, then the 
promulgation o f the State-Owned Manufacturing Industries W orkers (Terms and 
Conditions o f Service) Act, 1974, could not be said to have infringed the ILO 
requirements or standards as that being justified by the circumstances prevalent 
at that time.
However, the deliberate omission o f the Legislature in prescribing any 
time limit for the operation o f the Ordinance o f 197360 and subsequently by 
inserting in the Act o f 197461 that the provisions o f the Act have been made to 
give effect to the fundamental principles o f state policy as set out in Article 10 
o f the Constitution,62 made it clear that it was not a temporary measure but a 
permanent feature based on the assumption that under a system o f public 
ownership o f undertakings in the management o f which the workers will be
59 ILO, Report of the Committee o f Experts on Application o f Conventions and 
Recommendations (Articles 19. 22 and 35 o f the Constitution). Vol. B, Geneva 1973, 
p. 75.
60 State-Owned M anufacturing Industries Workers (Terms and Conditions o f Service) 
Ordinance.1973.
61 State-Owned M anufacturing Industries (Terms and Conditions o f Service) A ct.1974.
62 Ibid, Section 5. For the provisions o f Article 10 of the Constitution, see above, note 
45.
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called to participate, there will not be no need for collective bargaining.63 It is 
to be noted that whilst the ILO advocates collective bargaining as a general 
principle and while the Governments which have ratified Convention No. 98 are 
under an obligation to promote and encourage collective bargaining, it is left to 
each country to decide what is the best machinery to be established in order to 
put this principle into practice. Thus, instead o f providing a suitable machinery 
for collective bargaining, the act o f  curtailing the right to collective bargaining 
o f the workers o f public sector industries, in matters o f  wage and fringe benefits 
has undoubtedly resulted in breaching the Government's commitment to be 
bound by the provisions o f the ILO Conventions which it has ratified.64 The 
Government's action did not go unchallenged as National Workers Federation 
(Jatiya Sramik Federation) filed a complaint (Case No. 816)65 to the ILO 
Committee on Freedom o f Association alleging that the legislation in question 
had put an end to collective bargaining in public sector industries.66
The implementation o f the Industrial W orkers Wages Commission's 
recommendation through promulgation o f the State-Owned Manufacturing 
Industries W orkers (Terms and Conditions o f Service) Act, 1974 could not
63 See, Labour Policy. 1972.
64 For the Government's commitment to be bound by the ILO Conventions it has 
ratified, see, ILO, Record o f Proceedings. International Labour Conference, 57th 
Session, Geneva 1972, p. 301.
65 See, ILO, Official Bulletin. Series B, Vol. LXX, No. 1, 1976, p. 2 ; Vol. LXI, No. 
1, 1978, p. 2; Vol. LXI, No. 2 , 1978, pp. 6-8.
66 For discussion o f the case, see below, chapter 5, pp. 223-226.
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satisfy the workers because at the time o f implementation, those 
recommendations could not compensate for the escalation in the rate o f 
inflation.67 Nothing was done in respect o f workers' participation in 
management. Industrial disputes continued to rise.68 The industrial unrest 
coupled with other political factors prompted the Government to declare a state 
o f Emergency throughout the country.
4.5 THE RIGHT UNDER THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND MARTIAL 
LAW
On 28 December, 1974, the President under Article 141Aof the 
Constitution proclaimed a state o f Emergency69 throughout the country. By a 
separate Order,70 issued on that day he suspended, inter alia, the right o f  any 
person to move any court for the enforcement o f the right to freedom o f 
association as guaranteed under Article 38 o f the Constitution. Thus, the 
suspension o f enforcement o f right to freedom o f association resulted in denying 
the right, as the workers would not get justice in case o f denial o f such right by 
the employer or for that matter by the department o f  labour. Further, Section 19
67 Sobhan, R., and Ahmed, M., Public Enterprise in an Intermediate Regime : A Study 
in the Political Economy of Bangladesh. Dhaka 1980, pp. 524-28.
68 Khan, A. A., "Government Policies Towards Labour in Bangladesh: A Historical 
Analysis", in The Dhaka University Studies. Part-C, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1986, p. 95.
69 For the text o f the Proclamation o f Em ergency, see, Dhaka Law Reports. Vol. 27, 
1975, p. 76.
70 For text o f the Order, see, Dhaka Law Reports. Vol. 27, 1975, p. 78.
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of the Emergency Powers Rules, 1975,71 promulgated under Section 2 o f the
Emergency Powers Ordinance, 1974,72 provided:
If in the opinion o f the Government it is necessary or expedient so to 
do for ensuring the security, the public safety or interest o f Bangladesh, 
or for securing the maintenance o f public order or for maintaining 
supplies or services essential to the life o f the community, the 
Government may, by general or special order, applying generally or to 
any specified area and to any undertaking or establishment or class of 
undertaking or establishments make provision:
(a) for prohibiting, subject to the Order a strike or lock-out . . . .
In pursuance o f the above Rule, on 6 January, 1975, the Government by an
executive Order73 prohibited strikes and lock-out in all undertakings and
establishments in Bangladesh, both private and public sector. A general
prohibition o f the right to strike o f its kind was in contradiction with Article 10
of Convention No. 87 which recognises the right o f trade unions to formulate
and defend the rights o f their members. The same prohibition also violated
Article 3 o f the same Convention, which gives to the unions the right to
organise their activities and to formulate their programmes.
Soon after the proclamation o f Emergency, on 25 January, 1975, the
Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975, was passed.74 Article 117A o f the
Constitution provided that the President may by an Order direct that there shall
be only one political party in the state. Under these new powers, on 24
71 For the text o f the Emergency Powers Rules. 1975. see, Ibid, at p. 6.
72 For the text o f the Emergency Powers Ordinance. 1974. see, Ibid, at p. 76.
73 S.R.O. 14-L/75/S-VII/14( 17 )/74 /l2 dated 6 January, 1975.
74 For the text, see, Dhaka Law Reports. Vol. 27, 1975, p. 87.
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February, 1975, the President o f the Republic issued an Order introducing one- 
party system in Bangladesh.75 The single national party formed was to be known 
as the Bangladesh Krishok Sramik Awami League (hereinafter referred to as 
BAKSAL) i.e., Bangladesh Peasants' and Workers' National Party.76 However, 
BAKSAL was to have five fronts o f which one was Jatiyo Sramik League77 i.e., 
National Workers' Organisation. Following the formation o f the one party 
system in March 1975, the President o f Bangladesh addressed a labour rally in 
Tejgaon, Dhaka, where he announced that "there will be one labour front in the 
country as there will be only one political party".78 Accordingly, the Jatiyo 
Sramik League which was the existing labour front o f the Government became 
the only labour front o f  the country under the constitutional framework. Hence, 
there was no scope for the existence o f other labour organisations or unions.
The principle o f free choice o f trade unions is an essential element o f 
freedom o f association. According to the decision o f the ILO Committee on 
Freedom o f Association while it may be to the advantage o f workers to avoid 
multiplicity o f trade union organisations, and while Governments may, in certain 
cases, consider that a single trade union movement is more convenient for an 
adequate representation o f workers and their participation in the social and
75 See, Bari, E., Martial Law in Bangladesh 1975-79 : A Legal A nalysis. Unpublished 
Ph.D. Thesis, 1985, University o f London, p. 32.
76 Ibid, p. 32.
77 See, Ahmed, K., Labour Movement in Bangladesh. Dhaka 1978, p. 123.
78 Ibid, p. 123.
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economic field, unification o f unions should be the result o f a voluntary 
decision o f the workers and should not be imposed or maintained by legislation 
or other compulsory means.79 Thus, unification o f trade union movement 
imposed through state intervention by legislative means runs counter to the 
principle embodied in Article 2 and 11 o f Convention No. 87.80
The system of one national union lasted for only a few months until the 
assassination o f President Sheikh Mujib by a group o f army officers, which led 
to the proclamation o f Martial Law on 15 August, 1975.
On 1 December, 1975, the Martial Law Authority promulgated the 
Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinance, 1975, which was the first piece o f 
legislation after the independence o f Bangladesh, dealing directly with workers' 
right to association. It was not enacted to supplement the existing legislation on 
workers' right to association i.e., the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, but 
to over-ride it.81 Section 4 o f the Ordinance clearly discouraged the formation 
o f new workers association as it envisaged "unless the Government otherwise
79 ILO, Freedom of Association: Digest o f Decisions and Principles o f the Freedom 
of Association Committee o f the Governing Body o f the ILO. Geneva 1985, p. 47.
80 The ILO Committee o f Experts in 1973 commented on Egyptian legislation which 
aimed at unification o f Trade Unions in the following manner:
"Section 162 o f the Labour Code, as amended, which prohibits the establishment of 
more than one general Trade Union o f workers in the same occupation or trade, or 
more than one Trade Union committee in any one town or village, as mentioned in 
Section 169, would appear to be incompatible with Articles 2 and 11 of the 
Convention". See, ILO, Report o f the Committee o f Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recom mendation. Report III (Part 4 A), 1973, pp. 113-114.
81 See, Section 3 o f the Industrial Relations (Regulations) Ordinance 1975. in Dhaka 
Law Reports. Vol 27, 1975, p. 203.
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directs there shall not be any registration o f new trade unions under the 
Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969”.82 Unions registered prior to the 
promulgation o f the Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinance, 1975, were 
allowed to exist but their functioning was restricted as no election for 
determination o f collective bargaining agent under the IRO, 196983 was 
allowed.84 This provision was in contradiction o f Article 3 o f Convention No. 
87 which reads as follows: "Workers' ... organisation shall have the right to ... 
elect their representatives in full freedom ...". Again, reading Section 7 o f the 
Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinance, 1975, it appears that though after 
the promulgation o f the said Ordinance no election could take place for 
determination o f collective bargaining agent i.e., union representatives, yet in 
unions where collective bargaining agents already existed nothing debarred them 
from functioning. However, it was provided that where there was no collective 
bargaining agent in any establishment the registrar shall constitute a 
Consultative Committee which shall consist o f equal number o f workers and 
employers to be selected by the registrar.85 Thus, in the name o f constitution o f
82 It may be mentioned that Sections 5 and 6 o f the Industrial Relations Ordinance. 
1969. deal with the procedure o f registration o f Trade Unions.
83 Sections 22 and 22A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. 1969. deal with election 
of collective bargaining agent.
84 See, Section 7 o f the Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinance. 1975.
85 See, Section 8 o f the Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinance. 1975.
152
the 'Consultative Committee', contrary to Convention No. 87,86 the Ordinance 
under discussion substituted the provision for the election o f workers' 
representatives with that o f selection by the registrar o f Trade Unions.
Further the promulgation o f this Ordinance was a serious set-back in the 
development o f workers' right o f  association as a certain category o f workers, 
i.e., persons employed as members o f watch and ward or security staff or 
confidential assistants whose right o f association had been recognised since the 
enactment o f the very first legislation on the subject i.e., the Trade Unions Act, 
1926 and till the date o f passing this Ordinance, have been denied their right o f
07association.
Before adoption o f the Freedom o f Association and Protection o f the 
Right to Organise Convention, 1948, (No. 87) by the International Labour 
Conference, which provides full freedom in electing the representatives o f 
workers' organisation, when the Indian Parliament passed the Trade Union Act, 
1926, it provided that 50% o f the total office bearers o f  the union could consist 
o f persons, who were not actually employee or engaged in the industry with 
which the union was connected.88 All subsequent legislation on the issue,89
86 See, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention. 
1948. Article, 3.
87 See, Section 5 o f the Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinance. 1975.
88 See above, chapter 3, p. 83.
89 See, Trade Union (Amendment) Ordinance. 1960. Section 9; Trade Union 
(Amendment) Ordinance. 1961. Section 3(2); East Pakistan Trade Unions Act. 1965. 
Section 24; Industrial Relations Ordinance. 1969. Section 7.
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despite the fact that full freedom has been provided in Convention No. 87, 
reduced the limit to 25%. This may be explained to have provided at least 
limited freedom in electing those people as union executives who were not 
actually employed or engaged in any establishment. But ironically, ignoring the 
provisions o f the ILO Convention totally and also the fact that trade unions had 
been enjoying this right since 1926, the Government by promulgation o f the 
Ordinance90 curtailed the exercise o f this right at plant level unions though 
allowed at federation level unions.91
In exercise o f the powers conferred by Section 66 o f the IRO, 1969, the 
Government on 26 February, 1977 promulgated Industrial Relations Rules, 
1977. Rule 10 outlined the powers and functions o f the Registrar introducing 
external supervision o f the international affairs o f Trade Unions. This provision 
empowered the Registrar to enter any Trade Union or federation o f Trade 
Unions and make such inspection o f the office or premises and o f any register 
o f documents and seize any such record, register or other documents which he 
would deem necessary for carrying out the purposes o f  the Ordinance. No 
objective criteria was provided for such inspection. The failure to indicate any 
objective criteria for inspection on the part o f the Registrar leads us to the
90 See, Section 6 o f the Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinance- 1975. in Dhaka 
Law Reports. Vol. 27, p. 203.
91 For reasons o f prohibiting the persons not actually em ployed in the establishment 
to become trade union official, see below, pp. 162-164.
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contention that the provisions are violative o f Article 3 o f Convention No. 87.92 
If the administrative authority has discretionary power to examine the books and 
other documents o f an association, conduct an investigation and demand 
information at any given time, there is a grave danger o f interference which 
may be o f such nature to restrict the guarantee provided for in Convention No. 
87. Although the application o f legislative provisions and union rules concerning 
an organisation's administration must by and large be left to the members o f the 
Trade Union, the principle set out in the Convention do not exclude the external 
control o f the internal acts o f an organisation where they are alleged or where 
there are major reasons for believing them to be against the law (which should 
not o f course infringe the principles o f freedom of association) or the Union's 
Constitution.93
Since independence o f Bangladesh in the year 1971, the Industrial 
Relations Ordinance, 1969, which was promulgated during the closing years o f 
Pakistani rule, continued to be the governing legislation o f the workers' right to 
freedom of association and collective bargaining. Although its unfettered 
operation was restricted and curtailed by other legislation,94 it was not until the
92 For comments of the ILO Committee of Experts on this issue, see below, chapter 
5, pp. 212-215
93 See, ILO, Freedom o f Association and Collective Bargaining: General Survey. 
Geneva 1983, p. 59
94 See, for example, Bangladesh Nationalised Enterprises and Statutory Corporations 
(Prohibition o f Strikes and Unfair Labour Practice) Order .1 972. in Dhaka Law 
Reports. Vol. 24, 1972, p. 146; State-Owned M anufacturing Industries W orkers 
(Terms and Conditions o f Service) Ordinance. 1973. in Dhaka Law Reports. Vol. 26, 
1974, p. 161; Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinance. 1975. in Dhaka Law
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enactment by the Martial Law regime o f the Industrial Relations (Amendment) 
Ordinance, 1977, that the provisions o f the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, 
were directly altered, imposing further restrictions on the workers' right to 
freedom o f association. One o f the crucial restrictions has been the ban on the 
functioning o f unregistered unions. Section 5 of the Industrial Relations 
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1977, reads as follows: "No trade union which is 
unregistered or whose registration has been cancelled shall function as a trade 
union". Such a restriction had never existed nor was subsequently imposed by 
other legislation since the enactment o f the first legislation on the subject i.e. 
the Trade Unions Act, 1926. The insertion o f this new provision, "no trade 
union to function without registration", in other words, envisages that 
registration is not only a pre-requisite but mandatory for trade unions to 
function. Thus, it is apparent that any future establishment o f unions would be 
subject to registration amounting to 'previous authorisation' within the meaning 
of Article 2 o f Convention No. 87 as without such authorisation, i.e., 
registration, unions would not be able to function. This view is supported by the 
fact that the activities o f unregistered unions were made punishable as Section 
61A o f the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, as inserted by the Industrial 
Relations (Amendment) Ordinance, 197795 reads as follows:
W hoever takes part, or incites others to take part in the activities o f an
Reports. Vol. 27, 1975, p. 203.
95 See, Section 20 o f the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Ordinance. 1977. in Dhaka 
Law Reports. Vol. 29, 1977, p. 214.
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unregistered trade union ... shall be punishable with imprisonment for 
a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend 
to five hundred Taka, or with both.
But on the other hand the Committee on Freedom o f Association observed: "the
principle o f freedom o f association would remain a dead letter if workers are
required to obtain any kind o f previous authorisation to enable them to establish
an organisation".96 The requirements o f registration as the Committee on
Freedom o f Association further observed "must not be such as to be equivalent
in practice to previous authorisation, or as to constitute such an obstacle to the
establishment o f an organisation that they would amount in practice to outright
prohibition".97 Furthermore, the Committee on Freedom o f Association while
recognising that, in certain circumstances, it may be legitimate for registration
to confer advantages on a trade union organisation in respect o f such matters
as to representation for the collective bargaining, consultation by the
Governments, or the nomination o f delegates to international bodies, it should
not normally involve discrimination o f such character as to render non-registered
organisation subject to special measures o f police supervision in such a way as
to restrict the exercise o f freedom o f association.98
The Industrial Relations (Amendment) Ordinance, 1977, not only
prohibited the function o f unregistered unions but also imposed restrictive
96 ILO, Freedom of Association: Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom 
of Association Committee o f the Governing Body o f the ILO. Geneva 1985, p. 56.
97 Ibid, p. 57.
98 See, ILO, Committee on Freedom o f Association. 74th Report, Case No. 298, Para. 
45; 107th Report, Cases Nos. 251 and 414, Para 39.
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conditions for the registration o f unions. Section 4 provided that a trade union 
o f workers shall not be entitled to registration under this Ordinance unless it has 
a minimum membership o f thirty per cent o f  the establishment or group o f 
establishments in which it is form ed." It is apparent from the above provision 
that in one establishment no more than three unions could be established. Thus, 
the freedom o f workers to establish a fourth organisation in their establishment 
being curtailed, they undoubtedly became subject to limited freedom in 
contradiction to the promise o f full freedom to establish organisations o f there 
own choosing as enshrined in Article 2 o f  the Right to Organise and Collective 
Bargaining Convention, 1948, (No. 87). Another issue to be analysed here 
whether the minimum requirement o f 30% workers to be entitled to registration 
as a trade union amounts to previous authorisation. It may be argued that the 
30% requirement as such may not amount to 'previous authorisation’ though by 
dictating the terms o f establishing the unions and thereby depriving the workers 
o f their authority to decide, this provision undoubtedly violated another basic 
guarantee o f the workers right to freedom o f association i.e., ’establish and join 
organisation o f their own choosing’. Nevertheless, reading with the prohibitive 
clause as specified in Section 5, i.e., ’no unions to function without registration’, 
the 30% workers requirement clause amounts to ’previous authorisation’ within 
the meaning o f Convention No. 87 as even 29%  workers organised together to 
form an union would not be able to function as they would be denied
99 For opinion o f the ILO Committee o f Experts on this issue, see below, chapter 5,
pp. 211-212.
registration by the Registrar o f Trade Unions and would also be punishable if  
functions.100 On this point the Committee on Freedom o f Association has 
observed:
The formalities prescribed by legislation should not be o f such nature 
as to ham per freedom to form trade unions nor be applied in such a 
way as to delay or prevent the setting up of occupational 
organisation.101
W hatever criticism may be centred against the Industrial Relations Rules, 
1977 and the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Ordinance, 1977 it was only 
after promulgation o f this Ordinance on 18 July, 1977, that the Martial Law 
Government on 20 July, 1977, by an executive Order issued in pursuance o f 
Section 4 o f the Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinance, 1975102 provided 
that "the Government is pleased to direct that registration o f new trade unions 
is hereby permitted under the provisions o f the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 
1 9 6 9 " 103 Another executive Order issued on the same day in pursuance o f 
Section 7 o f the Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinance, 1975,104 provided
100 See, Section 61A of the IRO, 1969 as amended by Section 20 o f the Industrial 
Relations (Amendment) Ordinance. 1977.
101 See, ILO, Committee on Freedom o f Association. 177th Report, Case No. 889, Para 
332 and 119th Report, Case No. 891, Para 74.
102 Section 4 o f the Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinance. 1975. reads as 
follows: "Unless the Government otherwise directs there shall not be any registration 
of new trade union under the said Ordinance". Here the said Ordinance means 
Industrial Relations Ordinance. 1969.
103 See, S.R.O. 226-L/77/S-VII/1 (47)/76, Bangladesh Gazette. Extraordinary. July 20, 
1977.
104 Section 7 o f the Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinance. 1975. reads as 
follows: "Unless the Government otherwise direct, there shall not be any election for 
determination o f the collective bargaining agent under the said Ordinance". Here the
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that "the Government is pleased to direct that election for determination o f 
collective bargaining agent is hereby permitted under the provision o f the 
Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969". Thus after the promulgation o f the 
Industrial Relations (Amendment) Ordinance, 1977, the Martial Law Authority 
shifted from its earlier stand by issuing the executive Orders and thereby 
removing the restriction on registration o f new trade unions and election o f 
collective bargaining agents which created a dead-lock in the activities o f trade 
union affairs. The right to registration o f new trade unions was thus revived but 
it was subject to limitations as mentioned earlier.
4.6 THE RIGHT IN THE AFTERMATH OF EMERGENCY AND MARTIAL 
LAW
The Martial Law proclaimed on 15 August, 1975 was withdrawn on 6 
April, 1979 and constitutional Government began to function. Within a few 
months, on 27 November, 1979 the Emergency which was declared on 28 
December, 1974 and which continued during the continuance o f Martial Law 
was also withdrawn. With the withdrawal o f the Emergency the general ban on 
strikes which was imposed on 6 January, 1975 by an executive O rder105 issued 
under Emergency Powers Rules, 1975 ceased to have effect and thereby the 
workers' right to strike under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 was
said Ordinance means Industrial Relations Ordinance. 1969.
105 See, S.R.O. 14-L/75/S-VII/14( 17)/74 /l2, dated January 6, 1975.
160
restored.
In March 1980 the second labour policy o f Bangladesh was announced 
by Mr. Reazuddin Ahmed, the then Minister in charge o f labour. This policy, 
unlike the first one declared in September 1972, expressly recognised the right 
to strike and lock out as an instrument o f collective bargaining. While 
guaranteeing workers the right to strike, the policy specified that the right could 
be exercised only after securing, through secret ballot, support o f the majority 
o f the workers o f the collective bargaining agent.106 The policy emphasised 
growth o f leadership from among the rank o f workers and described it to be 
natural and desirable. The Government further asserted in the policy that there 
was no dearth o f leadership amongst the workers. Accordingly, with a view to 
fostering their leadership, Government expressed its intention to retain the 
existing practice o f formation o f executive committee o f trade unions at plant 
level with representatives from amongst the workers. The non-workers were, 
however, allowed to be elected as office bearers o f trade union federation at 
industry and national level. As to the formation o f trade unions, the policy noted 
that the Government believed that there was need for the growth o f healthy 
trade unionism and the right to form trade unions. It was however emphasised 
that the right o f association should not be extended to persons employed in 
security services, such as security staff, watch and ward etc.
From the declaration o f the above policy, it is apparent that with regard
106 See, Labour Policy. 1980.
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to workers right o f  association, apart from recognising the right to strike, the
Government simply reaffirmed the stand taken by the Martial Law authority in
1975 as reflected in the Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinance, 1975.
Hence, it appears that the Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinance, 1975
occupied the position o f interim Labour Policy o f the country so far as the
workers' right o f association was concerned.
Following the declaration o f the new labour policy on 25 July, 1980, the
Government promulgated the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 1980 to
give effect to its policy. In order to do so, the Act of 1980 almost in identical
terms re-enacted the provisions o f the Industrial Relations (Regulation)
Ordinance, 1975, though apparently repealing the Ordinance.107 Thus, following
Section 6 o f the Ordinance, the Act o f 1980 envisaged:
... a person shall not be entitled ... to be a member or officer o f a trade 
union formed in any establishment or group o f establishments if  he is 
not actually em ployed or engaged in that establishment or group of 
establishm ents.108
The 'outsider'109 participation in trade union leadership in the Indian sub­
continent is not been a recent phenomenon. Rather, it dates back to the very 
origin o f the trade union movement in the British period and also received 
statutory recognition.110 Outsider participation at that time appeared as a matter
107 See, Section 17 o f the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act. 1980.
108 See, Section 4, Industrial Relations (Amendment) A c t 1980.
109 Here the term 'outsider' is being used to mean a person who is actually not 
employed or engaged in any industry or establishment.
110 See, the Trade unions Act. 1926. Section 22.
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o f necessity.111 This necessity did not cease to be significant during the Pakistani
period. There is little evidence to suggest that the conditions under which
outsiders’ participation became inevitable in British India, changed at all during
the Pakistani period. The inevitability o f outsiders' role in organising trade union
activities has been reinforced by various reasons o f  which the most important
is the workers' or insiders' fear o f  being victimised by the management for their
alleged involvement in trade union activities. For the first time the Labour
Policy o f 1969 recognised this fear:
The employers ... have been hostile to the development o f trade unions.
The fear of loss of employment and other punitive measures have made 
many workers afraid o f joining trade unions ... By and large, leadership 
has not emerged from within the workers themselves and this has 
resulted in the creation o f a permanent professional leadership.112
This fear o f  victimisation coupled with lack o f education and other factors
created conditions under which it became difficult to develop trade union
leadership from the rank and file o f workers.
This fact has also been supported by the ILO Committee o f Experts on
Labour Management Relations in Pakistan back in 1960 who observed that
'outsiders' were the only people who could bring a union into existence under
the prevailing circumstances, taking into account factors such as unemployment,
illiteracy, the attitude o f employers and lack o f trade union leadership".113 Even
111 See above, chapter 3, pp. 83-84.
112 See, Labour Policy. 1969.
113 ILO, Report to the Government o f Pakistan on the Visit o f  a Joint Team o f Experts 
on Labour-M anagement Relations. Sept-Oct. 1959. Geneva 1960, p. 20.
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to this day, the necessity for outsiders has not outlived in any way in the
leadership o f plant level unions, as Dr Mainul Islam 114 observes:
Outside leadership in union activities is also a necessity in the context 
o f Bangladesh because they are in many cases not better qualified and 
equipped to deal with management .... any worker can be fired by the 
employer ... at any time and as soon as he is dismissed, a worker 
ceases to be a union executive. But the outsider leaders do not suffer 
from such a handicap and can bargain from a position o f strength and 
security.115
The ban on outsiders' participation in the leadership o f plant level unions
may be viewed as a motivated act o f Government in order to have a relatively
easy hold over the affairs o f the unions and the trade union movement as a
whole. It was also aimed at clearing off any effective opposition from among
the workers against the political party in power. To quote Islam:
Real reason behind barring outsiders at the plant level unions, was, 
however, prompted by narrow political motive o f the ruling parties of 
Bangladesh. ... one important reason behind barring outside leadership 
from the union was the weakness o f the ruling political parties to have 
their own strong trade union organisation when they came to power. So 
when they get hold o f the political power they want to capture the 
union power as well, if  necessary by force through the help o f police 
and management. But the tested veteran leaders with professional skill 
and strong record of service stood on their way to forcible occupation 
o f the union leadership. So there arose the need for enacting a law 
banning the outsiders to become union executives.116
It is beyond doubt that the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 1980, by 
disqualifying persons not actually employed or engaged in the establishment
114 Dr. Mainul Islam is a Professor o f the Department o f M anagement, University of 
Chittagong, Bangladesh.
115 Islam, M., "Industrial Relations in Bangladesh", in Indian Journal o f Industrial 
Relations. Vol. 19, 1982, p. 180.
116 Id.
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concerned where the union is formed to become an officer or a member o f trade
union, clearly violated Article 3 o f Convention No. 87 which guarantees
workers the right to elect their representatives in full freedom. Further,
according to the ILO Committee on Freedom o f Association:
If the national legislation provides that all trade union leaders must 
belong to the occupation in which the organisation functions there is 
a danger that the guarantees provided for Convention No. 87 may be 
jeopardised.117
The Committee also observed:
The right o f workers' organisations to elect their representatives freely 
is an indispensable condition for them to be able to act in full freedom 
and to promote effectively the interest o f their members. For this right 
to be fully acknowledged, it is essential that the public authorities 
refrain from any intervention which might impair the exercise o f this 
right, whether it be in determining conditions o f eligibility o f leaders 
or in the conduct o f the elections them selves.118
The Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, recognised the right to strike 
as a means o f collective bargaining subject to 21 days notice.119 The Industrial 
Relations (Amendment) Act, 1980 imposed further restrictions by adding a 
proviso according to which no collective bargaining agents were to serve any 
notice o f strike unless three-fourths o f its members had given their consent to 
it through a secret ballot specifically held for the purpose.120 Thus, the problem
117 ILO, Freedom of Association: Digest of Decisions and Principles o f the Committee 
o f the Governing Body o f the ILO. Geneva 1985, pp. 62-63.
118 Ibid, p. 62.
119 See, Industrial Relations Ordinance. 1969. Section 28.
120 Industrial Relations ( Amendment ) Act. 1980. Section 8.
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posed by the new Act was the requirement to hold election through secret ballot 
by the collective bargaining agents before deciding about a strike action. 
According to Section 7(2) o f the IRO, 1969 as amended by Section 4 o f the 
Industrial Relations (Amendment) Ordinance, 1977, if a union can claim 30% 
membership in a place o f work it can get registration. Thus if there exists more 
than one union in a single work place, collective bargaining agent is to be 
elected by the workers and a union needs 34% o f the total votes for the 
purpose.
On 30 May, 1981, President Ziaur Rahman was assassinated and the 
Vice-President Justice Abdus Sattar assumed the charge as acting President 
under Article 55(1) o f the Constitution o f Bangladesh, and in view o f the grave 
situation existing at that time, the acting President issued a Proclamation o f 
Emergency throughout the country under Article 141A o f the Constitution and 
thereby the people o f the country were subject to a second declaration o f 
Emergency after achieving independence in 1971.121 By a separate Order issued 
on the same date, the President, inter alia, suspended the enforcement o f the 
right to freedom o f association conferred under Article 38 o f the Constitution. 
Unlike the first emergency period,122 the suspension o f constitutional guarantee 
o f the right to freedom o f association did not last long as the Proclamation of
121 For the text of the Proclamation o f Em ergency, see, Dhaka Law Reports. Vol. 33, 
1981, pp. 119-20.
122 The first Emergency in the country was declared on 28 December, 1974, and was 
withdrawn on 27 November, 1979.
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Emergency was revoked by a subsequent proclamation issued by the acting 
President on 21 September, 1981.
4.7 THE SECOND MARTIAL LAW PERIOD AND THE WORKERS’ 
STRUGGLE
The constitutional guarantee o f the right to freedom o f association did not 
continue for long, because on 24 March, 1982, in a bloodless coup d ’etat, the 
elected Government o f President Sattar was overthrown and the armed forces 
took over power. The whole country was placed under Martial Law proclaimed 
by the Chief o f  Army Staff, Lieutenant-General Hussain Muhammad Ershad 
who assumed full power as the C hief Martial Law Administrator and suspended 
the Constitution. Thereby the nation witnessed the second Martial Law regime 
after achieving independence.123
The second Martial Law regime, following the first Martial Law 
regim e,124 on 27 August, 1982, promulgated the Industrial Relations (Regulation) 
Ordinance, 1982. Like the first Martial Law Regime, the emergence o f the 
second military regime o f Mr. Ershad also caused a set-back to the workers' 
right o f association. By promulgating the Industrial Relations (Regulation) 
Ordinance, 1982, the regime imposed restrictions on meetings o f trade union.
123 For the text o f the Proclamation o f Martial Law, see, Bangladesh Gazette. 
Extraordinary, dated March, 24, 1982.
124 The first Martial Law was declared on 15 August, 1975 and was withdrawn on 6 
April, 1979.
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Section 7 o f the Ordinance reads as follows:
No meetings o f any trade union including a meeting for election of 
executive committee, shall be held without the prior permission o f the 
Government or o f such authority as the Government may by 
notification in the official Gazette, specify.
It was also provided that whoever convenes any meeting in contravention o f the
above provision shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may
extend up to two years, or with fine which may extend up to five thousand taka,
or with both.125 But on the other hand the Committee on Freedom o f
Association observed:
The right o f trade unions to hold meetings freely in their own premises 
for discussion o f trade union matters, without the need for previous 
authorisation and without interference by the public authorities, is a 
fundamental aspect o f freedom of association.126
Thus, the imposition o f restrictions on meetings o f trade unions was against the
principle o f freedom o f association. W ithout the unfettered right to hold
meetings, trade unions can hardly function as for the purpose o f formulating
their activities and programmes the union executives need to get together
whenever there is a necessity. Accordingly, freedom from Government
interference in holding o f trade union meetings constitutes an essential aspect
o f trade union rights, and the public authorities should refrain from any
interference which would restrict or impede the lawful exercise o f these rights
thereof, on condition that the exercise o f these rights does not disturb public
125 See, Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinance. 1982. Section 8(2).
126 ILO, Freedom of Association: Digest o f Decisions and Principles of the Freedom 
of Association Committee of the Governing Body o f the ILO. Geneva 1985, p. 33.
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order or cause a serious and imminent threat thereto.127
Through the promulgation o f the Ordinance,128 the second Martial Law 
authority, like the first Martial Law authority, prohibited elections for 
determining collective bargaining agents.129 Industrial disputes were to be settled 
by negotiation and conciliation.130 Strikes were declared illegal.131 Thus, the 
whole concept o f collective bargaining became a hollow pronouncement. The 
workers having lost their right o f  collective bargaining and lawful trade union 
activities at the plant level, had been looking for an alternative to collective 
bargaining in order to articulate their demands at the enterprise concerned and 
at national level. An alliance o f eleven national federations o f trade unions132 
emerged by the end o f 1982. On November, 1982 they submitted '5-point' 
demands to the C hief Martial Law Administrator which, inter alia, included 
restoration o f unfettered rights o f trade unionism to workers. The leaders o f this 
trade union alliance started holding indoor meetings and exchanged ideas in
127 See, ILO, Committee on Freedom o f Association. 58th Report, Case No. 253, Para 
639; Case No. 261, Para 175; 70th Report, Case No. 288, Para 79.
128 Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinance. 1982.
129 Ibid, Section 4(2)- 4(4).
130 Ibid, Sections 5 and 6.
131 Ibid, Section 8.
132 The eleven national federation o f trade unions included: (1) Jatiyo Sramik 
Federation, (2) Jatio Sramik Jote, (3) Jatio Sramik League, (4) Ganatantrik Sramik 
Andolon, (5) Bangla Sramik Federation, (6) Bangladesh W orkers Federation, (7) 
Sanjucta Sramic Federation, (8) Bangladesh Federation o f Labour, (9) Bangladesh 
Sramik Federation, (10) Samajtantric Sramik Federation, and (11) Trade Union 
Kendra. See, The Ittefaq. Dhaka , 18 October, 1982.
169
order to evolve a plan for a shake-up. But it was not until the May Day o f 1983 
that they could succeed in organising rallies, meetings and processions of 
workers as their first move towards establishing contact among workers and also 
as a demonstration o f working class unity. Some eminent trade union leaders 
o f the country addressed the rally and called to observe demand-day on 3 June, 
1983. The rally also resolved, among others, to launch a movement to realise 
the '5-poinf charter o f demands as submitted to the Chief Martial Law 
Adm inistrator.133
This set the tone o f massive awakening among the urban industrial 
workers' o f the country. The leaders o f the eleven federations also started 
contacting the major unions at the plant level and mobilised workers mass 
support for an all-out movement against the regime. The trade union alliance 
was further strengthened by the joining o f Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Sramic Dal, 
on 29 March, 1984, and on that very day the formation o f the Sramik 
Karmachari Oikya Parisad (hereinafter referred to as SKOP) o f twelve national 
trade union federations was officially announced.134 The leaders o f the SKOP 
urged the Government to concede to their '5-poinf demands by 12 April, 1984, 
failing which they emphasised, the Government would have to face the 
consequences o f a 'direct-action' programme to be announced at the national
133 Khan, A. A., "Strikes and Military Rule in Bangladesh", in Chittagong University 
Studies (Comm erce). Vol. 5, 1989, p. 37.
134 See, The Bangladesh Observer. Dhaka, 1984, March 30.
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convention o f the SKOP on the day following the dateline (i.e., 13 April, 
1984).135 This threat o f the SKOP seemed to have softened the Government's 
position. It agreed to meet the SKOP leaders on 12 April. The meeting ended 
in failure and consequently a 24-hour strike call was given for 28 April by 
SKOP at its convention held on April 13, 1984 which was decided to be 
observed in all the mills, factories and offices o f the country.136
Meanwhile, the opposition political parties and Student Action Committee 
expressed solidarity with the strike o f SKOP for 28 April, 1984.137 According 
to Dr Abdul Awal Khan, as a result o f successful completion o f the strike o f 
April 28, 1984, the working class o f the country emerged and was 
acknowledged as the most powerful united force in the land one had ever seen 
within the constraints o f Martial Law in the country.138 Immediately after the 
strike and before the rally o f May-Day, 1984 two other national trade union 
federations139 officially joined forces with the SKOP, further strengthening the 
inner bonds o f the working class. On May-Day o f 1984, the huge rally o f 
workers threatened and urged the Government to either concede to the '5-poinf 
demands o f SKOP by 21 May, 1984 or prepare for an all-out nation-wide strike
135 See, Khan, A. A., above note 133, at p. 38.
136 Id.
137 The Holiday. Dhaka, 27 April, 1984.
138 Khan, A. A., above note 133, at p. 39.
139 The two national federations were: (a) Samajtantrik Sramik Front and (b) Jatiya 
Sarmik League (Hasina group o f Awami League).
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o f 48 hours on 22 and 23 May, 1984.140
In fact the success o f the strike o f 28 April, 1984, not only weakened the 
bargaining position o f the Government but it also shook the strength and 
confidence o f employers. They were left in a helpless position in the face o f the 
48 hour long strike that became immanent. Thus although the President asserted 
on 19 May, 1984 that the attempts o f the SKOP would be resisted at all cost, 
his Government had to soften up and abandon its position in order to save itself 
within a day o f making this assertion.141 The Government was thus brought to 
sign an agreement with SKOP on 21 May 1984 through which some vital trade 
union rights were revived. Thus following the agreement, on 22 May 1984, the 
Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinance, 1982, was repealed.142 As a result, 
trade unions were no longer required to obtain permission from the Martial Law 
Authority before holding trade union meetings and election o f union executive 
could take place in accordance with the provisions o f the Industrial Relations 
Ordinance, 1969.
Further, having repealed the Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinance, 
1982, the Martial Law Government on 13 March, 1985, promulgated the 
Industrial Relations (Amendment) Ordinance, 1985. Under this amendment, in 
some relaxation o f the previous restriction on outsiders becoming trade union
140 For details see, The Holiday. Dhaka, 3 May, 1984.
141 For details see, The Sarmbad. Dhaka, 20 May, 1984.
142 See, the Industrial Relations (Regulation) (Repeal) Ordinance. 1984.
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members or officials,143 an ex-worker o f the establishment became entitled to 
be a member or officer o f a trade union in that establishment.144 It may be 
recalled that this was not any new concession given to the workers who already 
had been enjoying this right since 1926 when the Trade Union Act, 1926 was 
enacted.145 The restriction o f its kind was first imposed by the Industrial 
Relations (Regulation) Ordinance, 1975 and subsequently by the Industrial 
Relations (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980.
In order to ensure that trade union activities are not hampered because 
o f transfer o f  union executives from one place to another the Industrial 
Relations (Amendment) Ordinance, 1985 further provided that no officer o f  any 
trade union shall be transferred from one place to another without his consent.146 
The Ordinance also safeguarded prospective union executives by laying down 
that no employer shall while an application under Section 5 o f the Industrial 
Relations Ordinance, 1969 for registration o f a trade union is pending alter, 
without prior permission o f the Registrar, to the disadvantage o f any workman 
who is an officer o f such trade union, the conditions o f service applicable to 
him before the receipt o f the application by the Registrar.147 It is apparent that 
the above provisions did not evolve either as a good will gesture o f the
143 See, Section 4 o f the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Ordinance. 1980.
144 See, Section 2, Industrial Relations (Amendment) Ordinance. 1985.
145 See above, chapter 3, p. 8.
146 See, Section 5 o f the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Ordinance. 1985.
147 Ibid, Section 5.
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Government in promoting trade unions activities or due to the Government's 
respect for the ILO Conventions but as the outcome o f the SKOP movement.
4.8 THE RIGHT IN THE AFTERMATH OF SECOND MARTIAL LAW
On 10 November, 1986, Martial Law was withdrawn restoring the
Constitution o f the People's Republic o f Bangladesh.148 Thus, the constitutional
guarantee o f the right to freedom o f association which was suspended on 24
March, 1982 again came into operation. However, it was not until 1 February,
1990, that any further law was promulgated amending the IRO, 1969 relating
to workers' right o f association. The Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act,
1990 restricted the scope o f the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Ordinance,
1985, as it envisaged that a person who has been dismissed from the service
would not be entitled to be a member or officer of a trade union o f that
establishment149 Further by Section 2 thereof two provisions were added to Sub-
Section (2) o f Section 7 o f the IRO, 1969 so that the entire subSection (2) of
Section 7 now read as follows:
A Trade Union o f workers shall not be entitled to registration under 
this Ordinance unless it has a minimum membership o f thirty percent 
of the total number o f workers employed in the establishment in which 
it is formed.
Provided that more than one establishment under the same 
employer, which are allied to and connected with one another for the 
purpose o f carrying on the same industry irrespective o f their place o f 
situation, shall be deemed to be one establishment for the purpose o f
148 See, The Constitution (Final Revival) Order. 1986. Chief Martial Law 
Administrator's Order No. VIII o f 1986.
149 See, Section 3 o f the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act. 1990.
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this sub-section.
Provided further that where any doubt or dispute arises as to 
whether any two or more establishments are under the same employer 
or whether they are allied to or connected with one another for the 
purpose o f carrying on the industry, the decision of the Registrar shall 
be final.
If an employer had more than one establishment under the unamended IRO, 
1969, the workers, without any distinction whatsoever, had the right to form 
trade unions in each establishment. The proviso added by the Amendment Act 
has introduced a scheme o f 'one employer, one establishment'. Thus the new 
Trade Unions have to be organised 'establishment-wise'.150 If  a trade union, thus 
constituted 'establishment-wise', seeks registration, then it will be entitled to 
registration, only if it has a minimum membership of thirty percent o f the total 
number o f workers employed in that establishment or group of establishments 
in which it is formed. Thus, irrespective o f number of establishments under one 
employer there can not be at a given time, more than three registered Trade 
Unions.
The vires o f the two provisos to sub-section (2) of Section 7 was 
challenged before the Supreme Court o f Bangladesh in the case o f Aircraft 
Engineers v Registrar, Trade Unions'51 on the ground that the amended 
legislation is violative of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 38 o f the 
Constitution.
150 Under Section 2(iv) of the IRO, 1969 "establishment means any office, firm, 
industrial unit, undertaking, shop or premises in which workmen are employed for the 
purpose o f carrying on any industry". Under Section 2(xiv) "industry means any 
business, trade, manufacture, calling, service, employment or occupation".
151 See, Dhaka Law Reports (AD). Vol. 45, 1993, p. 122.
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In this case after the promulgation o f the Industrial Relations 
(Amendment) Act 1990 the existing seven registered Trade Unions o f 
Bangladesh Biman Corporation152 were served with an order o f the Registrar 
dated 2.5.90153 stating therein that in pursuance o f an enquiry made under 
Section 2 o f the 1990 Act it had been found that none o f the seven existing 
Trade Unions were constituted in accordance with the newly introduced provisos 
to subSection (2) o f Section 7 o f  the IRO, 1969. The Registrar then caused a 
Notification to be published in the Bangladesh Gazette on 17 May 1990 listing 
therein the names o f the existing seven registered Trade Unions o f Bangladesh 
Biman Corporation, whose registrations were liable to be cancelled.
The appellants submitted inter alia that the impugned legislation has 
brought the inevitable effect o f bringing to an end and extinguishing the 
appellant-unions, particularly in view o f Section 11A o f IRO, 1969 which 
provides that "no trade union which is unregistered and whose registration has 
been cancelled shall function as a trade union".154
It was argued by the appellants that the right to form an association as 
union, guaranteed by Article 38 o f the o f the Constitution included the right to 
its continuance which was now being denied by the impugned legislation.Ihe
152 Prior to the enactment o f Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 1990 the Registrar 
o f Trade Unions had registered seven unions on the basis o f more establishments than 
one under the same employer.
153 See, Memo No. RTU/CBA(3)78C-40 dated 2.5.1990.
154 For more discussion on the issue, see above, p. 156-157.
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threatened cancellation o f registration was tantamount to negating the effective
existence o f the fundamental right and as such it was violative o f the
constitutional guarantee which can not be extinguished by law and on which
reasonable restrictions may be imposed only in the interest o f public order or
morality. But the Court rejected the above contention in the following terms:
This new legislation contains no restriction upon the workers' right to 
form a trade union and consequently there is no necessity to show that 
there is a nexus between the new legislation and public order or 
m orality.155
The Court based its argument on the following basis:
The workers o f more than one establishment under the same employer 
are free to form trade unions, as before. No doubt the existing trade 
unions lose their registrations in the process and are unable to continue 
in their old form, but ... the organisational structure o f trade unions is 
a legitimate domain o f legislative exercise and no worker has a 
fundamental right to a particular form o f organisational set-up.156
In order to emphasise the above contention the Court further elaborated:
To hold other wise will tantamount to holding that once trade unions 
are formed along particular pattern and registration given, there can be 
no further changes in the organisational set-up and that the trade union 
structure will remain frozen as long as fundamental rights exist, 
howsoever desirable or necessary it may be for a change to meet the 
changing needs o f times or situations.157
The argument of'changing needs o f times and situations' raises few questions:
was the promulgation o f the impugned legislation a necessity to meet the
changing needs o f times or situations? If so, why was it necessary and whose
155 See above, note 151, at p. 128
156 Id.
157 Id.
177
purpose it intended to serve? Surprisingly, the Court did not deal with these 
issues. However, in the course o f proceeding the respondent did not submit in 
any manner that the legislation was a necessity to suit the changing needs nor 
was it established that it was beneficial to workers. In the absence o f any such 
indication, it can be argued that the legislation may have intended to benefit the 
employers and not workers as it was detrimental to workers' interest resulting 
the extinction o f unions. A clear example is the present case where under the 
unamended provisions, seven trade unions were registered and five o f them 
were acting as collective bargaining agents but in view o f the amended provisos 
they could no longer function. Thus, it is apparent that the new legislative 
framework aimed at nothing but curtailing the exercise o f  the right which 
workers were already enjoying. Therefore, the argument o f his lordship is hardly 
convincing that:
The whole purpose o f the legislative exercise is not to restrict the right 
to form associations or unions, but to give the trade unions a shape and 
to chart out a well-ordered territory for their operation.158
Further, in a situation where due to the amendment of law, the existing unions
were to defunct, we can not agree to the interpretation o f his lordship that:
The amended legislation has nothing to do with restrictions on the right 
o f association or union or restrictions on its continence. It is a re- 
organisational statute and no one has a fundamental right to a particular 
form o f trade union.159
The question involved in this case was not one o f a particular form o f trade
158 See above, note 151, at p. 126.
159 Ibid, p. 129.
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union but the very existence o f the unions and therefore the denial o f the right 
by the Court is a serious set-back in the exercise o f right o f association.
The present Government which took office on 20 March, 1991 has not 
brought any change in the existing law on the right to freedom of association. 
However, on 29 June 1992 the Government by an executive order formed a 
National Labour Laws Reforms Commission consisting o f 35 members.160 The 
Commission has submitted its report in March 1994, tabling a Bill named the 
Labour Code 1994 for legislative enactment. It appears from the report, that the 
Commission basically performed the task o f unifying all the labour laws o f the 
country. The laws relating to trade unions and industrial relations i.e., the 
provisions o f the IRO, 1969 have found placed in chapter XIII of the Code. But 
in the proposed new Code the various restrictive and prohibitive provisions o f 
the IRO, 1969 which we have highlighted in our discussion have been 
incorporated in identical terms. Thus, the comments o f the ILO Committee o f 
Experts on the various restrictive provisions o f the IRO, 1969 vis-a-vis ILO 
Conventions which we will discuss in the next chapter received no consideration 
by the Commission as no step has been taken to comply with the Committee's 
opinion.
Thus, it is apparent from the above discussion that the various 
Governments succeeding one after another in the post independence period and 
the various legislative measures adopted by them have been directed mainly
160 Among these members, 12 were Government representatives, 8 employers', 8 
workers' and 7 legal experts.
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towards curbing the right o f association. Instead o f widening the horizon o f 
exercise o f the right to freedom o f association in conformity with the ILO 
Conventions, all successive Governments adopted repressive measures in 
contradiction to their professed faith in the right to freedom o f association and 
solemn declaration to abide by the ILO Conventions which the state has ratified. 
Hence, it may be concluded that the legislative framework on the right to 
freedom o f association which is prevalent in post independence Bangladesh have 
fallen much short o f what existed immediately before independence.
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CHAPTER 5 
THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN 
BANGLADESH: AN EVALUATION OF THE ILO
SUPERVISION
The ILO system for the supervision o f Conventions and consideration o f 
complaints is often cited as a model for other systems for ensuring protection 
o f human rights. But it is not easy to assess the effectiveness o f such a system. 
The relationship o f cause and effect in this area is difficult to measure and not 
always apparent. However, the ILO itself has undertaken studies o f the impact 
o f ILO supervision in global perspective1 and others have carried out similar 
examinations.2 While these studies may be lacking in precise conclusions, they 
have nevertheless led to the general view that ILO supervision o f 
implementation o f the Conventions in general has been relatively successful. We 
will however, in this chapter, assess how this supervision has been effective in 
the context o f Bangladesh in relation to the Conventions on freedom o f 
association. Thus, the present study undertakes the task o f determining the 
extent to which the permanent system of supervision such as the ILO's has been 
able to oblige the Government to discharge its international obligations and
1 ILO, The Impact of International Labour Conventions and Recommendations. 
Geneva 1976.
2 See, Haas, E. B., Human Rights and International Action: The Case o f Freedom of 
Association. Stanford 1970; Landy, E. A.. The Effectiveness o f International 
Supervision: Thirty Years of ILO Experience. London 1966.
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promote compliance with international legislation.
5.1 AN OVERVIEW OF THE ILO SUPERVISORY MACHINERY
From the outset, the Constitution o f the ILO contained a series o f 
requirements to ensure that international labour standards are given due 
consideration by the member countries. This explains why, o f the forty Articles 
contained in the Constitution o f the Organisation, more than a quarter o f them 
concern the establishment o f the machinery for the enforcement o f these 
standards.3 The supervisory system o f the ILO is based primarily on provisions 
o f the ILO Constitution, but these have served as the starting point for 
progressive development. The initial aim o f supervision was to ensure the 
discharge by states o f obligations arising out o f the ratification o f Conventions, 
but this was subsequently extended to promoting the implementation o f the ILO 
standards even where no formal obligations existed. The search for effectiveness 
led to the introduction o f a variety o f procedures beyond the constitutional 
provisions o f supervision.4
The methods and procedures that exist in the ILO for supervising its 
standards may be grouped under two headings.5 The first, that o f permanent
3 See, Articles 19 to 35 o f the ILO Constitution.
4 Valticos, N., International Labour Law . Deventer 1979, p. 258.
5 For a detailed account o f the supervisory machinery of the ILO, see, Tikriti, A., 
Tripartism and the International Labour Organisation. Stockholm 1982, pp. 274-333; 
Valticos, N., above note 4 at pp. 225-61; Samson, K. T., "The Changing Pattern o f 
ILO Supervision", in International Labour Review. Vol. 118, 1979, pp. 569-87.
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supervision, acts as a catalyst to obtain the widest possible application o f the 
instruments concerned, and seeks to detect or prevent any derogation from 
Conventions that have been ratified. Under this heading falls the submission by 
Governments o f reports on the implementation o f Conventions and 
Recommendations; the examination o f these reports by a Committee of 
Independent Experts; and the discussion o f problems o f application and 
compliance with the constitutional provisions relating to Conventions and 
Recommendations by a tripartite Committee o f the International Labour 
Conference. In addition to the reporting procedures, there exists another form 
o f supervision based on contentious proceedings i.e., the presentation of 
representations and complaints under the ILO Constitution. The general 
procedures stated as above apply to the Conventions on freedom o f association 
as they do to others, but in view o f importance o f the freedom o f association, 
the ILO has established additional machinery for its protection. This involves 
the examination o f complaints by the Governing Body's Committee on Freedom 
o f Association and by the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission on 
Freedom o f Association. A brief account o f the methods and procedures 
described above is given below.
5.1.1 SUBMISSION OF PERIODIC REPORTS BY GOVERNMENTS
It may be recalled that Article 22 o f the Constitution o f the ILO places 
each member o f the organisation under an obligation to submit to the
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International Labour Office an annual report on the measures it has taken to 
give effect to the Conventions which it has ratified.6 However, non-ratification 
o f a Convention is not a licence for a member to ignore or disregard a 
Convention. According to Article 19(5)(e) o f  the Constitution, the Government 
should report to the Director-General o f the ILO, at such appropriate intervals 
as are requested by the Governing Body, the position o f law and practice in 
regard to the matters dealt with in the Convention, and the effect which it has 
given, or is proposed to be given, to the instrument.7
By communicating regularly on the manner in which they comply with 
the terms o f a ratified Convention, the Governments make it possible for the 
ILO to seek some kind o f information which is an essential though not a 
sufficient precondition o f any realistic attempt at supervision.8 The submission 
o f reports by Governments does not in itself enough to constitute a system o f 
supervision. It is only when the reports are subjected to detailed and impartial 
scrutiny that it is possible to talk o f supervision.9
5.1.2 EXAMINATION OF PERIODIC REPORTS FROM GOVERNMENTS
A few years after the establishment o f the ILO, certain delegates to the
6 See above, chapter 2, pp. 63-66.
7 Ibid, pp. 67-68.
8 See, Landy, E. A., above note 2, at p. 15.
9 Valticos, N., "Fifty Years of Standard-Setting Activities by the International Labour 
Organisation" in International Labour Review, Vol. 100, 1969, p. 228.
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ILC expressed their concern that the reports submitted by the member states did 
not receive sufficient consideration from the Conference and suggested that a 
Committee should be set up to examine them .10 As a result, the Conference 
adopted, at its 8th Session in 1926, a resolution which authorised the Governing 
Body to appoint a Committee o f Experts to make preliminary report o f  the 
annual reports submitted by the Governments. The resolution also provided that 
every future session o f the ILC should set up a special Committee to consider 
annual reports.11 Accordingly, to ensure that reports on the Conventions were 
properly examined, the organisation had set up two special bodies, the 
Committee o f Experts12 and the Conference Committee.13
The primary function o f the Committee o f Experts is to examine the 
information and reports submitted by members in order to establish the extent 
to which each state has complied with its obligations under the Conventions and 
the provisions o f the Constitution.14 In discharging this task, the Committee is
10 See, ILO, Record o f Proceedings. ILC, 7th Session, Geneva 1925, pp. 156-157.
11 See, ILO, Record o f Proceedings. ILC, 8th Session, Geneva 1926, pp. 238-244.
12 The Committee o f Experts is made up o f 20 independent persons (originally 8) 
nominated by the Director General and appointed by the Governing Body o f the ILO. 
It meets once a year, sits in private and conducts entirely written proceedings. It 
submits a report to the Conference, usually unanimous except for occasional dissenting 
opinions.
13 This Committee is a tripartite body appointed by the Conference each year. Its 
meetings are public. Its proceedings are conducted orally, and it may hear and 
examine witnesses. The Committee's terms o f reference are laid down in Article 7 of 
the Standing Order o f the International Labour Conference.
14 On the functions o f the Committee o f Experts, see, Tikriti, A., Tripartism and the 
International Labour Organisation. Stockholm 1982, pp. 288-291.
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guided by the fundamental principles o f supervision i.e., independence, 
impartiality and objectivity. The comments o f the Committee o f Experts on 
ratified Conventions may take the form o f observations which are incorporated 
into a printed report which is communicated to the members o f the ILO or 
'direct request' addressed to the Government and not incorporated in the printed 
report. However, the impact o f the comments o f the Committee depends on the 
kind o f response it is able to evoke from the Governments.
As has been stated above, the second supervisory body, set up by the 
Conference at the beginning o f each regular session is a Conference Committee. 
This Committee takes as the basis o f its work the report o f the Committee o f 
Experts, selecting the cases dealt with in the report which it regards as the most 
important. It invites the Governments concerned to furnish explanations in 
respect o f the discrepancies noted and the measures taken as contemplated by 
them to remove such discrepancies. The replies, written or oral o f Governments, 
sometimes give rise to a detailed discussion. The discussions and conclusions 
o f the Committee are summarised in a report which is transmitted to the 
Conference and is then discussed in the plenary sitting.
5.1.3 CONTENTIOUS PROCEDURES
In addition to the system o f examination o f reports, the Constitution o f 
the ILO provides for another set o f procedures which authorise action against 
members that fail to discharge their obligations under the Conventions which
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they have ratified. Thus, there are two types o f contentious procedures available 
under the ILO Constitution, i.e., representations and complaints.
In accordance with the provisions o f Article 24 o f the ILO Constitution, 
an industrial association o f employers or o f  workers may submit a 
representation to the ILO that any o f the members has failed to secure in any 
respect the effective observation within its jurisdiction, o f any Convention to 
which it is a party. A fundamental feature o f this procedure is that it gives the 
right o f employers' and workers' organisations to initiate procedures designed 
to examine the implementation by members o f the ILO Convention which they 
have ratified.
The Complaint procedure provided for in Articles 26-34 o f the 
Constitution o f the ILO is the most formal type o f supervisory procedure in the 
ILO. A complaint may be filed by any member state if it is not satisfied that 
any other member is securing the effective observance o f any Convention which 
both have ratified. It is not required that the state filing the complaint, or any 
o f its nationals should have suffered any direct prejudice. It may be pointed out 
that no complaint or representation has yet been filed against the Government 
o f Bangladesh.
5.1.4 SPECIAL FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION PROCEDURES
The general procedures described above apply to the Conventions on 
freedom o f association as they do to all other, but in view o f the importance o f
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freedom o f association, the ILO has established additional machinery for its 
protection. The special machinery in the field o f freedom of association for 
trade union purposes was set up by the ILO in 1950 following an agreement 
with the Economic and Social Council o f the United Nations.15 It is based on 
the submission o f complaints by Governments or by employers' or workers' 
organisations, the latter case being the most frequent. Complaints under this 
procedure may be made even against states which have not ratified the 
Conventions on freedom o f association. For non-ratifying states, the machinery 
is based on their membership on the ILO and on the fact that the ILO 
Constitution has affirmed the principles o f freedom o f association so that the 
organisation can promote the realisation o f this principle. The machinery set up 
in this field comprises two different bodies, i.e., the Fact-Finding and 
Conciliation Commission established in 1950 by the agreement with the UN and 
the Committee on Freedom o f Association established by the Governing Body 
o f the ILO at its 117th Session in November 1951.16 The two organs were 
originally intended to play a distinct and separate part in the examination o f 
complaints. The Committee was to be a body responsible for making a 
preliminary examination o f the complaints and recommend to the Governing 
Body o f the ILO whether some o f them merited being referred to the
15 See, Resolution 277(X) o f 17th February, 1950 o f the Economic and Social Council 
of the United Nations.
16 See, Wolf, F., "ILO Experience in the Implementation o f Human Rights", in The 
Journal o f International Law and Econom ics. Vol. 10, 1975, pp. 620-23.
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Commission. In principle, no complaint may be referred to the Commission 
without the consent o f the Government concerned. Thus, when it was 
subsequently found that for want o f 'consent' there were difficulties in the way 
o f referring the complaints to the Commission, the Committee on Freedom o f 
Association itself proceeded to examine the substance o f the complaints. 
Eventually, it took precedence over the Commission without its authority being 
in any way challenged, as for a number o f years, the necessity o f obtaining the 
consent o f the Government concerned before a case could be investigated 
crippled the activities o f the Commission.17 Now that its competence to deal 
with cases directly has by general consent became gradually recognised, the 
Committee o f Freedom of Association has emerged as the linchpin o f the entire 
procedure.18 Since 1951, the Committee has dealt with about 1800 cases. The 
cases concerning Bangladesh will be discussed later in this chapter.19
Thus at different stages o f its development the ILO has evolved a number 
o f different procedures for dealing with different aspects o f the promotion and 
protection o f freedom o f association which may be regarded as complementary 
in character.
The following sub-sections will highlight how the machinery described
17 The Commission dealt with its first case in 1964 when Japanese Government 
consented.
18 Ghevali, V., The International Labour Organisation: A Case Study o f the Evolution 
o f the UN Specialised Agencies. Dordrecht 1989, p. 238.
19 See below, pp. 220-236.
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above has been effective in terms o f Government's interaction with it and also 
in terms o f securing actual promotion and protection o f the right to freedom o f 
association as provided by the ILO Conventions.
5.2 THE STATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH REPORTING OBLIGATIONS BY 
THE GOVERNMENT
However important may be the adoption o f international standards and 
ratification o f Conventions, these are only the first steps in an international 
standard-setting activity. The rights proclaimed, and in many cases legally 
accepted, might remain without effect if there were no machinery to follow up 
their application. As described above, the basis o f  the system o f examination 
and follow-up is Article 22 o f the ILO Constitution which requires a ratifying 
state to report regularly to the International Labour Office 'on the measures 
which it has taken to give effect to the provisions o f Conventions to which it 
is a party'. The working and success o f the whole procedure depends on 
satisfactory compliance with this basic requirement. Supervision is impossible 
unless reports are in fact received and it is necessary therefore to consider 
whether the Governments comply in fact with its reporting obligation. This is 
o f  significance to the present study because the receipt o f reports is the essential 
precondition o f and starting point for any attempt at supervision.20
We will begin our discussion with Convention No. 11. The Government
20 See, Landy, E. A., above note 2, at p. 27.
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o f India having ratified this Convention on 11 May 1923 had sent its first report 
in 1924 and this the Government followed by submission o f subsequent reports 
every year until the creation o f Pakistan in 1947.21 Following its membership 
in the organisation on 31 October 1947 and the Convention having been ratified, 
the Government o f Pakistan duly submitted its report for the year 1948 and 
continued to do so annually until 1958. In 1959, on the proposal o f  the 
Committee o f Experts, supported by the Conference Committee, the Governing 
Body o f the ILO decided that reports would in future be sent in every two 
years. However, the annual periodicity continued for first reports on newly 
ratified Convention and in any case where the supervisory bodies noted material 
discrepancies between national law and practice and the requirements o f a 
particular Convention; and decided that reports be sent accordingly.22 However, 
from 1960 until the independence o f Bangladesh, the Government o f Pakistan 
without any failure sent its reports on Convention No.l 1 on two yearly basis, 
the last one being in 1970.
The Government o f Pakistan, having ratified Convention No. 87 on 14 
February 1951, communicated its first report for the period 1 July 1952 to 30 
June 1953 on 6 January 1954.23 Similarly, Convention No. 98 having been
21 See, ILO Official Records, File No. ACD 8-2-33-11.
22 See, Minutes o f the 142nd Session o f the Governing Body, (May-June 1959), pp. 
35-36 and 92-93.
23 See, ILO, Official Records, File No. ACD 8-2-170-87.
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ratified on 26 May 1952, the Government sent its first report in January 1955.24 
Since then the Government duly sent annual report for both the Conventions 
until 1959 and after that, following the change in reporting procedure,25 reports 
on Convention No. 98 were sent on two yearly basis. But so far Convention No. 
87 was concerned, being requested by the Committee o f Experts, the 
Government continued to send annual reports up to 1966 which was then 
followed by normal two yearly reports.26
Following the independence o f Bangladesh in 1971 and its membership 
in the ILO on 22 June 197227 and the Conventions Nos. 11, 87 and 98 having 
ratified, the Government sent its first reports for all these Conventions in 1974.28 
Since then the Government has always duly sent its reports due under the 
Conventions.
So far as the unratified Conventions on freedom o f association are 
concerned, under Article 19 o f the Constitution, the ILO in 1980 requested the 
Government o f Bangladesh to send report on the position o f national law and 
practice in regard to the Rural Workers' Organisations Convention, 1975 (No. 
141). The Government duly sent its report which was received by the ILO
24 See, ILO Official Records, File No. ACD 8-2-170-98.
25 See above, note 22.
26 See above, note 23.
27 See above, chapter 2, p. 34.
28 See, ILO, Official Records, File No. ACD 8-2-309-11; File No. ACD 8-2-309-87; 
File No. ACD 8-2-309-98.
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office on 26 August 1982.29
Hence, it is apparent that successive Governments have complied with 
their constitutional obligation o f submission o f reports on ratified and unratified 
Conventions under Articles 22 and 19 respectively o f the Constitution o f the 
ILO. We may thus conclude that the Government o f Bangladesh has abided by 
its constitutional obligation o f submission o f reports.
The mere fact o f compliance by the Government o f regular submission 
o f reports does not provide any guarantee by itself that the supervisory 
machinery has been effective and the purpose and objective has been achieved, 
but it does provide a basis for achieving it. However, on the basis o f  reports the 
Committee o f Experts is the body to evaluate the degree o f legislative 
conformity and also to be able to ascertain whether the law and regulations have 
been enacted or modified as a result o f  ratification and its observations. Thus, 
our next step will be to scrutinise the reports with a view to analysing them and 
to explore how this body o f information have been subject to comments by the 
ILO supervisory body and how far the purpose o f supervision has been 
achieved.
5.3 THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ROLE IN THE ASSESSMENT OF 
REPORTS AND GOVERNMENTS’ RESPONSE
Having outlined Governments' degree o f compliance with the reporting
29 See, ILO Official Records, File No. ACD 7-309-141; ILO, Freedom o f Association 
and Collective Bargaining. 1983 Geneva, p. 1 and 131.
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obligation which sets the supervisory machinery in motion, we will now
highlight and examine the contents o f the reports and the observations o f  the
Committee o f Experts. This will on the one hand show the nature o f
governmental reporting practice and on the other hand provide how this
supervisory organ o f the ILO has dealt with these reports in an effort to secure
compliance with the provisions o f  the Conventions. It has been already
mentioned that the Government o f Pakistan duly submitted its first report under
Article 22 o f the Constitution immediately after ratification o f Conventions Nos.
87 and 98.30 Our discussion in chapter 3 has revealed that after ratification o f
the Conventions, the Governm ent did not bring any amendment to the existing
law i.e., the Trade Unions Act, 1926, dealing with right o f association so as to
give effect to the Conventions.31 Let us now analyse how the Government
explained its stand in various reports sent to the ILO and how the Committee
o f Experts responded.
We will begin our discussion with Convention No. 87. In order to reply
to question No. 1 o f the report form which requires the Government to indicate
whether effect has been given to the Articles of the ratified Convention by
customary law or practice, or by legislation, the Government admitted:
No new legislation has been promulgated to give effect to the 
provisions o f the Convention. The rights in question are nevertheless 
recognised by the provisions o f the Trade Unions Act, 1926. The 
Convention has been brought to the notice o f all concerned and its
30 See above, p. 191.
31 See above, p. 101.
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provisions are applied in practice.32
But as an indication o f positive action the Government in its report stated:
The Basic Principles Committee o f the Constituent Assembly of 
Pakistan has included in its recommendation a provision declaring, 
inter alia , that freedom of association is a fundamental right to be 
guaranteed in the future Constitution o f the State, which is at present 
before the Assembly.33
Question No. 2 o f the report form requires the Government to supply available
information concerning the customary law, practice, legislative provisions and
regulations and any other measures the effect o f which is to ensure the
application o f each o f the Articles o f  the Convention. In the following
paragraphs we will highlight and analyse Government's responses.
In relation to Article 2 o f the Convention34 the Government stated that
there were no statutory restrictions on the right o f workers and employers to
establish their organisations without previous authorisation. It was only in the
case when these organisations would seek legal status by way o f registration
under the Trade Unions Act, 1926, that certain conditions specified in Sections
5, 6, 7, 15, 16, 21, 22, 27 and 28 o f the Act were to be fulfilled. Regarding
Government employees' right o f association the report stated:
Government employees have complete freedom to join organisations of 
their own choosing so long they do not take part in, or assist
32 ILO, Summary of Reports on Ratified Conventions. Report III, (Part I), 37th 
Session, Geneva 1954, p. 130.
33 Id.
34 Article 2 reads as follows: "Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, 
shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organisation 
concerned, to join organisations o f their own choosing without previous authorisation".
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financially or otherwise a political movement, by which is meant any 
movement or activity whose aim is, directly or indirectly, to excite 
opinion against or to embarrass the legal Government, or to promote 
feelings of hate and enmity among different classes o f citizens or to 
disturb the public peace.35
It appears from the Government's report that freedom o f association for
Government employees was not only restricted by the terms indicated above but
as the report specified that such organisations to get recognition from
Government were required to comply with the conditions laid down in the
Cabinet Secretariat's Notification No. 6/1/48-Est.(S. E) o f 30 August 1948.36
On Article 3 o f the Convention37 the Government replied that under the
Trade Unions Act, 1926 there were no restrictions on the rights granted to the
employers' and workers' organisations by this Article. But this was only true in
the case o f unions which remained unregistered. However, the Government
admitted this fact by mentioning that when any union wanted legal recognition
it must comply with the provisions o f Sections 5, 6, 7, 15, 16, 22, 27 and 28
o f the Act.
35 See, ILO, Summary o f Reports on Ratified Conventions. Report III, (part I), 37th 
Session, Geneva 1954, p. 130.
36 See above, chapter 3, pp. 120-121.
37 Article 3 reads as follows:
"1. Workers' and employers' organisations shall have the right to draw up their 
Constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives in full freedom, to organise their 
organisation and activities and to formulate their programmes.
2. Public authorities shall refrain from any interference which would restrict this right 
or impede the lawful exercise thereof'.
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On Article 4 o f Convention38 the report indicated that present practice 
was in conformity with the provisions o f the Article in so far as the unregistered 
Trade Unions were concerned because these were not liable to be dissolved by 
administrative action under any law. In the case o f registered unions, certificate 
o f registration could be withdrawn or cancelled if the union did not fulfil the 
provisions o f Section 10 o f the Trade Unions Act, 1926. Regarding Article 5 o f 
the Convention,39 the Government reported that there was no law contravening 
the provisions o f the Article.
It appears from Government's first report that the enjoyment o f the right 
to freedom o f association as envisaged in Articles 1 to 5 o f Convention No. 87, 
was subject to the fulfilment o f relevant provisions o f the Trade Unions Act, 
1926. But so far as the unregistered unions were concerned, they were not 
subject to any legal limitations and as such could enjoy the rights granted as per 
Convention No. 87.
The intention underlying these limitations, as the Government explained, 
was not to restrict the rights o f workers and employers to form their associations 
but designed to help them to develop the administration o f the organisations on
38 Article 4 reads as follows: "Workers' and employers' organisations shall not be 
liable to be dissolved or suspended by administrative authority".
39 Article 5 reads as follows: "Workers' and employers' organisations' shall have the 
right to establish and join federations and confederations and any such organisation, 
federation or confederation shall have the right to affiliate with international 
organisations o f workers and employers".
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sound lines.40 The above justification seems to have been convincing to the ILO
as the Committee o f Experts at that juncture without being critical about the
legislative provisions, in its comment on the Government's report on Convention
No. 87 merely observed:
The Committee wishes to thank the Government for its first report on 
the application o f the Convention, which appears to indicate that the 
legislation in force does on the whole give effect to its provisions.41
From the above observation it appears that although no new legislation had been
enacted to give effect to the Convention and unlike unregistered unions,
registered unions did not enjoy the rights as envisaged by the Convention, the
Committee expressed its general satisfaction on the legislative provisions. Such
satisfaction may have been due to the fact that the Committee was less
demanding or relying on Article 8 o f the Convention42 considered that for
registered unions, compliance with the legislative formalities o f the Trade
Unions Act, 1926, was within the permissible limits.
Although the provisions o f the Trade Unions Act, 1926, at that juncture
appears to have satisfied the ILO Committee o f Experts, the main objection
40 See, ILO Official Records, File No. ACD 8-2-170-87, Report of the Government 
for the period 1 July 1952 to 30 June 1953.
41 ILO, Report of the Committee o f Experts on the Application o f Conventions and 
Recommendations. Report III (Part IV), 37th Session, Geneva 1954, p. 39.
42 Article 8 reads as follows:
"1. In exercising the rights prohibited for in this Convention workers and employers 
and their respective organisations, like other persons or organised collectivities, shall 
respect the law of the land.
2. The law o f the land shall not be such as to impair, nor shall it be so applied as to
impair, the guarantees provided for in this Convention".
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raised by the Committee was in respect o f the right o f association o f
Government employees. As the Committee noted:
In the case o f Government employees certain provisions laid down in 
the Cabinet Secretariat's notification o f 30th August do not appear to 
be in conformity with the Convention. Under Sections 2 and 3 o f this 
notification, separate association o f Government employees must be set 
up for each o f the various categories into which Government servants 
are broadly classified and the latter may belong only to the associations 
representing their category. This provision does not appear to be in 
harmony with Article 2 o f the Convention, which provides that workers 
shall have the right to establish, subject only to rules o f the 
organisation concerned and to join organisations o f their choosing.43
In response to the above observation, the Government in its report for the period
1 July 1956 to 30 June 195744 made an effort to justify the Notification in
question by stating that the Government servants were not a homogeneous entity
but comprised heterogeneous elements. They belong to different classes by
virtue o f having different scales o f pay, different duties and responsibilities,
different terms and conditions o f service, which varied from class to class. The
interests o f various classes o f Government servants were divergent and in some
cases conflicting. It was therefore not possible for a single recognised body o f
Government servants to represent effectively the interests and grievances o f all
classes o f Government servants and only an association representing a distinct
class o f Government servants whose interests were common could do so. The
report also stated that administratively it was not possible for the Government
to deal with the demands o f Government servants whose conditions o f service
43 See above, note 41, 37th Session, Geneva 1954, at p. 39.
44 See, ILO Official Records, File No. ACD 8-2-170-87.
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were divergent. Having argued as above, the Government maintained its position 
in the following terms: "the principle o f class wise recognition o f associations 
does not, in any way, offend the spirit o f Article 2 o f the C onvention"45 The 
Government's above explanation and justification did not satisfy the Committee 
o f Experts which maintained its earlier stand and our scrutiny o f the subsequent 
observations o f the Committee till the independence o f Bangladesh in 197146 
exhibits that the Committee on every occasion requested the Government to 
bring the Government employees' right o f association in conformity with Article 
2 o f the Convention No. 87.
Although in 1957 the Government asserted that the class wise formation 
o f association did not offend the spirit o f Article 2 o f Convention No. 87 but 
in 1962 the Government reconsidered the Committee's observations and 
communicated:
With reference to the observations o f the Committee o f Experts and the 
Conference Committee on the Application of Convention and 
Recommendations it is informed that amendment o f the Establishment 
Division Notification No. 6/1/48/Ests. (S.E) of 30th August 1948 to 
bring it in line with the provisions o f Article 2 and 5 o f the Convention 
is under way.47
The above indication however, did not result in any positive action to bring 
Government employees' right o f association into line with Convention No. 87.
45 See, ILO Official Records, File No. ACD 8-2-170-87, Report of the Government 
for the period 1 July 1956 to 30 June 1957.
46 For position after independence, see below, pp. 215-216.
47 See, ILO Official Records, File No. ACD 8-2-170-87, Report of the Government 
for the period 1 July 1961 to 30 June 1962.
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The various reports o f the Government on the issue merely noted: "it is ... 
expected that necessary amendment in the notification would be made shortly";48 
"the question o f amendment ... is under consideration";49 "expected to be 
amended shortly".50
Thus, the Committee o f Experts observations, which began with 
optimism resulted in scepticism, due to inaction o f the Government. 
Accordingly, in its various reports the Committee observed: "the Committee 
notes with interest that the Government is examining a bill to amend the 
legislation on Trade Unions";51 "the Committee expresses the hope that the Bill 
which is now been under consideration for some time will be enacted at an 
early date";52 "the Committee notes with regret that the Bill destined to bring the 
legislation into conformity with Article 2 o f the Convention has not yet been 
passed";53 "the Committee regrets to note that the draft amendment o f the 
legislation, which has been mentioned since 1958, is still being examined by the 
Government";54 "the Committee notes that the Government does not supply any
48 Ibid, Report o f the Government for the period 1 July 1962 to 30 June 1963.
49 Ibid, Report o f the Government for the period 1 July 1963 to 30 June 1964
50 Ibid, Report o f the Government for the period 1 July 1964 to 30 June 1965.
51 See above, note 41, 42nd Session, Geneva 1958, at p. 56.
52 See above, note 41, 43rd Session, Geneva 1959, at p. 48.
53 See above, note 41, 44th Session, Geneva 1960, at p. 44.
54 See above, note 41, 46th Session, Geneva 1962, at p. 95.
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further information relating to the rights o f civil servants to organise";53 "the
Committee notes that the Government does not refer in its report any further
measures taken to bring notification No. 6/1/48-Ests. (S.E) o f 30 August 1948
relating to freedom o f association o f public officials or Government servants,
into line with the provisions o f Article 2 o f the Convention".56
From the above account it is clear that ILO Committee o f Experts
persistent effort to bring Government employees' right o f association in line
with the Convention No. 87 failed to achieve any positive result.
We will now examine Committee o f Experts observations on the Trade
Unions Act, 1926 vis-a-vis Convention No. 98 with a view to ascertaining the
Committee's supervisory role. We have already noted that the Government
having ratified the Convention, on 26 May 1952 duly sent its first report for the
period 1 July 1953 to 30 June 1954.57 The Government’s response to questions
Nos. 1 and 2 o f the report form was as follows:
The Convention was ratified on the assumption that, by the time it 
came into force in Pakistan an amendment to the existing Trade Unions 
Act incorporating the provisions o f Article 1 and 2 would have been 
enacted. However, due to certain administrative difficulties, it has not 
been possible to have the necessary legislation passed during the period 
covered by the report. There has therefore been no legislative 
implementation o f Articles 1 and 2, but the Government proposes to 
table a Bill at an early date.58
33 See above, note 41, 51th Session, Geneva 1967, at p. 90.
36 See above, note 41, 56th Session, Geneva 1971, at p. 128.
37 See above, pp. 191-192.
38 See above, note 35, 38th Session, Geneva 1955, at p. 198.
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W ithout being critical of the Government's inaction, the Committee o f Experts 
at that juncture merely noted the fact and expressed hope that amendments 
proposed by the Government will come into force in near future.59 Our 
discussion in chapter 3 has revealed that it was not until the promulgation o f 
the Trade Unions (Amendment) Ordinance, 1960, any effort to this end was 
adopted which gave partial effect to the provisions o f the Convention No. 98.60
Our assessment o f the role o f the Committee in the intervening years 
indicates that instead o f condemning Government's inaction, the Committee 
adopted a technique o f polite insistence, as in its various reports the Committee 
stated: "it would be grateful if the Government would indicate as soon as 
possible what progress has been made as regards the adoption o f the legislation 
which it considers necessary in order to give effect to the Convention";61 "the 
Committee would be grateful if the Government would be good enough to 
indicate, as soon as possible, whether it has been able to make any progress 
with a view to ensuring the application o f the Convention".62
However, when the Government enacted the Trade Unions (Amendment) 
Ordinance, 1960, the observation o f the Committee on the legislation in question 
vis-a-vis Convention 98 was as follows:
59 See above, note 41, at p. 77.
60 See above, chapter 3, pp. 103-107.
61 See above, note 41, 39th Session, Geneva 1956, at p. 85.
62 See above, note 41, 48th Session, Geneva 1957, at p. 95.
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The Comm ittee has taken note with interest o f Ordinance No. XIV 
1960 am ending the Trade Unions Act. Section 28-1 o f this text provides 
protection for workers' organisations against acts o f interference 
(Article 2 o f the Convention) and protection for workers against acts 
o f discrimination with respect to dismissal (Article 1, paragraph 
2(b)}.63
From the above observation it is evident that the Committee expressed its 
satisfaction for the partial fulfilment o f Convention No. 98 as Article l(2)(a) o f 
the Convention was not incorporated in the Ordinance which deals with 
protection from anti-union discrimination at the time o f employment on the 
ground o f  union membership. But in its observation for Convention No. 8764 the 
Committee did not make any comment although the Ordinance by amending 
Section 22 o f the Trade Unions Act, 1926 restricted workers' right to elect their 
representatives in full freedom as envisaged in Article 3 o f  the Convention.65 
Even when the Trade Unions (Amendment) Ordinance, 1961 brought further 
restrictions on this issue,66 the Committee remained silent.67
However, the Government's response to the Committee's observation on 
Convention No. 98 regarding Section 28-1 was immediate and positive as in its 
report for the period o f 1 July 1962 to 30 June 1964 the Government 
communicated to the ILO:
63 See above, note 41, 45th Session, Geneva 1961, at p. 98.
64 See above, note 41, 45th Session, Geneva 1961, at p. 75.
65 For details, see above, chapter 3, p. 83.
66 Ibid, p. 107.
67 See above, note 41, 45th Session, Geneva 1961, at p. 75.
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With reference to observations made by the Committee of Experts on 
the application o f Conventions and Recommendations it may be stated 
that the question of amending Section 28-1 o f the Trade Unions Act,
1926 as modified by the Trade Union (Amendment) Ordinance, 1960, 
with a view to incorporating therein provisions along the lines of 
Article l(2)(a) o f the Convention has been taken up for consideration.68
Despite Government's above communication, a year later when the East Pakistan
Trade Unions Act, 1965 was promulgated repealing the Trade Unions Act,
1926, it was noticed that having done nothing to incorporate provisions along
line with Article l(2)(a) o f  Convention No. 98, the new Act in Section 40
merely reproduced the provisions o f Article 28-1 o f the repealed Act. Further,
the scope o f the exercise o f right o f association as enshrined in Convention No.
87 was also limited by the new Act.69 In such a situation the Committee o f
Experts made several 'direct requests' to the Government to bring the legislation
in conformity with the Conventions Nos. 87 and 98.70 Although the Committee's
requests did not evoke instantaneous response but nevertheless in 1969, the
Government promulgated the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. This indeed
received appreciation from the Committee o f Experts as, while noting its
observation for Convention No. 98, the Committee observed:
With reference to its previous direct requests concerning the protection 
of workers against acts of anti-union discrimination at the time o f their 
engagement, the Committee notes with satisfaction that the Industrial 
Relations Ordinance 1969, gives effect to the Convention in this
68 See above, note 24.
69 See above, chapter 3, pp. 113-115.
70 See above, note 24.
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respect.71
Similarly, in relation to Convention No. 87 the Committee observed:
The Committee notes with satisfaction that, following its previous 
observation and direct request the Government has enacted the 
Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 which repeals the East Pakistan 
Trade Unions Act, 1965.72
It is clear from the above observations that the promulgation o f the new
Ordinance was considered by the ILO to be a direct result o f its supervisory
comments. However, an evaluation o f the circumstances under which the
Ordinance was promulgated reveals somewhat different picture. As we have
noted earlier, the Ordinance was promulgated by the Martial Law Authority in
an effort to blunt the militancy o f the working class and achieve popularity.73
Nevertheless, the Martial Law Authority while promulgating the Ordinance, may
have considered the comments and concerns o f the ILO, as the new Ordinance
in comparison to the repealed Act o f 1965 was closer to the provisions o f
Conventions Nos. 87 and 98.
Soon after the promulgation o f the IRO, 1969 and before the ILO
Committee o f Experts could make any observation on the legislation in
question, erstwhile East Pakistan emerged as a sovereign state. However, the
new state o f Bangladesh immediately becoming a member o f the ILO, the
legislation came under the ambit o f the ILO Committee o f Experts supervision.
71 See above, note 41, 56th Session, Geneva 1971, at p. 146.
72 See above, note 41, 56th Session, Geneva 1971, at p. 128.
73 See above, chapter 3, p. 119.
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Accordingly, the Government in 1974 submitted its first report on the 
application o f Conventions Nos. 87 and 98. As far as Convention No. 87 was 
concerned, the Government's report,74 without taking consideration o f the 
various provisions o f  the Ordinance merely highlighted Section 3 o f the 
Ordinance,75 as giving effect to the provisions o f the Convention. Similarly, for 
Convention No. 98 the Government's report76 indicated Sections 3 and 15 o f the 
Ordinance to be the corresponding provisions.77
In chapter 4 it has been shown that since independence in 1971, the IRO, 
1969 has undergone several amendments restricting the exercise o f right o f  
association.78 The discussion below will highlight the various aspects o f 
incompatibility o f the legislation vis-a-vis Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 which 
the Committee has been indicating over the years but has failed to evoke any 
positive action on the part o f the Government to fulfil its international 
obligations by bringing the legislation into conformity with the Conventions 
which it has ratified.
74 See above, note 23.
75 For discussion on Section 3, see above, chapter 3, pp. 120-121.
76 See above, note 24.
77 For the provisions o f Section 15, see above, chapter 3, pp. 124-125.
78 The Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinances of 1975 and 1982 and the State- 
Owned M anufacturing Industries W orkers (Terms and Conditions of Service) Act. 
1974, were passed to override the provisions o f the IRO, 1969.
207
R estrictions upon the right to jo in  or to hold office in Trade Unions
Soon after the promulgation o f the Industrial Relations (Regulation) 
Ordinance, 1975, which in Section 6 provided that only persons working in the 
undertaking concerned may be members o f a Trade Union, the Committee o f 
Experts in 1977 by a 'direct request'79 notified the Government that the 
enactment o f the said provision restricted trade union rights guaranteed by 
Articles 2 and 3 o f Convention No. 87. The Committee also requested the 
Government to re-examine the legislation with a view to giving effect to the 
guarantees contained in the Convention.80 But the Government, instead o f re­
examining the provisions in the light o f the suggestions made, re-enacted the 
provisions by the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 1980, which repealed 
the Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinance, 1975. Section 7A l(a)(ii) o f  the 
IRO, 1969, as amended by the Act o f 1980 contained in identical terms the 
provisions o f the repealed Regulation o f 1975. This prompted the Committee 
to point out that Section 7A 1 (a)(ii) o f the IRO, 1969 limited the right to be a 
member or officer o f a Trade Union to persons actually engaged in an 
establishment or group of establishments concerned. Thus, the Committee 
considered the provisions to be violative o f Articles 2 and 3 o f Convention No. 
87.81 The observation o f the Committee was followed by asking the Government
79 See, ILO Official Records, File No. ACD 8-2-309-87.
80 Id.
81 See, ILO, Report o f the Committee o f Experts on the Application of Convention and 
Recommendation. Report III (Part 4A), 69th Session, Geneva 1983, pp. 115-16.
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to re-examine and re-consider the provisions in question.82 Although the
Committee noted incompatibility o f the legislation in 1977 and requested the
Government to take necessary measures, the Government did not take any
positive action nor pass any comment on the issue until 1984 when it reported:
The Governm ent has since re-considered the provisions under Section 
7A (l)(a)(ii) and (b) o f Act No. XXIX of 1980 and measures of 
relaxation is under consideration.83
The Committee's response on the above communication was as follows:
It notes with interest the Government's statement that it is prepared to 
exam ine these provisions and that measures to ease them are under 
study.84
The Government's indication o f 'under consideration' was followed by the 
promulgation o f Industrial Relations (Amendment) Ordinance, 1985, which 
brought some amendments to the provisions in question.85 The Committee noted 
the abolition o f the requirement contained in clause (b) o f the Section in 
question that an officer or member o f a Trade Union must cease to be an officer 
or member o f  the said Trade Union on the coming into force o f the 1980 
amendment if he was not employed in the establishment in which the union had 
been formed and observed that the clause has been abolished because it has 
ceased to be necessary by reason o f the effluxion o f time.86 It further observed:
82 Id.
83 See above, note 79.
84 See above, note 81, 71st Session, Geneva 1985, at p. 121.
85 See above, chapter 4, p. 172-173.
86 See above, note 81, 73rd Session, Geneva 1987, at p. 142.
"the basic requirement contained in Section 7A l(a)(ii) remains in force".87 The
Committee's above observation evoked Government's response as it was
considered by the Government that the new amendment brought the provisions
in question in conformity with the Convention. Thus, in its report for the period
ending 30 June 1988 the Government communicated:
The provisions of Section 7A l(a)(ii) and (b) have already been 
amended in 1985 into Section 7A (l)(a)(b). The Government therefore 
does not agree to the interpretation o f  the ILO  88in this regard.89
Actually, the stipulation formerly embodied in Section 7A(a)(ii) is to be found
in the new Section 7(1 )(b), but with an important qualification that former
employees at an establishment or group o f establishments could be members or
officers o f Trade Unions formed at that establishment. The omission by the
Committee in its observation o f this 'qualification' may have led the Government
to hold the contrary view. Nevertheless, the Committee subsequently pointed out
the fact.90
Despite Government's disagreement with the 'interpretation o f the ILO' 
as the Government put it, the Committee has consistently taken the view that 
provisions o f this kind do restrict the right o f workers to establish and join 
organisation o f their own choosing (Article 2 o f Convention No. 87), to elect 
their representatives in full freedom and to organise their administration and
87 Id. and also see, 74th Session, Geneva 1988, at p. 142.
88 Italics for emphasis.
89 See above note 79.
90 See above, note 81, 76th Session, Geneva 1989, at p. 128.
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activities (Article 3). The Committee therefore has been requesting the 
Governm ent to adopt measures with a view to making the present provisions 
more flexible by exempting from the occupational requirement a reasonable 
proportion o f the officers o f an organisation so as to allow the candidature o f 
persons who are outside the profession.91
The "30 per cent” requirement for initial or continued registration as a 
Trade Union
On the issue o f  30 per cent requirement for initial or continued 
registration as a trade union as provided in Sections 7(2) and 10(l)(f) o f  the 
IRO, 1969, the Committee o f  Experts in its various observations92 has requested 
the Governm ent to review them in order to bring the provisions into conformity 
with Article 2 o f  Convention No. 87. The first o f  these provisions is to the 
effect that no Trade Union may be registered unless it has a minimum 
membership o f 30 per cent o f  the total number o f workers employed in the 
establishments in which it is formed. The second gives the Registrar o f  Trade 
Unions the power to cancel the registration o f a union where its membership has 
fallen below the 30 per cent threshold. In reply, the Government in one o f its
91 See above, note 81, 78th Session, Geneva 1991, at p. 148; 81st Session, Geneva 
1994, at pp. 197-98; 82nd Session, Geneva 1995, at p. 152. For the union leaders', 
workers' and employers' views on the issue, see below, chapter 6, pp. 284-285.
92 See above, note 81, 71st Session, Geneva 1985, at p. 123; 73rd Session, Geneva 
1987, at p. 150; 75th Session, Geneva 1988, at p. 144; 76th Session, Geneva 1989, 
at p. 130; 78th Session, Geneva 1991, at p. 149; 81st session, Geneva 1994, at p. 198; 
82nd Session, Geneva 1995, at p. 153.
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reports indicated:
The provisions o f Section 10(f) o f the IRO, 1969, as amended by 
Section 5 o f  Act No. xxix o f 1980, were incorporated to create a strong 
and healthy trade union movement in the country. M ultiplicity o f Trade 
Unions with nominal membership weakens the cause o f workers and 
leads to unhealthy conflict and hampers industrial peace. The principle 
o f 30% was adopted after due consideration o f the national 
conditions.93
The Government by another report94 expressed its inability to review the
provisions o f law in the following terms:
The said requirement has attained its objectives o f reducing mushroom 
growth o f Trade Unions and it is not considered by the workers as an 
obstacle to establishment o f organisations.95
On the other hand, in the opinion o f the Committee o f Experts, the figure o f 30
per cent, applied generally both to small and to large establishments, is
excessive and may be an obstacle to the establishment o f organisations and thus
violative o f Article 2 o f Convention No. 98.
The extent o f external supervision o f the internal affairs o f Trade Unions
It may be recalled that Rule 10 o f Industrial Relations Rules, 1977 
introduced the provisions o f supervision by the Registrar or any other person 
authorised by him o f the internal affairs o f Trade Unions.96 The power o f
93 See above, note 79. Report o f the Government for the year ending 30 June 1986.
94 See above, note 79, Report of the Government for the year ending 30 June 1988.
95 See above, note 79, Report for the year ending 30 june 1989. For the workers' and
union leaders' views on this issue, see below, chapter 6, pp. 286-287.
96 See above, chapter 4, pp. 154-155.
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supervision as per the rule which allows the Registrar to enter the premises o f
a Trade Union or federation o f Trade Unions and inspect and seize any record,
register or other documents attracted Committee's attention. The Committee has
repeatedly considered that the procedure under which an administrative authority
has wide power o f supervision over the internal affairs o f a Trade Union, is
incompatible with Article 3 o f the Convention No. 8797 which provides that
workers' and employers' organisation have the right to organise their
administration and activities and to formulate their programmes and that public
authorities shall refrain from any interference which would restrict this right or
impede the lawful exercise thereof. The Committee therefore asked the
Government to reconsider the provisions in question. But the Government
instead o f reconsidering the provisions in the light o f the suggestions, adopted
a defensive stand as it communicated to the ILO:
As regards empowering the Registrar o f Trade Unions to inspect and 
seize any record o f Trade Unions and federations, it may be stated that 
this has been done to ensure proper maintenance of accounts and 
safeguarding against tampering o f documents, misappropriation and 
misuse o f union funds, raised mainly through subscriptions and 
donations from its members. Hence, it would be evident that the 
existing provision of law is not to interfere or restrict the right to 
freedom of association o f workers or o f employers.98
It appears from the above statement that Government considers the issue in 
question as a facilitating provision whereby the Registrar o f Trade Unions
97 See above, note 81, 69th Session, Geneva 1983, p. at 116; 71st Session, Geneva 
1985, p. at 123; 73rd Session, Geneva 1987, at p. 150; 75th Session, Geneva 1988, 
at p. 141; 76th Session, Geneva 1989, at p. 129; 78th Session, Geneva 1991, at p. 148.
98 See above, note 79. Report o f the Government for the year ending 30 June 1986.
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would help the unions and federations to meet the expectations o f their 
members. At this juncture it may be recalled that in its General Survey in 1983, 
the Committee o f Experts has emphasised that in order to avoid interference by 
the authorities in Trade Union matters, "supervision o f union funds should not 
normally go beyond a requirement for the organisation to submit periodic 
financial returns" and that "investigatory measures should be restricted to 
exceptional cases, when they are justified by special circumstances, such as 
presumed irregularities that are apparent from annual financial statements or 
complaints reported by members o f the Trade Unions" and "furthermore, ... 
these controls should be conducted subject to review by the competent judicial 
authority".99
In the absence o f any express indication in the provisions o f the Rule, 
Government's explanation that "as per provision of the law the supervision 
exercised is limited to inspection o f account books and calling for clarification 
relating to maintenance o f accounts"100 can not be considered to provide 
sufficient guarantee o f the provisions o f the Convention. Thus, the Committee 
has been rightly observing for some years that investing an administrative 
authority such as the Registrar of Trade Unions, with broad discretionary 
powers to examine the papers o f an organisation would create grave danger of
99 ILO, Freedom o f Association and Collective Bargaining: General Survey. Geneva 
1983, pp. 59-60.
100 See above, note 79. Report for the year ending 30 June 1988.
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interference with the guarantees provided by the Convention.101
The right o f association o f public servants
W e have already seen that during Pakistani rule when the Convention
was first ratified, followed by Government's first report, the Committee's main
concern centred on the issue o f the right o f association o f public servants which
continued in the following years.102 As already indicated, during that period the
right o f  association o f public servants were governed by the Secretariat's
Notification No. 6/1/48 Ests. (S.E.) o f 1948 which provided for 'class wise'
associations. After independence the situation did not change as rule 29 o f the
Government Servant's (Conduct) Rules, 1979, following the said Notification,
inter alia provided for 'class wise' organisations. The promulgation o f this rule
clearly indicates that the earlier observations o f the Committee103 was simply not
taken into consideration. On the contrary the Government in one o f its reports
to the ILO asserted:
The Government considers the present position regarding the 
association o f public servants as in conformity with the principles set 
forth by the Convention.104
It needs to be emphasised that Rule 29(a) provides membership o f the
101 See above, note 81, 76th Session, Geneva 1989, at p. 129; 78th Session, Geneva 
1991, at pp. 148-49; 81st Session, Geneva 1995, at p. 56.
102 See above, p. 200.
103 See above, pp. 201-202.
104 See above, note 79. Report for the year ending 30 June 1988.
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associations to be confined class wise and under rule 29(b) they must not be
affiliated to another association105. The Committee accordingly observed:
... these aspects o f legislation are not in accordance with the right of 
workers to establish and join organisation o f their own choosing laid 
down by Article 2 o f the Convention ... and to the right that every 
Trade Union should have to exercise its activities, to formulate its 
programm es and to organise its administration without interference 
from the public authorities, in accordance with Article 3 .106
The Committee's above observation was not confined to mere pointing out the
incompatibility but followed by requests to reconsider the situation in the light
o f the above comments with a view to giving full effect to Articles 2 and 3 o f
the Convention in respect o f public servants.107 In its various reports the
Government merely indicated that it has noted the observation o f the Committee
on this point,108 but provided no indication that it proposes to introduce the
changes as requested by the Committee. This led the Committee to note with
'regret' about the continued failure o f the Government to give effect to the
requirements o f the Convention.109
105 See, Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1979.
106 See above, note 79, 71st Session, Geneva 1985, at p. 122; 73rd Session, Geneva 
1987, at p. 149; 75th Session, Geneva 1988, at p. 143.
107 Id.
108 See above, note 79. Reports o f the Government for the years 1989 and 1990.
109 See above, note 81, 78th Session, Geneva 1991, at p. 148; 81st Session, Geneva 
1994, at p. 198; 82nd Session, Geneva 1995, at p. 152.
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Voluntary bargaining in public sectors
In chapter 4 we have discussed the limitations o f the right to collective 
bargaining in public sector industries as a result o f the promulgation o f the 
State-Owned M anufacturing Industries Workers (Terms and Conditions Service) 
Act, 1974.110 Under the Act the Government may determine wages and other 
fringe benefits for any worker employed in a state-owned manufacturing 
industry and that no condition more favourable than those fixed could be 
granted to the workers concerned. The Committee as early as in 1977 and 1979 
reviewed the provisions o f the Act and indicated them to be not in conformity 
with Article 4 o f Convention No. 98.111
In its reply for the period ending 30 June 1980, the Government 
explained that the legislation was designed to achieve uniform wage structure 
for the public sector and to safeguard the interest o f workers in less viable 
industries and therefore did not counteract Article 4 o f Convention No. 98.112 
So far as the safeguarding o f workers' interest in less viable industries is 
concerned, the Committee indicated that though it might be normal for a 
Government to issue direction and guidelines as to wages, the final decision on 
the matter should rest with the parties to the agreement.113 Accordingly, the
110 See above, chapter 4, p. 143.
1,1 See, ILO Official Records, File No. ACD 2-8-309-98.
112 Id.
113 See above, note 111. Direct request addressed to the Government in 1981 by the 
Committee of Experts.
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Committee has expressed its concern for a number o f years, in relation to the 
development o f collective bargaining in the public sector and has drawn 
Government's attention to Article 4 o f the Convention requesting to take steps 
to encourage and promote the development and utilisation o f machinery for the 
voluntary negotiation o f collective agreements.114
Protection against the acts o f interference in establishing, functioning and 
administering unions
Following Government's first report after independence in 1974, the
Committee on several occasions requested the Government to indicate in what
manner the protection o f workers' organisations against acts o f interference was
being assured under Article 2 o f Convention No. 98.115 In response, the
Government in its report for the year ending 30 June 1978 admitted:
There is no protection in our law against any acts which are designed 
to promote the establishment o f workers organisations under the 
domination o f an employer or employers' organisation as to support 
workers' organisations by financial or other means, with the object of 
placing such organisations under the control of an employer or an 
employers' organisation. Generally, such efforts are not made by the 
employers in this country.116
The Government further assured:
114 See above, note 81, 71st Session, Geneva 1985, at pp. 214-15; 73rd Session, 
Geneva 1987, at p. 262; 76th Session, Geneva 1989, at p. 262; 78th Session, Geneva 
1991, at p. 250-51; 81st Session, Geneva 1994, at p. 251.
115 See above, note 111. Direct request addressed to the Government by the Committee 
o f Experts.
116 See above, note 111.
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If the circumstances demand the Government will not hesitate to 
protect workers' organisation against acts o f interference whatsoever.117
The Committee o f Experts noted Government's statement and relying on
preventive rather than curative approach requested the Government to consider
the possibility o f adopting specific provisions guaranteeing legal protection
against the acts o f interference covered by Article 2 o f the Convention.118
Further, the Committee took the view that by virtue o f Article 2 special
measures must be taken, in particular through legislation, accompanied by
appropriate civil and penal sanctions.119
However, the Government instead o f adopting any legislative measure
subsequently changed its stand and pointed out that Sections 15 and 16 o f the
IRO, 1969, provide legislative protection with respect to interference in trade
union activities.120 This attracted Committee's attention which observed:
The Committee noted that Sections 15 and 16 o f the Ordinance, taken 
together with Section 53 do appear to provide an appropriate form of 
legislative protection against anti-union discrimination as envisaged by 
Article 1 o f the Convention. However, the Committee is not satisfied 
that these provisions constitute an adequate response to the 
requirements o f Article 2 .121
The Committee therefore has been requesting the Government to review its
legislation with a view to the adoption o f an appropriate measure o f protection
117 Id.
118 See above, note 111. Direct request addressed to the Government by the Committee 
of Experts.
119 See above, note 81, 73rd Session, Geneva 1987, at p. 263.
120 See above, note 111. Report o f the Government for the year ending 30 June 1989.
121 See above, note 81, 76th Session, Geneva 1989, at p. 263.
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against any interference for purposes of Article 2 o f Convention No. 98.122
Our investigation into the Committee o f Experts role in the supervisory 
process has revealed that in the most recent period o f the Committee's history, 
its reports have been ever more detailed, its observations ever more pointed, and 
its suggestions for remedial actions more specific. This has resulted due to 
Government's introduction o f various restrictive provisions on trade union rights 
in the post independence period. It must be pointed out that the Committee's 
persistence in demanding full implementation o f ratified Conventions has been 
commendable. In the case o f certain recurring non-compliance, the Committee 
has continued to exert pressure with a view to bringing the legislation in 
conformity with the provisions o f the Conventions at some point.
5.4 CASES BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
AND THE OUTCOME
Complaints to the Committee on Freedom o f Association (CFA) may be 
submitted by Governments or by organisations o f workers or employers. All 
complaints to the CFA until now have been lodged by the organisations o f 
workers and employers. There are three categories o f workers' and employers' 
organisations which may file complaints: (a) national organisations directly 
interested in the matter; (b) international organisations o f workers, employers
122 See above, note 81, 78th Session, Geneva 1991, at p. 251; 81st Session, Geneva 
1994, at p. 251.
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or employers having consultative status with the ILO 123 and (c) other 
international organisations o f workers and employers where the allegations relate 
to matters directly affecting their affiliated organisations. So far Bangladesh is 
concerned, all the above three categories o f workers' organisations have lodged 
complaints before the CFA.
We will now examine the cases which have concerned Bangladesh, 
highlighting the allegations made in the various complaints against the 
Government; the response o f the Government, the examination o f these cases 
by the CFA and the outcome o f the procedures with a view to ascertain the role 
played by the CFA.
Case No. 729: Complaint presented by Bangladesh W orkers Federation
The complaint o f the Bangladesh Workers Federation was contained in 
a letter dated 20 November 1972. This was transmitted by the CFA to the 
Government which sent its observation in a letter dated 24 April 1973.124
The complainant's allegations were: a) that the Presidential order No. 55 
o f 20 May prohibited strikes in public sector industries and b) that new labour 
policy announced on 25 September 1972 has abolished the system o f collective
123 The international organisations o f workers and employers which presently have 
consultative status with the ILO are the following: International Confederation o f Free 
Trade Unions, World Confederation o f Labour, World Federation o f Trade Unions, 
International Organisation of Employers.
124 For details o f the case, See, ILO, Official Bulletin. Vol. LVII, Series B, No. 1, 
(Supplement), 1974, pp. 288-90.
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bargaining in public sector industries.
The Presidential Order o f 1972 which prohibited the right to strike in 
nationalised industries and public bodies had a very limited scope as it expired 
on 29 November 1972,125 so the Government, without showing any 
embarrassment on its part, merely notified the fact to the CFA. The legislation 
in question was to expire on the date mentioned unless the Government decided 
otherwise i.e., to renew it. Now the question arises whether the complaint filed 
9 days before the date o f expiry o f the Order had any bearing on the decision 
o f the Government not to renew the application o f the Order. In the absence o f 
any indication by the Government to this effect it may be concluded that there 
was no direct nexus between the two events. However, as the Order expired, the 
workers o f the public sector were able to enjoy the right in question. 
Accordingly the CFA considered the problem to be solved and thereby passed 
no observation on the issue.
On the question o f abolishing the right to collective bargaining under the 
proposed policy, the Government replied that no legislation giving effect to the 
policy was passed. The Government further informed o f its decision to defer the 
application o f the policy with a view to reconsider it in the light o f  the 
Constitution which was adopted two and a half months after the declaration o f 
the policy. But at the same time the Government maintained that under the new 
policy, collective bargaining would be unnecessary in view o f the proposed
125 See above, chapter 4, p. 130.
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system o f workers participation in the administration o f nationalised
undertakings and the planned creation o f National W age Board would be
empowered to revise wages in the public sector. In view o f the above reply o f
the Government, the CFA observed:
By declaring that it was bound by the Convention No. 98 the 
Government took upon itself the obligation to encourage and promote 
the full development and utilisation o f machinery for voluntary 
negotiation between employer or employers' organisations and the 
workers' organisations with a view to the regulation o f terms and 
conditions o f  em ployment by means o f collective agreem ents.126
Thus, the CFA drew attention o f the Government to the standards contained in 
Convention No. 98 for its encouragement and promotion.
Case No. 816: Complaint presented by the National W orkers Federation 
(Jatiya Sramik Federation)
The National W orkers Federation (of Bangladesh) presented its complaint 
in a communication dated 31 June 1975.127 The complainant described the 
arbitrary imprisonment o f  a number o f trade unionists without trial and 
dismissal o f many employees and trade unionists including members o f the 
complainant organisation that had taken place in 1972. In particular, the 
complainant described the situation in the Dhaka Match Factory where, in early 
1972, the entire union executive and four hundred members o f the union had 
been driven out o f  employment and the union office was occupied by the
126 See above, note 124, at p. 289.
127 For details o f the case, See, ILO, Official Bulletin. Series B, Vol. LIX, No. 1, 
1976, p. 2; Vol. LXI, No. 1, 1978, p. 2; Vol. LXI, No. 2, 1978, pp. 6-8.
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official Government union. The complainant further alleged that in 1973, over 
two hundred workers and leading members o f the union in the R-R Jute Mills 
(Chittagong) were killed by a 'semi-official army squad' under the command o f 
the ruling party leader. Further, according to the complainant, similar killings 
had taken place in other mills and factories across the country, for example, 
stated the complainants, the General Secretary o f the National Jute Mills 
W orkers Union, Ghorashal, and the publication Secretary o f the Jatiya Saramik 
Federation were both killed by army squads.
The com plainant also alleged that in November 1973, the Government 
by promulgating the State-Owned Manufacturing Industries W orkers (Terms and 
Conditions o f Service) Ordinance, 1973, has effectively put an end to the right 
to collective bargaining in public sector undertakings.
The com plainant further added that in 1974, repression o f trade union 
activities continued and thousands o f trade union activists were imprisoned 
under the Special Powers Act, 1974. The complainant also added that the state 
of emergency proclaimed on 28 December 1974 resulted in suspension o f the 
enforcement o f the constitutional guarantee o f the right to freedom o f 
association in general and by an executive Order dated 6 January 1975 passed 
under the Emergency Powers Rules, 1975, the Government prohibited strike 
action. Finally, added the complainants, the Government dissolved all national 
Trade Union organisations except its own official Trade Union front, the Jatiya 
Sramik League to which the Government gave direct support.
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However, in a communication dated 20 October 1975 the complainant 
organisation requested the CFA to keep the case in abeyance until further 
notice. This, the complainant submitted, was due to the fact that President 
Khondokar M ustaque Ahmed o f the People's Republic o f Bangladesh in a recent 
address to the nation, had announced the firm commitment o f his Government 
to restore normal democratic life by 15 August 1976 and hold a general election 
by early 1977.128 The CFA at its session in November 1975, requested the 
complainant organisation to inform in due course whether it wished the case to 
be examined further or withdrawn and provide reasons for its decisions. This 
request was repeated by the CFA at each o f its meeting up to November 1977 
when noting that no confirmation has been received from the complainant, the 
CFA requested the Government to transmit its observation on the complaint. 
This prompted the complainant organisation to respond immediately which in 
a communication dated 10 December 1977 confirmed that it did not wish the 
case to be examined.
The CFA took account o f the fact that the allegations, although very 
serious in nature related mainly to the period between 1972 and 1975, since 
which time there had been important political changes in the country. This 
factor and in the light o f the complainant's statement that discussions were 
taking place with the Government concerning the restoration o f Trade Union
128 It may be recalled that on 15 August 1975 the Government against whom the 
allegations had been m ade was overthrown by a coup and the country was under 
Martial Law.
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rights, the CFA decided that no purpose would be served in pursuing the 
examination o f the case further and as such decided the case not to be called for 
further examination.
Case No. 861: Complaint presented by the World Federation o f Trade 
Unions (WFTU)
In its complaint, presented on 10 September 1976, the WFTU alleged 
that there had been grave violations o f Trade Union rights by the authorities in 
Bangladesh which constituted an infringement o f the ILO Conventions Nos. 87 
and 98. The WFTU stated that under the Martial Law Regulations all forms o f 
democratic organisations and expressions by the Trade Unions was declared 
illegal, infringing in particular the right o f free assembly and free speech and 
the right to strikes. The complainant further alleged that the authorities imposed 
restrictions on workers' right to freely elect the officers of Trade Unions, 
specially persons who were not working in the enterprise concerned. The WFTU 
further alleged that the Jatiya Sramik League (the united Trade Union 
organisation) was dissolved which constituted a direct attack on the right to 
organise o f the workers in Bangladesh. The W FTU also alleged that the 
authorities in Bangladesh resorted to a large scale arrest o f Trade Union leaders 
who were being kept in detention without trial specified and 11 such Trade 
Unionists who were arrested and being detained without trial. They were: Mr. 
Abu Taher Masud, Mr. Udayan Nag, Mr Alauddin Ahmed, Mr. Quazi
226
Muzammel Hoq, Mr. Saidur Rahman Sadu, Mr. Hasanuddin Sarkar, Mr. Ali
Azam, Mr. Chitta Deg, Mr. Abdur Rahim, Mr. Ruhul Amin and Mr. Selim.129
In its reply dated 2 March 1977 the Government bluntly stated that no
labour leader in Bangladesh was detained for Trade Union activities. According
to the Government the labour leader named Alauddin Ahmed was never been
detained and Mr. Abu Taher Masud, Mr. Udayan Nag, Quazi Muzammel Hoq
and Mr. Hasanuddin Sarkar, Mr. Ali Azam and Mr. Selim were detained for
activities prejudicial to the security o f the state and not for Trade Union
activities. The other four Trade Union leaders, according to the Government,
were no longer in detention.
Thus, it appears that except for one leader the Government admitted the
allegation o f detention but remained silent about other aspects o f  the complaint
i.e., allegation relating to general interference in Trade Union activities and the
dissolution o f the Jatiya Sramik League. This led the CFA to observe that the
Government supplied some information on certain aspects o f the case, but
supplied no information as regards certain other serious allegations made by the
complainant and reminded the Government:
The purpose o f the whole procedure is to promote respect for Trade 
Union rights in law and in fact, and the Committee is confident that if 
it protects Governments against unreasonable accusations, Governments 
on their side will recognise the importance, for the protection of their 
own good name, of formulating for objective examination detailed 
factual replies to such detailed factual charges as may be put
129 See, ILO, Official Bulletin. Series B, Vol. LX, No. 3, 1977, pp. 57-61; Vol. LXI, 
No. 3, 1978, pp. 108-113; Vol. LXII, No. 2, 1979, pp. 49-52; Vol. LXIII, No. 1, 1980, 
pp. 45-47; Vol. LXIII, No. 3, 1980, pp. 71-73; Vol. LXIV, No. 3, 1981, pp. 7-8.
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forward.130
Accordingly, the CFA requested the Government: a) to furnish further 
observation on the alleged dissolution o f the Jatiyo Sramik League, stating in 
particular the present situation o f the organisation and its ability to carry out 
normal trade union activities; b) to supply full and precise information 
concerning the trade union leaders who were alleged to be in detention, 
including information concerning the charges brought against them and to 
supply the texts o f any judgments against them by the courts and c) to transmit 
its observation on the allegations relating to general interference in Trade Union 
activities.
In response to the above request the Government in its communication 
o f 11 May 1978 explained that under Article 117A o f the Constitution o f 
Bangladesh, one political party, i.e., BAKSAL was formed in the country and 
that the Jatiyo Sramik League was incorporated in it as one o f its organs and 
the repeal o f the constitutional provision in question by a proclamation o f 8 
November 1975 resulted in the disappearance o f the Jatiyo Sramik League. 
Further the Government stated that a number o f Trade Union organisations 
affiliated to the Jatiyo Sramik League have once again began to function. In this 
regard the CFA recalled the principle set forth in the resolution concerning the 
independence o f Trade Union movement, according to which Governments 
should not attempt to transform the Trade Union movement into an instrument
130 ILO, Official Bulletin. Series B, Vol. LX, No. 3, 1977, pp. 58-59.
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for pursuance o f political aims.
As regards the arrested trade unionists, the Government merely indicated 
in its letter dated 29 May 1978, that Mr. Abu Taher Masud, Mr. Udyan Nag 
and Mr. Shamsuzzaman Selim have been released, the first two on 26 and 28 
April 1977 respectively and did not mention any date o f release o f the other 
person.The Government also stated that information concerning Mr. Ali Azam 
and Mr. Quazi Muzammel Hoq would be supplied after receipt o f the decision 
o f the Supreme Court on the appeals filed by them. However no information 
was sent regarding the detention o f Mr. Hasanuddin Sarkar. This led the CFA 
to request once again to furnish information regarding him.
The CFA noted with interest that another three Trade Union leaders 
mentioned by the complainant were released. But nevertheless, noted with regret 
that Government supplied no information on the precise grounds for their arrest 
nor stated whether they were brought to the trial before competent judicial 
authorities. In its letter o f February 1979 the Government stated that "no trade 
union leaders unconnected with political parties were arrested, i.e., no non­
political Trade Unionists was detained nor was anyone arrested for Trade Union 
activities".131 It also explained that in accordance with law when anyone is in 
custody he is to be served with the grounds therefor within 15 days o f his 
detention and his case was to be reviewed by advisory boards or Committees 
consisting o f High Court judges and senior civil officials. Further the
131 ILO, Official Bulletin. Vol. LXII, Series, B, No. 2, 1979, p. 50
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Government communicated that Mr. Ali Azam and Muzammel Hoq were 
released following the order o f the High Court Division o f the Supreme Court. 
As all the trade union leaders as specified in the complaint were released, the 
CFA considered that no useful purpose would be served to examine the 
allegations concerning them.
As regards allegations concerning interference o f Trade Union activities, 
the Government in its communication o f 29 May 1978 sent copies o f two 
notifications o f 20 July 1977 which did put an end to the restrictions imposed 
by Sections 4 and 7 o f the Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinance, 1977. 
Under these notifications registration o f new Trade Unions and election for 
determination o f collective bargaining agent were allowed. In its November 
1978 session the CFA noted the information provided by the Government and 
as the complainant's allegation also concerned other specific points i.e., right 
to strikes and to hold meetings, the Committee thus once again requested the 
Government to communicate its observations.
In its communication o f 20 February 1979, the Government stated that 
restrictions on the right to strike and lockout and freedom o f association were 
imposed only temporarily in view o f the emergency prevailing in the country 
at that time and applied both to workers and to management. It is also 
mentioned that bans were imposed on meeting and processions generally and 
not merely on meeting and processions o f Trade Unions. Thus, after admitting 
about the restrictions imposed as alleged by the complainant, the Government
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mentioned that bans on meetings and processions no longer existed. Regarding 
alleged infringement o f Trade Union rights under a state o f emergency, the CFA 
concluded that "it was not competent to express an opinion on the need or 
advisability o f such legislation, which is a question purely o f political 
character".132 The CFA was, however, o f the opinion that it should consider the 
repercussions which such legislation might have on the free exercise o f Trade 
Union rights. Thus, in the present case, the CFA observed that the ban on 
certain Trade Union activities imposed in connection with state o f emergency 
involved serious restrictions. However, as the restrictions were no longer in 
effect, the CFA noted the information o f the Government with 'interest', an 
expression used by the CFA to indicate satisfaction.
Case No. 955: Complaint presented by the World Federation o f Trade 
Unions
The complaint dated 2 April 1980 contained that Mr. Manzurul Ahsan 
Khan, Secretary o f the Trade Union Kendra and several public service 
employees on strike were arrested. The complainant urged that the Government 
should release all arrested Trade Unionists and show respect for Trade Union 
rights.133
The Government in its reply dated 23 May 1980 stated that Mr.
132 Ibid, p. 51.
133 For details o f the case, see, ILO, Official Bulletin. Series B, Vol. LXIII, No. 3, 
1980, pp. 12-13.
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Manzurul Ahsan Khan was taken into custody by law enforcing authorities on 
political grounds and not for Trade Union activities. The Government also 
indicated his release from detention. Regarding the arrest o f public service 
employees, the Government pointed out that the arrested members of the 
Government employees' association were released after a settlement was arrived 
between the parties.
The CFA in its observation noted the different reasons given by the 
complainant and the Government for the arrest o f Mr. Manzurul Ahsan Khan, 
the former alleging that he was detained for his Trade Union activities, the latter 
stating political grounds. In view o f the above situation the CFA drew attention 
o f the Government to the principle that measures o f preventive detention may 
involve serious interference with Trade Union activities and emphasised the 
rights o f all detained persons to receive a fair trial at the earliest possible time. 
However, as the detainee was released the CFA decided not to examine the case 
further.
Case No. 1214: Complaints presented by eleven national Trade Union 
Federations
In their letter o f 17 June 1983 eleven national Trade Union federations134
134 The Bangladesh Sanjukta Sramik Federation, Bangladesh Trade Union Kendra, 
Samajtantrik Sramik Front, Bangladesh W orkers Federation, Jatiyo Sramik Jote, 
Bangladesh Sramik Federation, Bangladesh Ganotantrik Sramik Andolan, Bangladesh 
Sramik Federation, Jatiyo Sramik League, Jatiyo Sramik Federation and the 
Bangladesh Federation o f Labour.
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alleged that promulgation o f Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinance (No. 
XXVI) o f 30 August 1982 violated Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 which the 
Government has ratified. In particular the complainants cited the following 
provisions o f the Ordinance: Section 4 (1)(2),135 Section 4(3),136 Section 7,137 
Section 8.138 In addition, the complainants referred generally to other legislative 
restrictions on Trade Union rights as specified in the IRO, 1969 i.e., power o f 
the Registrar o f Trade Union to cancel the registration o f any Trade Union 
having less than one third o f the total number o f employees in the 
establishment(s) concerned; denial of Government employees' right to form 
Trade Unions; prohibition o f non-employees o f that undertaking from holding 
Trade Union office.139
The Government's response o f 21 August 1983 on the above allegations 
was very brief and concerned only with the Industrial Relations (Regulation) 
Ordinance 1982. Thus being silent on other restrictive issues o f Trade Union
135 It dealt with prohibition o f any election for determination o f collective bargaining 
agents; discretion o f the Registrar o f Trade Unions to declare any registered Trade 
Union as collective bargaining agent.
136 It provided that to be allowed as collective bargaining agent, a Trade Union must 
have not less than one third o f the total number of employees in the establishment(s).
137 It dealt with prohibition on the holding o f any meeting, including a meeting for the 
election of the executive committee o f the Trade Union without prior permission o f 
the Government.
138 It dealt with prohibition o f strikes and lockouts and any breach punishable with a 
maximum of two years imprisonment or a maximum fine of five thousand taka or 
both.
139 See, ILO, Official Bulletin. Series B, Vol. LXVI, No. 3, 1983, pp. 89-93.
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rights o f the IRO, 1969 the Government merely stated:
The restrictive provisions in question are temporary in nature and are 
under constant review with a view to relaxations/amendments, as well 
as to ultimate withdrawal which could coincide with the revival o f the 
constitutional provisions in the country.140
Despite above assurance the CFA drew Government's attention to the following
aspects o f  the Ordinance in the following manner:
Section 4 deprives workers o f their right to choose their representatives 
for collective bargaining purposes in full freedom;
Section 4(3) imposes an unnecessary high membership proportion (one 
third) for Trade Unions to be eligible to be declared as collective 
bargaining agents;
Section 7 deprives workers o f freedom of assembly which is 
indispensable to the free exercise o f the Trade Union rights and 
moreover, deprives workers o f the right to elect their representatives in 
full freedom and to organise their administration and activities; taken 
further, such a prohibition denies workers the right to establish and join 
organisations o f their own choosing;
The right to strike is one o f the essential means available to workers 
o f promoting and defending their occupational interests and Section 8, 
when read with Section 6 (compulsory arbitration to settle industrial 
disputes), results in a severe limitation on the workers' right to organise 
their activities and formulate their program m es.141
The CFA's above observation was followed by a request to the Government to 
amend the legislation. With regard to legislative restrictions o f the IRO, 1969 
as mentioned by the complainant, the CFA endorsed the Committee o f Experts 
observation which noted the provisions to be incompatible with the Conventions 
on freedom o f association and requested the Government to reconsider the 
provisions. However, the CFA referred the legislative aspect o f the case to the
140 Ibid, p. 90.
141 Ibid, p. 91.
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Committee o f Experts for continued supervision within the regular framework 
o f the ILO supervisory machinery as it does in similar situations.
Case No. 1246: Complaint presented by World Federation of Teachers 
Unions
In its communication o f 7 November 1983, the complainant alleged that
professor Shareeful Islam, Secretary General o f Bangladesh College Teachers
Association was imprisoned for one year because o f participating in an informal
meeting o f the association at its head quarter. In its reply o f 16 February 1984
the Government notified the CFA that Mr. Islam was sentenced by a competent
Court to rigorous imprisonment for one year because o f misappropriation o f
funds and not for participating in an informal meeting o f the association. By a
subsequent communication dated 23 April 1984 the Government informed the
CFA about the release o f Mr. Islam.142
The CFA on the basis o f information at its disposal noted the
contradictory reasons given for imprisonment by both the parties. Further the
Government did not specify whether the alleged misappropriation o f funds was
of Trade Union's fund or other. The CFA in the absence of any detailed
information recalled:
In cases such as this involving the arrest, detention or sentencing o f a 
Trade Union official, it has always taken the view that individuals have 
the right to be presumed innocent till found guilty.143
142 See, ILO, Official Bulletin. Serirs B, Vol. LXVII, No. 2, 1984, pp. 22-23.
143 Ibid, p. 23.
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However, in view o f the fact that the Trade Union leader in question was 
released, apparently before the expiry o f his prison sentence, the CFA 
considered that the case did not require further examination.
Case No. 1259: Complaint presented by the Trade Unions International of 
Transport Workers
In its communication o f 3 February 1984, the complainant alleged that 
four leaders144 o f its affiliated organisation, i.e., the Chittagong Port Workers 
Union were under arrest for almost one year. By a further communication o f 6 
March 1984 the complainant reported the arrest o f Mr. Manzurul Ahsan Khan 
a leader o f another o f its affiliated organisations. In its reply o f 14 July 1984 the 
Government merely stated that the arrested trade union leaders were released 
after withdrawal o f cases against them .145 The CFA in its observation pointed 
out that the complainant organisation neither alleged nor provided further 
information to show that the complaint was based on Trade Union activities nor 
specified why the arrests were unlawful.
However as the arrested union leaders were released, the CFA considered 
that the case need not be called for further examination.
From the cases discussed above, it is apparent that the allegations in the 
various complaints concerned the arrests and detention o f trade unionists and the
144 Mr. Abdul Kalam, Mr. Jalaluddin, Mr. Nazrul and Mr. Shiek Manik.
145 See, ILO, Official Bulletin. Series B, Vol. LXII, No. 3, 1984, pp. 18-20.
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infringement o f trade union rights imposed by legislative enactments. In cases 
Nos. 955 and 1246 the Government furnished the information that the detainees 
were not arrested for their trade union activities but for political activities and 
misappropriation o f funds respectively. In case No. 1259 the Government 
released the detainee before reporting to the CFA. So did the Government in 
case No. 955. The consideration o f case No. 729 by the CFA was o f no 
practical value as the Presidential Order No. 55 o f 1972 prohibiting strikes in 
public sector was withdrawn before the case came up for consideration and the 
Government having deferred the application o f its labour policy. Case No. 816, 
although concerned serious allegations, was not examined on merits by the CFA 
as the complainant did not wish the case to be examined. In case No. 861 the 
CFA continued the examination o f the case and insisted that the Government 
should furnish details o f the grounds o f arrests and detention o f the detainees.. 
The CFA pursued till the Government released the detainees. Thus, in the cases 
discussed above, the Government released all the detainees at some point during 
the pendency of the case and informed the CFA accordingly.
The question now arises, how far the CFA can be credited for this? 
Actually, there is no way o f summarising the success o f the procedure in 
quantitative terms as neither the Government nor the CFA make any public 
announcement on the issue. The conclusion is to be inferred from the context. 
Thus, the communication o f complaints followed by subsequent release o f 
arrested persons as mentioned in various complaints, whatever be the time gap,
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may be considered to have had some bearing on the decision o f the 
Government. The procedure has been o f significance as it has shown the 
awareness and concern o f the working class o f their rights and on the other 
hand caused the Government to explain its position in an international forum. 
Also, it must be emphasised that the procedure has been utilized by some 
national and world Trade Union federations and the more and more use o f it in 
the event o f  violation o f Trade Union rights may result in making the procedure 
more effective.
But at the same time it may be argued that the release o f various 
detained alleged trade unionists resulted not because of the CFA procedures but 
because the purposes for which they were arrested by the Government in power 
were achieved. Regarding allegations concerning legislative incompatibility with 
the ILO Conventions, the CFA in above case No. 1246 requested the 
Government to amend the legislation. The Committee o f Experts indeed has 
repeatedly pointed out the various legislative incompatibilities in the domestic 
law vis-a-vis ILO Conventions which we have detailed earlier in our discussion. 
But in its attempts, the CFA failed to evoke any positive response from the 
Government. There is hardly any indication that the attempts by the CFA 
influenced Government's decisions or policy making. Accordingly, so far as 
Bangladesh is concerned, from the cases discussed above, no positive conclusion 
can be reached as to the success o f the CFA procedure. Overall, it may be right 
to conclude, that the supervisory role o f the ILO in ensuring compliance with
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the ratified Conventions has hardly achieved its goal.
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C H A P T E R  6 
THE RIGHT TO FREEDO M  OF ASSO CIATIO N IN 
BANGLADESH: TESTING AW A RENESS, OPINION AND  
ATTITUDES OF THE BENEFICIARIES
This chapter attempts to inquire into the awareness and attitudes o f the workers, 
union leaders and employers about the ILO and its Conventions on freedom o f 
association. In particular, it examines their opinions on the extent o f the right 
to establish trade unions and their functioning as well as their awareness and 
satisfaction about the provisions o f the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, 
dealing with the right to freedom o f association. The study was undertaken with 
the aid o f field research following the questionnaire survey method. The 
following sections first elaborate the research design and then present and 
analyse the findings. It may be emphasised that the presentation here is based 
entirely on interviews with the respondents included in the sample and does not 
question the correctness o f their views.
6.1 DESIGNING AND PRE-TESTING THE QUESTIONNAIRES
In the present research, structured questionnaires were used. As the 
success o f the questionnaire method o f collecting information depends largely 
upon the proper design o f the questionnaire, a pilot study was undertaken which 
involved discussions with eminent trade unionists, employers, workers and
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academics with regard to the following issues: (a) the information to be sought 
(b) the number o f questionnaires required (c) the manner in which the individual 
questions will be sequenced (d) the form o f response each question will have 
(e) the content o f each question and (f) the manner in which the questionnaires 
will be administered.
As a result o f the pilot study, it was decided to frame three sets o f 
questionnaires' for the three group o f respondents i.e., trade union leaders, 
workers and employers (hereinafter referred to as 'target groups'). Although, 
three sets o f questionnaires were constructed, the content o f the questions in all 
the three sets remained the same except the issue on test o f attitudes o f the 
respondents towards the ILO and its Conventions on freedom o f association. 
This was so designed because the 'target groups' were considered as being 
examined on the same issues in order to assess differences o f opinion, 
awareness, and attitude o f the respective groups.
Each questionnaire consisted o f two parts, the first concerning factual 
information, i.e. the respondent's identification and level o f education, while the 
second dealt with a series o f substantive questions. These questions were 
logically arranged in groups maintaining the sequence in terms o f the purpose 
and o f the persons who would supply the information. In order to reply, 
respondents were provided with the option o f fixed alternative and multiple 
choice answers depending on the nature of questions asked. This was done after
1 For questionnaires, see Appendices.
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the experience o f the pilot study, as it appeared that it would not only facilitate 
tabulation o f data but also lead to tables o f quantified direct responses.
After drafting the questionnaires, it was decided to pre-test them on the 
samples. This pre-testing method occupied a significant place in the research 
since it helped to redesign the questionnaires on the basis o f practical difficulties 
faced in gathering the required information. Through the pre-testing procedure 
many problems concerning the questionnaires were settled before the actual field 
operation commenced as unforeseen defects were removed and corrected at this 
stage o f research. For example, some questions were dropped, some had to be 
asked in a different form, the sequence had to be changed and some new 
questions were added.
6.2. SAMPLE SIZE AND SAMPLING FRAME
Having designed the questionnaires, a total o f two hundred respondents 
were considered to be the appropriate sample size taking from three categories 
o f respondents in the following distribution: workers 100; trade union leaders 
50; employers 50. The choice o f such sample sizes was not arbitrary but based 
on the limitation o f the tenure o f field research2 and in view o f the objectives 
o f the study.
A larger sample was not deemed essential because the industrial workers 
of Bangladesh could be seen as a highly homogeneous group in so far as their
2 For the period of field investigation, see below, p. 248.
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socio-economic, cultural, religious, linguistic and ethnic background is 
concerned.3 Heterogeneity in their behaviour, whether in the work place or in 
unions, was not to be expected as most o f them have been recent migrants from 
villages, belonged to the same religion and also spoke the same language. There 
have also been little caste, sectarian and tribal distinctions among them.4 This 
factor has helped to promote a behavioural cohesion among them and led me 
to accept a relatively small sample size. Deciding what sample size to use is 
almost a matter more o f judgem ent than o f calculation. Further, it is not found 
in the methodology o f social science research that a certain percentage of 
population is to be taken from the total population for making the sample size 
representative. Thus, the criteria o f  deciding sample size are subjective rather 
than objective depending on the circumstances, nature and scope o f the research. 
Hence, taking into consideration o f limitation o f time in carrying out the field 
research, the sample size, as taken for the study, might be deemed adequate.
Having decided the size o f samples, the next step was to decide the type 
o f sampling to be used in selecting the samples. After considering various types 
o f sampling techniques, keeping in view the study objectives, the simple and 
stratified random methods o f sampling were chosen.5
3 See, Khan, A. A., Industrial Relations in Bangladesh: A Study of Trade Unionism. 
Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1987, University o f Chittagong, Bangladesh, p. 21.
4 Id.
3 For various types of sampling, see, Moser, C. A., and Calton, G., Survey Methods 
in Social Investigation, London 1971, pp. 61-210.
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O f the different industrial sectors, the sample o f workers was drawn from 
the jute and textile industries, as these two sectors have a long history o f trade 
unionism and are the m ajor employers o f industrial labour in the large-scale 
manufacturing sector o f the country, not to speak o f their importance in the 
national economy. Before selecting the sample o f workers it was first necessary 
to select the enterprises from which the sample o f workers was to be taken. 
Accordingly, lists o f jute and textile enterprises were collected from the 
Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation and Bangladesh Textile Mills Corporation 
to cover the public sector while lists o f private sector jute and textile enterprises 
were collected from Bangladesh Jute Mills Association and Bangladesh Textile 
Mills Association. As these enterprises were located all over the country in 
different districts, keeping in view the length o f field research, it was considered 
to take the sample o f enterprises from two districts only. Accordingly, the 
sample o f enterprises was drawn from the districts o f Dhaka and Jessore. The 
selection o f Dhaka district was purposive, it being the capital o f the country and 
also having within its boundary the highest number of enterprises under study 
in comparison with other districts.6 The district o f Jessore was chosen following 
simple random method o f selection.
Having determined the sample o f districts, the next task was to select the 
sample o f enterprises. Thus, according to alphabetical order a sample o f eight
6 O f 93 textile enterprises o f the country, both public and private, 42 were located in 
the district of Dhaka. Similarly, o f 72 jute enterprises, 28 were located in the district 
o f Dhaka.
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enterprises was taken from the district o f Dhaka i.e., four from Jute and four 
from textile: two each the public and private sectors. Following the same 
method four enterprises wee taken as sample from the district o f Jessore. Hence, 
the total number o f sample enterprises was twelve. From these enterprises one 
hundred workers were chosen as sample following the simple random method 
o f selection in the following distribution: nine workers from each sample 
enterprise o f Dhaka district (i.e., seventy two) and seven workers from each 
sample enterprise o f Jessore district (i.e., twenty eight).
The Trade Union structure in Bangladesh comprises both plant level 
unions at the base and federations o f Trade Unions at the national level.7 
Therefore, the sample o f trade union leaders was selected from basic unions as 
well as from the national federations o f Trade Unions. Following the method as 
followed in sampling the workers i.e., simple random method, twenty five basic 
level union leaders, were chosen from the sample enterprises o f jute and textile. 
The other twenty five respondents were chosen from amongst the leaders o f 
twenty three registered national federations o f Trade Unions8 following the 
random method o f selection. The national federations o f Trade Unions, because 
o f their position as apex organisation o f Trade Unions affiliated to them, play 
a vital role in the trade union movement o f the country. The whole movement
7 For Trade Union structure in Bangladesh, see, Alam, F.,"Some Aspects o f Trade 
Union Structure in Bangladesh" in Chittagong University Studies. (Commerce), Part 
I, Vols. V-VI, 1981-82, pp. 1-22.
8 According to the Department o f Labour, at the time o f carrying out field research 
twenty three registered national federations of trade unions existed in Bangladesh.
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is in fact structurally divided along political and ideological lines through the 
leadership o f these federations and thus it was considered necessary to take the 
leaders o f national Trade Union federations as sample .
In order to select a sample o f employers, three categories o f employers 
were taken into consideration: employers o f jute and textile enterprises and the 
employers representing the Bangladesh Employers' Association. The Bangladesh 
Employers' Association is a national organisation representing all sectors o f 
industry,trade, banking and insurance, etc. It was established in 1951 and since 
then it has remained the only association o f its kind in Bangladesh. Following 
the simple random method o f selection, ten members out o f twenty members o f 
its executive committee were taken as sample . Following the same method 
forty employers twenty from the jute sector and twenty from the textile sector 
were taken as the sample o f employers for the purpose o f the study.
6.3 TECHNIQUE AND PERIOD OF DATA COLLECTION
After designing the questionnaires and selecting the sample , 
administering the questionnaires was the next step. O f the different techniques 
available to administer questionnaires,9 the personal interview method was 
adopted. Thus, the questionnaires were filled in by the writer on the basis of 
personal interviews. The reason for adopting this method is that information so 
obtained is likely to be more accurate since at the time o f interview I could
9 For various means o f administering questionnaires, see, Moser, C. A., and Calton, 
G., above note 5, at pp. 257-302.
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clear up doubts and if necessary, explain the questions to the respondents. 
Further, for some o f the respondents, especially workers who were not well 
educated, it would not have been possible for them to fill in the questionnaires 
themselves, no matter in what language or in what form the questionnaires were 
constructed. However some respondents filled the questionnaires by themselves 
as they preferred to do so.10
In interviewing workers and union leaders, I avoided the presence o f the 
management o f the industry concerned so that the respondents could speak as 
freely as possible without being influenced by management. All possible efforts 
were made to establish contact with the respondents chosen on the basis o f 
random sampling by paying, whenever necessary, repeated visits. In a very few 
cases the respondents could not be contacted. In cases where the respondents 
could not be contacted despite all efforts, another respondent was chosen. 
Anticipating such situations, a few more persons had been included in the 
sample chosen beforehand than the number required in each category o f 
respondents. The first missing sample was substituted by the first sample kept 
in reserve and the second by the second and so on. The method o f substitution 
may not be satisfactory in the sense that it might have impaired the randomness 
o f the sampling method to some extent, but in order to complete the field-work 
within the scheduled time this method had to be followed.
Utmost care was taken to avoid omission o f entry in the questionnaires,
10 12 respondents fell in this category, eight of which were the employers and the rest 
union leaders.
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yet, three responses in the case o f two samples (two in one sample and one in 
one sample) were not entered at all." To remedy the defects I tried to contact 
the respondents but succeeded only in one case; the other respondent could not 
be contacted. This omission o f entry in the questionnaire has been indicated as 
'no response' in the ultimate analysis while utilising the other entries o f the 
questionnaire.
The field investigation was carried out between 1 July, 1992 and 30 
November, 1992. Hence, the data collected through the questionnaire survey 
method and presented and analysed in this study refer to that period only.
6.4 FINDINGS OF THE FIELD RESEARCH
The purpose o f this chapter being to test the awareness, opinion and 
attitude o f the respondents about the various aspects o f the right to freedom o f 
association, the field investigation was conducted, first by enquiring about the 
level of education o f the respondents with a view to ascertain if education has 
had any bearing on their responses. The reported level o f education o f the 
respondents is shown in diagram No. 1.
" These respondents filled the questionnaires by themselves.
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Diagram No. 1 shows that 20% o f union leaders (10 out o f 50) have 
secondary education and 34% (17 out o f 50) have higher secondary education, 
while 46% (23 out o f  50) are graduate and above. It is to be noted that none o f 
the union leaders belonged to the primary education category. On the contrary, 
71% o f workers have primary education and only 29% possess secondary 
education, none representing higher secondary and above level o f education. The 
study o f employers on the other hand provide an opposite picture as 84% (42 
out o f 50) o f employers responded to have graduate and above level o f 
education, while only 16% (8 out o f 50) possess higher secondary education. 
The study has revealed that the employers have a higher level o f education and 
from this finding it can not be generalised that the employers in general possess 
the level o f  education as described above. This higher rate of education has 
been due to the sampling frame as adopted. As mentioned earlier, the employers 
were chosen from the large scale manufacturing sectors o f the country and from 
amongst the members o f the executive committee o f the Bangladesh Employers' 
Association who occupy a prominent economic and social position in the 
society. It may be mentioned that they were chosen not because o f the above 
reason but because o f the fact that they are more associated with the trade union 
affairs o f the country.
It is perhaps surprising to note that while as one would expect none o f 
the workers have higher secondary and above level of education, 46% of union 
leaders were graduate and above. This may be attributed to the fact that 50%
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(25 out o f 50) o f the sample o f union leaders were chosen from amongst the 
leaders of national federations o f trade unions and out o f that 46% belonged to 
this category. The remaining 4% had higher secondary education. Another 
reason is that as the IRO, 1969 allows non-workers to be union executives at 
the level o f national federations o f trade unions, so some social workers and 
politicians having good educational background engage themselves in trade 
union activities. 50% (25 out o f  50) o f the sample o f union leaders who were 
chosen from basic level unions and who were all actual workers employed in 
their respective establishments provided a different picture as none o f them were 
graduates or above and only 30% (15 out o f 25) have higher secondary 
education while 20% (10 out o f  25) have secondary education.
6.4.1 TESTING AWARENESS ABOUT THE ILO AND ITS CONVENTIONS 
ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
Respondents' awareness o f and familiarity with the ILO itself has to be 
established as the starting point of the inquiry into the impact o f the ILO 
Conventions on freedom o f association in the domestic arena o f Bangladesh. So 
before engaging into the inquiry about the state of awareness o f the ILO 
Conventions, it was considered necessary to investigate the respondents' state 
o f awareness with the organisation itself The findings o f this investigation are 
presented below in table No. 1.
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TABLE NO. 1 
AWARENESS ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF THE ILO
ARE YOU AWARE ABOUT THE 
EXISTENCE OF THE ILO?
RESPONSES
YES NO
CATEGORY OF 
RESPONDENTS
NUMBER OF 
RESPONDENTS
No. % No. %
UNION LEADERS 50 50 100 0 0 |
WORKERS 100 30 30 70 70 |
EMPLOYERS 50 50 100 0 0 |
From table No. 1 it is evident that all the trade union leaders and 
employers are aware about the existence o f the ILO, while only 30% o f the 
workers are aware about the existence o f the ILO. The field investigation thus 
shows that a substantial majority o f the workers i.e. 70%, have no idea about 
the existence o f the ILO. The reasons o f unawareness will be discussed later in 
this chapter.12
Respondents those who replied in affirmative were asked to state their 
source o f awareness. The findings of this investigation are presented in table 
No. 2.
12 See below, p. 254.
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TABLE NO. 2
SOURCE OF AWARENESS ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF THE ILO
SOURCE OF AWARENESS 
ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF 
THE ILO
RESPONDENTS |
UNION
LEADERS
WORKERS EMPLOYERS I
No. % No. % No. % |
OWN READING 30 60 0 0 50 100 I
MASS MEDIA 4 8 0 0 0 0 I
| LOCAL ILO OFFICE 0 0 0 0 0 0 I
1 POLITICAL LEADER 3 6 4 4 0 0 1
| UNION LEADER 13 26 21 21 0 0 I
[ EMPLOYER 0 0 2 2 0 0 1
[ WORKER 0 0 5 5 0 0 |
It is significant to note that 60% (30 out o f 50) o f union leaders are 
aware o f the ILO through own reading, while 26% (13 out o f 50) o f union 
leaders have come to know from a fellow union leader. Only 6% (3 out o f 50) 
o f union leaders expressed that they derived the knowledge from political 
leaders and the remaining 8% (4 out o f 50) acquired knowledge through mass 
media. O f the 60% union leaders who gave own reading as their source o f 
awareness, 50% (25 out o f 50) were the leaders o f national federations o f trade 
unions, i.e., all the respondents chosen from this category. This has reflected 
their higher level o f education and further as national level leaders they could 
be expected to have such knowledge. The remaining 10% (5 out o f 50) o f 
respondents were from amongst the basic level union leaders. The awareness o f 
26% o f union leaders (who were all leaders o f basic level unions) about the ILO
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from one or other federation level leader reflects the interaction amongst them.
It has been shown in table No. 1 that all the employers are aware about 
the ILO. When asked about the source o f information, all o f  them indicated 
academic exercise. Their response seems convincing as in diagram No.l it has 
been shown that they possess a fairly high level o f education.
As mentioned earlier (see, table No. 1) only 30% workers know about 
the ILO. As to their source o f information, 21% mentioned that they came to 
know from their union leaders, 5% mentioned fellow workers and 4% political 
leaders.
The 70% o f workers who claimed no knowledge o f the existence o f the
ILO were requested to explain the reasons for not knowing. In reply, 36%
suggested lack o f education as the main reason, while 18% admitted lack o f
interest but 16% thought that they ought to have been informed. When they
were asked whom they thought should have informed them, some mentioned
their union leaders. To quote one worker:
Because o f our background and academic limitations we are not in a 
position to know about the existence of an organisation like the ILO by 
ourselves. The union leaders should take initiative to make us aware o f 
the establishment and activities o f the ILO .13
Having investigated about the awareness o f the ILO generally, inquiring about
the ILO Conventions on freedom o f association was the next step, as it would
enable us to know to what extent the message o f the Conventions have reached
to the respondents. The findings o f this search are presented in table No. 3.
13 Personal interview dated 12.8.92. Translated from Bengali.
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TABLE NO. 3
AWARENESS ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF THE ILO CONVENTIONS ON
THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
ARE YOU AWARE THAT THE ILO HAS LAID 
DOWN SOME CONVENTIONS ON RIGHT TO 
| FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION ?
RESPONSES
YES NO
1 CATEGORY OF 
| RESPONDENTS
NUMBER OF 
RESPONDENTS
No. % No. %
UNION LEADERS 50 44 88 6 12
WORKERS 100 24 24 76 76
1 EMPLOYERS 50 50 100 0 0 |
Table No. 3 shows that 88% o f union leaders (44 out o f 50) are aware 
about the existence o f the ILO Conventions on freedom of association while 
only 24% o f workers have such knowledge. On the other hand all the employers 
as interviewed are aware about the ILO Conventions on freedom o f association. 
The above respondents' extent o f knowledge about the provisions o f  the 
Conventions will be shown later in this chapter which will depict their actual 
awareness o f the rights detailed in the Conventions.14 The 12% o f union leaders 
who denied any knowledge o f the existence of the Conventions were from the 
basic level unions having only secondary educational background. The level o f 
education thus appears to be an important determinant factor in the responses 
o f the respondents. The respondents' source o f awareness about the ILO 
Conventions on freedom of association which is shown below in table No. 4 
further establishes that proposition.
14 See below, pp. 257-260.
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TABLE NO. 4
SOURCE OF AWARENESS ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF THE ILO
CONVENTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
|  SOURCE OF AWARENESS 
I ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF 
I THE ILO CONVENTIONS ON 
I RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF 
I ASSOCIATION
RESPONDENTS
UNION
LEADERS
WORKERS EMPLOYERS
No. % No. % No. %
|  OWN READING 24 48 0 0 35 70 1
|  MASS MEDIA 3 6 0 0 4 8 |
1 LOCAL ILO OFFICE 0 0 0 0 0 0 |
|  POLITICAL LEADER 4 8 4 4 3 6
|  UNION LEADER 13 26 15 15 0 0
|  EMPLOYER 0 0 0 0 8 16 |
|  WORKER 0 0 5 5 0 0 |
It has been mentioned earlier in table No. 3 that 88% o f union leaders 
are aware about the existence o f the ILO Conventions on freedom o f 
association. Table No. 4 shows that 48% (24 out o f 50) o f union leaders have 
derived their information from own reading. All these respondents were the 
leaders o f the national federations o f Trade Unions. Only 6% (3 out o f 50) o f 
union leaders acquired knowledge through mass media, while 8% (4 out o f 50) 
through political leaders and another 26% (13 out o f 50) from fellow union 
leaders. All the respondents who indicated mass media, political leaders and 
fellow union leaders as their source o f awareness were the leaders o f basic level 
unions, except one who was a leader o f one trade union federation.
O f the 24% workers having knowledge about the existence o f the ILO
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Conventions on freedom of association (see table No. 3), 15% derived their
knowledge from their union leaders, 4% from political leaders, 5% a fellow
worker. The majority o f the employers on the other hand i.e., 70% (35 out of
50) have knowledge through academic exercise. Only 16% (8 out o f 50)
responded to have knowledge through fellow employers, while 6% (3 out o f 50)
from political leaders and 8% (4 out o f 50) through mass media. The local ILO
office was suggested in the questionnaire as a possible source o f information to
find out whether the local ILO office in Bangladesh has been playing any
significant role in communicating to the workers knowledge o f the rights
advocated by the ILO. Though none o f the respondents gave local ILO office
as the source, one union leader recognised:
The local ILO office occasionally undertakes workers' education 
programmes. But the effort is far from sufficient and without the 
Government's direct intervention and the employers' cooperation in the 
matter, virtually no progress in educating the workers is practical or 
possible.15
Those respondents who knew about the existence o f the ILO Conventions were 
further requested to state the extent of their knowledge about the Conventions 
and the findings are shown in the following diagram No. 2.
15 Personal interview dated 4.10.92.
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Table No. 3 shows that 88% o f union leaders have knowledge about the
existence o f the ILO but from diagram No. 2 it is apparent that only 6% (3 out
o f 50) have a fairly detailed knowledge o f  the provisions o f the Conventions,
26% (13 out o f 50%) are aware o f the basic contents, 20% (10 out o f 50) very
little, while 36% (18 out o f 50) merely heard about the existence o f the
Conventions. It is o f interest to note that o f  the 24% of workers who knew
about the Conventions (see, table No. 3 ), none possessed fairly detailed
knowledge or o f the basic contents: 3% o f workers admitted to very little
knowledge while 21% had merely heard o f the existence o f the Conventions.
This state o f workers' knowledge is not a matter o f surprise as one leader o f a
federation o f trade union admitted:
General workers have hardly any idea about the ILO and its 
Conventions for the fact is that the Conventions are not published in 
the local language and the leaders refer to the ILO only in some public 
lectures but do not discuss in details.16
The question arises as to whether it would make any difference if the texts o f
the Conventions were to be made available in the vernacular. According to one
basic level union leader:
Such efforts will not bring any positive result. To the workers who are 
faced with their day to day economic hardship - the availability of 
literature on the ILO in the vernacular will be o f no practical use as 
their immediate real concern is to earn bread and butter rather than 
acquainting themselves with the international events.17
The union leaders' possible role in educating the workers about the right to
16 Personal interview dated 11.10.92. Translated from Bengali.
17 Personal interview dated 26.10.92. Translated from Bengali.
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freedom o f association as enshrined in the ILO Conventions was depicted by
one union leader. According to him:
The financial constraints upon the unions coupled with unfavourable 
circumstances in running the union activities i.e., employers' anti-union 
attitude, lack o f proper union office, workers' reluctance to pay union 
subscriptions etc., make it almost impossible for us to launch workers' 
education programmes. Thus, given the present circumstances we 
cannot play any positive role in com municating to the workers about 
the ILO Conventions on freedom of association nor it appears to be of 
any prime concern to them .18
All the employers unlike union leaders and workers know about the existence
o f the ILO Convention on freedom o f association (see, table No. 3), but only
12% (6 out o f 50) claimed to have fairly detailed knowledge while 22% (11 out
o f 50) are aware o f the basic contents of the Conventions. 36% of employers
(18 out o f 50) have very little knowledge about the Conventions and on the
other hand 30% (15 out o f 50) merely have heard about the existence o f the
ILO Conventions on freedom o f association.
The respondents who did not have any knowledge about the ILO
Conventions, were requested to state their reasons for not knowing about the
Conventions and their responses are presented below in table No. 5.
18 Personal interview dated 18.9.29.
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TABLE NO. 5
REASONS FOR NOT KNOW ING ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF THE ILO
CONVENTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM  OF ASSOCIATION
REASONS FOR NOT KNOWING 
ABOUT THE ILO CONVENTIONS 
ON RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF 
ASSOCIATION
RESPONDENTS
UNION
LEADERS
WORKERS EMPLOYERS
No. % No. % No. %
LACK OF EDUCATION 0 0 39 39 0 0
LACK OF INTEREST 0 21 21 0 0
NOBODY TOLD ME 6 12 16 16 0 0
From table No. 5 it appears that the 12% (6 out o f  50) o f union leaders
who did not have any knowledge about the ILO Convention have all mentioned
that they did not have knowledge because they were not told about the
Conventions. It may be mentioned that all these respondents were the leaders
o f the basic level unions. One basic level union leader considered:
The leaders o f trade union federations to which they belong should tell 
them and the Government being a member o f the ILO also incur some 
responsibilities to convey the message o f the Conventions to the 
workers.19
Another basic level union leader suggested:
The leaders o f the national trade union federations who represent the 
workers at the ILO annual Conference should com municate to them 
about the outcome o f the ILO Conference and describe what rights the 
workers are supposed to enjoy as stipulated by the ILO Conventions.20
It is to be noted that none of the basic level union leaders mentioned lack o f
education as their reasons for not knowing about the ILO Conventions on
19 Personal interview dated 17.10.92. Translated from Bengali.
20 Personal interview dated 22.11.92. Translated from Bengali.
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freedom o f association. The workers on the other hand replied somewhat 
differently i.e., 39% suggested lack o f education as their main reason for not 
knowing, while 21% lack o f interest. However, like 12% o f union leaders, 16% 
o f workers' argument for not knowing about the Conventions was due to the 
fact that nobody told them about the existence o f the Conventions. We have 
seen earlier that basic level union leaders who advanced the same reasoning 
held the leaders o f national trade union federations responsible, but so far as the 
workers were concerned they primarily held their union leaders to be 
responsible.
In table No. 1 and table No. 3 respondents' knowledge about the 
existence o f the ILO and the ILO Conventions on freedom o f association have 
been presented respectively. The following diagram No. 3 delineates the 
comparative rate o f the respondents' knowledge about them.
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From the above diagram it is apparent that all the union leaders have 
knowledge about the existence o f the ILO but all o f them do not know about 
the existence o f the Conventions. Though union leaders' response about the 
knowledge o f the Conventions show quite a high percentage i.e., 88%, yet it is 
evident from the diagram No. 2 that the majority o f them i.e., 36% merely 
heard about the existence o f the Conventions, while another 20% have very 
little knowledge. The field investigation further revealed that out o f  eight 
Conventions which the ILO has adopted so far on freedom o f association, only 
3 union leaders knew o f 4 Conventions i.e., Conventions Nos. 11, 87, 98 and 
141. Another 2 union leaders suggested to know about 3 Conventions i.e., 
Convention Nos. 11, 87, 98, and all other union leaders knew about less than 
3 or merely heard about the Conventions in general without having specific 
knowledge about any particular Convention. From diagram No. 3 it is also 
apparent that the rate o f knowledge of workers about the ILO Conventions is 
also less than the ILO like that o f  the union leaders. However, the employers 
show an opposite picture as all o f them know about the ILO and its 
Conventions on freedom o f association. This appears to be due to the fact that 
all o f them were educated enough to know about the existence o f the ILO and 
its Conventions on freedom of association (see, diagram No. 1).
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6.4.2 TESTING VIEWS ON THE EXTENT OF THE RIGHT TO 
ESTABLISH TRADE UNIONS AND THEIR FUNCTIONING
After inquiring about the ILO and its Conventions on freedom o f 
association the respondents were asked to state their views on the extent o f the 
right to establish trade unions and their functioning. Our findings in the previous 
section have revealed that many o f the respondents were not aware about the 
existence o f the ILO and its Conventions on freedom o f association and among 
those who knew about the existence o f the Conventions many o f them were not 
acquainted with the substantive provisions o f the Conventions or knew very 
little about them. Thus, in order to explore what the respondents generally 
thought about the right to trade unionism, they were asked to respond to a series 
o f statements. The statements were: (a) "workers should have the right to 
establish trade unions"; (b) "workers should have the right to establish and join 
trade unions o f their own choosing"; (c) "workers should have the right to 
establish trade unions without previous authorisation"; (d) "in order to establish 
trade unions workers should have the right to elect their representatives in full 
freedom"; (e) "trade unions should not be liable to be dissolved or suspended 
by administrative authority and (f) "trade unions should have the right to 
establish and join federations and confederations". These statements were 
framed on the basis o f  the provisions o f the ILO Convention No. 87 dealing 
with the right to freedom o f association. This was done with the object that on 
the one hand it would reflect respondents' own views about the extent o f the
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enjoyment o f the right and on the other hand depict to what extent their views 
are in line with the ILO Convention No. 87. The findings o f this investigation 
are presented below in table No. 6.
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(A) Response to the statem ent: "workers should have the right to establish 
trade unions".
From table No. 6 it is evident that all the union leaders and workers 
interviewed strongly agreed that workers should have the right to establish trade 
unions. The expression o f such strong commitment appeared to be due to the 
fact that all these respondents considered that, without the existence o f some 
form of workers' organisation, the working class would be unable to defend its 
occupational interests and would be subject to the whim and mercy o f the 
employers. The common arguments put forward by the union leaders and 
workers, advocating their right to establish trade unions were as follows: "to 
fight the arbitrariness o f employers", "to safeguard and secure the rights of 
workers", "workers cannot solve their problems individually", "without an 
organisation one gets nothing" and "union is strength". These statements are a 
reflection o f the reality that unions generally have to exist in a hostile 
environment and rely on the unity o f the members to withstand pressures from 
the management and Government. Thus the general proposition was that an 
individual in isolation is powerless and unable to defend his interests effectively 
and that power lies in unity, association and collective action.
Unlike union leaders and workers, none o f the employers strongly agreed 
that workers should have the right to establish trade unions. Nevertheless, 64% 
(32 out o f 50) merely agreed. The main reasons for agreeing may be 
summarised as follows: some considered that the time has come for the workers
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to look after themselves, others considered that, once unions are established, 
union leaders can solve many o f the problems o f the workers for which 
management would not be bothered, a few others said that the existence o f trade 
unions help the functioning o f industrial enterprises as the management need not 
talk to all workers but to the union representatives. Though the majority o f the 
employers were in favour o f the existence o f trade unions, yet 24% (12 out of 
50) o f employers disagreed and 12% (6 out o f 50) strongly disagreed on the 
basis that it should be the employers to look after their workers and not the 
union leaders as all resources are with the employers not the union leaders. 
According to many o f them the establishment o f Trade Unions creates an 
unhealthy atmosphere in industrial enterprises which often end up in a hostile 
relationships between management and unions as unions often put forward an 
ambitious charter o f demands without considering the resources o f the 
management.
These employers clearly expressed their scepticism about any positive
role o f Trade Unions in economic and industrial development and would prefer
the absence o f any kind o f trade unions in their establishments. From this it
appears that some employers have not changed their notion o f anti-unionism,
although 25 years have passed since the labour policy o f 1969 was declared,
which expressly criticised employers' attitude in this regard and offered the
following explanation:
The employers are generally first generation industrialists 
unappreciative of the role that motivated workers can play towards
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higher productivity and profitability and have been hostile to the 
development o f trade unions.21
However, it should be emphasised that only 36% of Employers expressed a
negative attitude towards workers having the right to establish trade unions
while majority, i.e., 64%, were in favour o f it. Below we will see their response
on the broader issues o f trade union rights.
(B) Response to the statem ent: "workers should have the right to establish 
trade unions of their own choosing".
The responses o f the union leaders and workers, as is evident in table No. 
6, have been very positive as all the respondents in the sample strongly agreed 
that workers should have the right to establish trade unions o f their own 
choosing. None o f the worker respondents referred to the relevant provisions o f 
the ILO Conventions to support their views, yet all o f them regarded 'free 
choice' as one o f the foundations o f freedom of association. In the course of 
discussion it was conveyed to them that this right has been recognised by the 
ILO Convention No. 87. When reference to the relevant ILO Convention was 
made, it appeared that none o f the workers knew about the existence o f any 
such provision.22 Amongst the union leaders in the research sample, only three 
respondents appeared to know about the provision o f ’free choice' as embodied
21 See, Labour Policy, 1969.
22 Although 24% of workers claimed to know about the existence o f the ILO 
Conventions (see above, table No. 3, p. 255 ) but in view o f their extent of knowledge 
as indicated in diagram No. 2 (see above, p. 258) such response could be expected.
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in the ILO Convention No. 87.23 All these respondents were the leaders o f 
national federation o f trade unions and had represented workers' delegate once 
or more at the annual International Labour Conference. None o f the employers 
strongly agreed to the statement, though 64% (32 out o f  50) merely agreed and 
36% (18 out o f 50) did not give any reply to the question. By answering 'agree' 
and not 'strongly agree' the employers showed their lower commitment to the 
statement in contrast to that of the union leaders and workers. The employers 
(i.e., 36%) who expressed the opinion that workers should not have the right to 
establish trade unions were the respondents who did not give any reply to the 
present statement. The main plea o f non-response was that as they do not 
support the cause o f establishment o f unions so they need not give any reply to 
the statement that workers should have the right to establish trade unions o f 
their own choosing. This argument advanced for non-response may not be 
logical enough but nevertheless depicts their anti-union attitudes.
(C) Response to the statem ent: "workers should have the right to establish 
trade unions without previous authorisation".
A majority o f the respondents seemed unacquainted with the concept of 
'previous authorisation' and replied only after it was explained to them. An 
overwhelming majority o f union leaders i.e., 98% (49 out o f 50) strongly agreed 
that workers should have the right to establish trade unions without previous
23 This response sequences with diagram No. 2 (see above, p. 258) which shows that 
only 3 out o f 50 union leaders claimed fairly detailed knowledge o f the Conventions.
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authorisation. Amongst the sample o f trade union leaders only one union leader
who is the president o f a national Trade Union federation and who also once
represented the workers' delegate at the ILC expressed a diametrically opposed
view. According to him:
In an ignorant, uneducated and underdeveloped society like us - we 
need some kind of previous authorisation. In a developed, educated and 
conscious society there need not be any kind of authorisation because 
they are more conscious about their rights, duties and obligations as 
citizens. The scenario in our country is different and as such the ILO 
concept of ’previous authorisation' is not applicable to us.24
The above view received remarkable support from the workers as 39% of
workers disagreed with the statement. The main concern o f these workers was
that as they are not educated enough to understand the day to day affairs of
trade unions and also their establishment and functioning so they would
appreciate the intervention o f the department o f labour to police that necessary
formalities are being complied with in establishing a trade union and as such
support the registration procedure. Lack o f trust on the union leaders also was
a major factor for some workers to support the issue of'previous authorisation'.
When it was explained to them that by supporting the requirement o f 'previous
authorisation' they would limit their freedom to establish unions, one o f the
workers responded:
We don't know what rights or freedoms we have got on trade unionism 
and our leaders never discuss these aspects with us.25
Another worker said:
24 Personal interview dated 27.9.92.
25 Personal interview dated 15.10. 92. Translated from Bengali.
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We act upon the instructions of the union leaders and do what they ask 
us to do and as such right to freedom of association matters little to 
us.26
However 10% of workers shared the majority view o f the union leaders that 
workers should have the right to establish trade unions without previous 
authorisation. These workers were educated to the secondary level and seemed 
to be more conversant with trade union affairs than those workers who favoured 
previous authorisation. The workers who did not strongly agree but merely 
agreed to the statement constituted the majority as 51% fell in this category. By 
not strongly agreeing, they have showed lower commitment to the statement. 
The majority o f these respondents were doubtful on the issue o f previous 
authorisation as they neither strongly agreed nor disagreed but agreed. The 
affirmative response o f the workers on the statement cannot be argued to be due 
to the influence o f the relevant provisions o f the ILO Convention No. 87 as 
none o f these respondents had specific knowledge about the existence o f the 
Convention.
D) Response to the statement : "while establishing trade unions workers 
should have the right to elect their representatives in full freedom".
On the issue o f election o f representatives o f trade unions, all the union 
leaders and workers strongly agreed with the statement. Thus the union leaders 
and workers in the sample unanimously held that the right o f workers'
26 Personal interview dated 7.9.92. Translated from Bengali.
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organisations to elect their own representatives freely is an indispensable 
condition for them to be able to act in full freedom and to promote effectively 
the interests o f their members. On the other hand only 18% (9 out o f 50) o f 
employers strongly agreed and 56% (28 out o f 50) agreed. 26% (13 out o f 50) 
o f employers abstained from answering the question. The employers who 
strongly agreed were all from the sample o f respondents chosen from the 
Executive Committee o f the Bangladesh Employers Association. These 
respondents were o f the opinion that freedom o f association implies the right of 
workers to elect their representatives in full freedom and thus if freedom of 
association is to mean anything, it must be accompanied with a full guarantee 
to elect representatives in full freedom.
(E) Response to the statement:"trade unions should not be liable to be 
dissolved or suspended by administrative authority".
Before presenting the response o f the respondents it is necessary to state 
that the IRO, 1969, does not confer directly power on the administrative 
authorities to dissolve or suspend Trade Unions. It empowers the Registrar of 
Trade Unions to cancel registration o f a Trade Union.27 This provision o f 
cancellation o f registration by the Registrar o f Trade Unions was understood by 
majority o f respondents to be amounting to dissolution or suspension o f unions 
by the administrative authority. That view is supported by the ILO as the
27 See, Industrial Relations Ordinance. 1969. Section 10.
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Committee on Freedom o f Association in one case emphasised:
The cancellation o f registration o f an organisation by Register of Trade 
Unions is tantamount to the suspension or dissolution of that 
organisation by administrative authority.28
In the line o f  this understanding all the union leaders and 68% of workers
strongly agreed to the statement while 24% of workers agreed. To these
respondents the power o f cancelation o f registration o f unions by the Registrar
o f Trade Unions was seen as a serious impediment in exercising their right to
freedom o f association. The overwhelming view was that suspension o f Trade
Union organisations by the administrative authority constitutes a serious
restriction o f the workers' organisations to elect their representatives in full
freedom and to organise their activities.
While all the union leaders and a majority o f the workers had expressed
a positive response to the statement, 8% o f workers disagreed with the
statement. These workers asserted that they understood little o f the day to day
affairs o f trade unions either due to their lack o f education or interest or that
their union leaders did not want them to know. Therefore, they were not in a
position to assess the role o f union leaders' in running the union and union
affairs as a whole. Hence, for the purpose o f healthy trade unionism, they would
welcome the role o f administrative authority having the power to cancel
registration o f unions if a particular union deviates from its actual role and fails
to comply the law o f the land. It did not seem that they were opposed to the
28 See, ILO, Committee on Freedom of Association. 230th report, Case No. 1189, para 
686 .
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right to freedom o f association and the response was the result o f their own 
ignorance o f Trade Union affairs and scepticism about the role o f union leaders.
(F) Response to the statement: "trade unions should have the right to 
establish and join federations and confederations".
Table No. 6 shows that all the trade union leaders and a majority o f 
workers i.e., 58% strongly agreed while 33% agreed to the statement. The main 
arguments in support o f their contentions were that the workers o f any single 
industry or factory can no longer launch a successful trade union movement all 
by themselves, because o f Governmental interference on the one hand and 
centralisation o f the movement at the national level on the other hand. In order 
to fight for better terms and wages, the workers o f all industries and factories 
are required to act unitedly. So there is an inevitable necessity for a greater 
unity o f the working class under the unified leadership o f national level 
federations o f trade unions.
It should not, however, be construed to mean that the basic level unions 
are o f no avail. Rather a paradox emerges: while the basic unions tend to 
depend upon national federationsfor leadership, the national federationron their 
end, however, cannot initiate any movement without the active co-operation of 
the basic unions. It was quite clear to these respondents that in order to defend 
the interests o f their members more effectively, the basic-level unions must have 
the right to form and join federations and confederations o f their choosing.
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Some of the respondents also asserted that if freedom of association is to mean 
anything, trade union federations and confederations must also enjoy the rights 
accorded to basic level unions including the right to bargain collectively.
6.4.3 TESTING AWARENESS AND OPINION ABOUT THE IRO, 1969, 
DEALING WITH THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
Having investigated respondents' awareness about the ILO, its 
Conventions on freedom o f association and their views on the extent o f the right 
to establish trade unions and their functioning, the next step was to test their 
awareness about the existence o f the IRO, 1969, dealing with the right to 
freedom o f association and their level o f satisfaction with the legislative 
provisions. Respondents' awareness about the provisions o f the IRO, 1969, on 
the right to freedom o f association is shown below in table No. 7.
TABLE NO. 7
AWARENESS ABOUT EXISTENCE OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE IRO 1969 
ON THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
ARE YOU AWARE THAT THE IRO, 1969 
CONTAINS PROVISIONS ON RIGHT TO 
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION ?
RESPONSES
YES NO
CATEGORY OF 
RESPONDENTS
NUMBER OF 
RESPONDENTS
No. % No. %
UNION LEADERS 50 50 100 0 0
WORKERS 100 62 62 38 38
EMPLOYERS 50 50 100 0 0
It appears from table No. 7 that all the union leaders and employers are
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aware about the existence o f the provisions o f the right to freedom of 
association as provided in the IRO, 1969. So far as the workers are concerned, 
62% have such knowledge and 38% did not. The question posed to the 
respondents which led to the tabulation o f table No. 7 was o f a general nature. 
The object was to find out merely the awareness o f the respondents about the 
existence o f the domestic legislation dealing with freedom o f association. Thus, 
at this juncture it should not be assumed that the respondents who replied in 
affirmative had detailed knowledge about the provisions o f the IRO, 196929 
Respondents who knew about the existence o f the provisions o f the IRO, 
1969, on the right to freedom o f association were further requested to state their 
extent o f knowledge and the findings o f this investigation are shown in the 
following diagram No. 4.
29 For respondents' extent of knowledge about the provisions of the IRO, 1969, see 
below, Diagram No. 4, p. 280.
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It appears from table No. 7 that all the union leaders have knowledge 
about the provisions o f the IRO, 1969, on the right to freedom o f association 
but diagram No. 4 shows that only 60% (30 out o f 50) have fairly detailed 
knowledge, 32% (16 out o f 50) basic contents and 8% (4 out o f 50) have very 
little knowledge. Though 60% of union leaders have fairly detailed knowledge 
about the provisions o f the IRO, 1969, on right to freedom o f association but 
none o f the workers claimed to have fairly detailed knowledge. Only 4% 
answered to have knowledge about the basic contents, 10% very little while the 
majority o f the workers i.e., 48% had merely heard about the existence o f such 
provisions. From table No. 7 it is apparent that all the employers unlike workers 
are aware o f the provisions o f the IRO, 1969, and diagram No. 4 shows that 
76% (38 out o f 50) claimed to have fairly detailed knowledge and the remaining 
24% (12 out o f 50) knew about the basic contents.
The workers who did not have any knowledge about the provisions o f the 
IRO, 1969 (i.e., 38% as has been indicated in table No. 7) were requested to 
state the reasons for their ignorance. The responses o f these respondents were: 
14% replied lack o f education as main reason while 24% considered that they 
did not know because nobody told them about it. When asked whom did they 
think should have told them, all the respondents asserted that this should have 
been communicated to them by their union leaders as they do not have the 
required level o f education to acquaint themselves with the knowledge of the 
provisions o f the IRO, 1969, dealing with the right to freedom of association.
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The respondents those who admitted to know about the provisions o f the 
IRO, 1969, on right to freedom o f association were requested to state if they 
were satisfied with the provisions. The findings o f this investigation are given 
below in table No. 8.
TABLE NO. 8
SATISFACTION ABOUT THE PROVISIONS OF THE IRO, 1969, ON THE 
RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
I ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE 
I PROVISIONS OF IRO, 1969, ON 
I RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF 
1 ASSOCIATION ?
RESPONSES
YES NO NO
RESPONSE
1 CATEGORY OF RESPONDENTS No. % No. % No. %
|  UNION LEADERS 42 84 8 16 0 0
1 WORKERS 6 6 0 0 56 56
|  EMPLOYERS 34 68 0 0 16 32
The above table shows that 84% (42 out o f 50) o f union leaders are 
satisfied with the legislative provisions on freedom o f association and 16% (8 
out o f 50) o f union leaders are not satisfied. The workers' response to the 
question was that only 6% expressed their satisfaction while 56% o f workers 
did not give any reply to the question so their views have been shown as no 
response in table No. 8. Such non-response appears to have been due to the fact 
that 48% o f workers (as shown in diagram No. 4) had merely heard about the 
existence o f the provisions o f the IRO, 1969, on the right to freedom o f 
association and thus were unable to express any view on the issue. It appears 
from table No. 8 that 68% (34 out o f 50) o f employers expressed their
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satisfaction while 32% (16 out o f 50) did not reply to the question and their 
responses have been indicated as no response in the table No. 8.
It is evident from the above table that a minority o f union leaders i.e., 
16% have expressed their dissatisfaction about the provisions on freedom o f 
associations as provided in the IRO 1969. The various reasons o f dissatisfaction 
as advanced by these respondents are: (a) the prohibition on outsiders to become 
union executives at the basic level unions; (b) the requirement o f 30% workers 
to form a union in any establishment; (c) the restriction on number o f unions 
i.e., no more than three unions to exist in one establishment; (d) the requirement 
o f compulsory registration o f unions and (e) the power o f the Registrar to cancel 
registration o f unions.
When these respondents were asked why they considered it necessary to 
have an outsider union leader in the management, the most common reply was 
the fear o f victimisation. Other reasons advanced were: the high degree o f 
illiteracy amongst the workers; that, being subordinates, the workers on the 
executive could not discuss their grievances freely with the management. 
Considering 30% of workers' support in the establishment o f a union as high 
percentage and supporting unlimited multiplicity of unions, these respondents 
specified that the formation o f a union should be left to the workers to decide 
and as such the legislation should not prescribe the maximum number o f unions 
to exist in one establishment which in other words limits the workers o f their
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right to form associations. In this context three union leaders30 recalled the ILO
Convention No. 87 which advocates full freedom for formation o f associations.
Contrary to the above views, an overwhelming majority o f the union
leaders (i.e., 84%) and all the workers who expressed their opinion on the issue
of satisfaction on domestic legislation (i.e., 6%) were o f the opinion that certain
legislative regulations are necessary for proper functioning o f the unions.
Supporting the prohibition o f outsiders' participation at the basic level union,
one basic level union leader argued:
The outsider leadership is responsible for the slow growth of insider 
leadership thus preventing trade unionism in the country from being 
self-reliant and truly dem ocratic.31
Another basic level union leader said:
The outsiders are extremely influential in the field o f industrial 
relations and through this influence and power they try to capture the 
trade unions for their own benefit and hence, they act as a barrier to 
stop the internal supply o f trade union leadership.32
The obvious criticism by the employers against the outsiders were, to quote one
employer:
They are not from the rank and file o f the workers. They have different 
life styles and have little connection with the workers they lead. They 
lack practical knowledge about the detailed procedures in the industry 
or the difficulties of the workers or o f the management.33
30 These respondents claimed to have fairly detailed knowledge about the provisions 
of the Conventions on freedom of association (see above, diagram No. 2 at p. 258).
31 Personal interview dated 2.10.92. Translated from Bengali.
32 Personal interview dated 15.9.92. Translated from Bengali.
33 Personal interview dated 28.9.92.
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The other criticism against outsiders is that they are political men acting as the
agents o f a particular party. Thus they bring politics into unions, exploit unions
for political purposes and subordinate union loyalty to political loyalty.
Therefore, it was often suggested by the employers that the dependence of
unions on outsiders as their executives is one o f the many causes of unhealthy
rivalries in the labour movement. Thus, it was pointed out one by employer:
Politically motivated outside trade union leaders want to establish 
unions o f their own with a view to increasing their influence.34
Historically, the unwillingness o f the employer to accept the ordinary worker as
a fit person with whom he might sit across the table for negotiation made the
outsiders a virtually indispensable category o f labour leaders in the trade unions
o f the Indian sub-continent.35 That role was greatly reinforced by an elaborate
set o f rules and regulations and the role o f Government agencies. The
proceedings, for example, were conducted in English which served to exclude
many workers and promote the growth o f intellectual outsiders. Another
important factor promoting the outsiders in the trade union movement in the
country was the links between trade union growth and the organised
independence movement against the British colonial rulers. The nation's
struggles for political freedom brought together many organisations irrespective
of different and conflicting views. Hence, the organising and political
34 Personal interview dated 19.11.92.
33 See, Badiuzzaman, M., The Growth and Development o f Trade Unionism in
Bangladesh: 1947-1986. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1987, University o f Keele,
England, p. 389.
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consciousness o f workers were regarded as vital factor and in some cases, 
inseparable from the united movement for independence.36
Besides these historical factors the hostile attitude o f the employers 
towards the formations of Trade Unions has restricted the supply o f internal 
leadership. Victimisation is the main consequence o f the hostile attitude o f the 
management in dealing with the Trade Unions. The earliest survey on labour 
problems carried out by the ILO Mission in the then Pakistan found that the 
most common reason for the need o f the outsiders, advanced by both trade 
union officials and workers, was the fear o f victimisation felt by employees.37 
Considering the development o f Trade Unions in the country, the Mission 
suggested:
However necessary these outsiders may have been in the past, the 
mission feels that if  the fear o f victimisation can be removed there are 
many workers o f sufficient intelligence and education who with some 
specialised training would be quite capable o f running trade unions.38
The field investigation showed that the workers and union leaders want
protection against victimisation by the employers rather than allowing outsiders
as a substitute for leadership.
An overwhelming support for the maximum o f three unions to exist in
one establishment was expressed by union leaders and workers who expressed
their satisfaction about the provision of the IRO, 1969. It was pointed out by
36 Ibid. 399.
37 ILO, Report to the Government of Pakistan on a Comprehensive Labour Survey, 
Geneva 1953, pp. 131-132.
38 Ibid, p. 133.
286
some o f the respondents that if there are several unions in the same
establishment trying to cater for the same set o f employees, it results in undue
rivalries and jealousies ultimately causing weak unions. On this point the ILO
Mission in the then Pakistan commented:
While the trade union movement is poorly developed, it is paradoxical 
that there are far too many registered unions in some industries; there 
activities overlap and disunity prevails.39
The Mission rightly pointed out the problem of multiplicity o f unions because
it was extremely easy to form and register a union under Sections 4 and 8 of
the Trade Unions Act, 1926 as any seven members could form a union. On the
problems o f multiplicity o f unions one union leader pointed out:
The most important weakness o f trade unionism in Bangladesh is the 
very deep division o f trade unions which exists amongst the different 
factions. Because o f this division it is difficult to have a strong trade 
union organisation in one establishment which can claim support of the 
majority o f the workers.40
The difference o f opinion and ideology amongst unions in one establishment
could have been considered healthy for trade union activity if it had operated
in a democratic framework. Unfortunately in most cases this infighting crosses
all norms o f democratic behaviour and even develops into armed conflicts. One
union leader rightly summarised:
After one group or union wins the right o f being collective bargaining 
agent it takes an extreme position against those who have lost. They 
may be physically prevented from entering the factory premises. In 
some extreme case this rivalry has even led to the murder o f the leader
39 Ibid, p. 130.
40 Personal interview dated 25.1 1.92.
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of rival group.41
Thus, one o f the major problems with which the Trade Unions face is the 
multiplicity o f unions at the enterprise level. In order to combat the adverse 
effect o f  this multiplicity, the Government has introduced the concept o f 
collective bargaining agent and fixed the maximum number o f trade unions to 
exist in one establishment which the field survey reveals is supported by the 
majority o f the union leaders and workers. This prompts us to question how far 
the provisions o f the ILO Conventions and the suggestions o f the ILO 
supervisory bodies to bring the domestic law in harmony with the ILO 
Conventions are relevant in the context o f Bangladesh.
6.4.4 TESTING ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE ILO AND ITS CONVENTIONS 
ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
The investigation to find out the attitudes o f the respondents in the 
sample about the ILO and its Conventions on freedom o f association in 
Bangladesh was carried out as a logical follow-up after having inquired their 
knowledge about the ILO, its Conventions on freedom o f association and their 
opinion on the extent o f the right to establish Trade Unions. The technique 
adopted to test the attitude o f the respondents was two fold: first, all the 
categories o f respondents were requested to state their own attitude and the 
second involved inquiring about the perception by one category of respondents
41 Personal interview dated 11.10.92.
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of the attitude o f the other category o f respondents in the sample.
Respondents' own attitude about the ILO and its Conventions on the right 
to freedom o f association is presented below in diagram No. 5.
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From diagram No. 5 it is evident that not a single respondent from any
o f the categories expressed an anti-ILO attitude whereas 92% (46 out o f  50) of
union leaders, 26% o f workers and 30% (15 out o f 50) o f  employers expressed
a pro-ILO attitude. No matter to what extent the union leaders and workers
knew about the activities o f the ILO and the contents o f its various
Conventions, they were under the impression that the organisation has been
established for the welfare o f labour i.e., ensuring and advocating their rights.
On the basis o f this assumption they exhibited their pro-ILO attitude. To quote
one union leader:
Union leaders and workers in general consider that the ILO standards 
are generally pro-workers and these may help them in real terms as 
guidelines in furthering the enjoyment o f their rights.42
On the other hand one employer while expressing his pro-ILO attitude said:
Though the ILO has been established primarily for the interest o f 
labour but nevertheless it serves the interest o f everybody in the 
country including the employers. Without a harmonious relationship 
between the two partners of production the economy o f a country can 
not prosper.43
52% (26 out o f 50) o f employers admitted that they maintain double standard 
with regard to the ILO and its Conventions on freedom o f association. All these 
employers were requested to state the reasons for their answer but surprisingly 
enough none o f them advanced any argument in support o f  their views and 
decided not to comment on the issue. As one would expect, none o f the union 
leaders and workers expressed to be maintaining double standard. However, 4%
42 Personal interview dated 21.9.92.
43 Personal interview dated 29.10.92.
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workers and 6% (3 out o f 50) o f union leaders could not ascertain their attitude 
whereas majority o f the workers i.e., 70% did not reply to the question. The 
non-response o f the workers appears to be due to the fact that they had virtually 
no idea about the ILO44 and the Conventions on freedom o f association.45 It was 
apparent from their responses that the establishment o f the ILO and the 
existence o f the Conventions was virtually o f no significance to them. It made 
no difference to them that the ILO exists and that there are certain Conventions 
which advocates for their right o f  association. However, 8% (4 out o f  50) o f
union leaders46 and 12% (6 out o f 50) o f employers47 did not reply to this
question as they admitted to be lacking sufficient knowledge about the ILO 
Conventions on freedom o f association to express any opinion.
Having investigated all the respondents' own attitude about the ILO and 
the Conventions on freedom of association, each category o f respondents were 
requested to state their own views about the attitude of the other categories of 
respondents and o f the Government. The findings o f this investigation are 
presented below in tables Nos. 9, 10 and 11.
Union leaders’ views about the attitude o f workers, employers and
44 See above, table No. 1 at p. 252.
45 See above, table No. 3 at p. 255.
46 Such response could be expected as these respondents were amongst the 36% of 
union leaders who admitted to have merely heard about the existence o f the 
Conventions (see above, diagram No. 2, at p. 258)
47 These respondents were amongst the 30% o f employers who adm itted to have 
merely heard about the existence o f the Conventions (see above, diagram No. 2 )
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Government towards the ILO and its Conventions on freedom o f association are
shown below in table No. 9.
TABLE NO. 9
ATTITUDE OF WORKERS, EMPLOYERS AND GOVERNMENT TOWARDS 
THE ILO AND ITS CONVENTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF 
ASSOCIATION: UNION LEADERS’ PERSPECTIVE
I ATTITUDE OF 
1 WORKERS,
1 EMPLOYERS AND  
I GOVERNMENT  
1 TOWARDS THE ILO 
1 AND ITS
I CONVENTIONS ON 
|  RIGHT TO FREEDOM 
|  OF ASSOCIATION
UNION LEADERS’ PERSPECTIVE
WORKERS EMPLOYERS GOVERNMENT
No. % No. % No. %
|  ANTI-ILO 0 0 17 34 6 12
|  PRO-ILO 41 82 7 14 8 16
I MAINTAIN DOUBLE 
1 STANDARD
0 0 23 46 36 72
1 COULD NOT 
|  ASCERTAIN
5 10 3 6 0 0
|  NO RESPONSE 4 8 0 0 0 0
It appears from table No. 9 that 82% (41 out o f 50) of union leaders 
think that workers hold pro-ILO attitude, while 10% (5 out of 50) could not 
ascertain and another 8% (4 out o f 50) did not reply to the question. 
Respondents who could not ascertain workers' attitude and those who did not 
give any reply asserted that workers in general have little idea about the ILO 
and its Conventions and therefore it was difficult for them to assess their 
attitudes. However, some o f them expressed the view on the assumption that if 
the workers were conversant about the ILO and its Conventions then they would
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have thought that workers would be holding a pro-ILO view as they consider
that the ILO has been established mainly for the promotion o f workers' rights.
The view o f union leaders on employers' attitudes was that 34% (17 out
o f 50) thought employers hold anti-ILO attitudes and 46% (23 out o f 50)
maintain double standard. Union leaders who said that employers hold anti-ILO
attitudes did not advance any specific argument in support o f their perceptions.
The majority o f them were generally o f the opinion that employers are opposed
to the concept o f freedom o f association as specified in the ILO Conventions
and create pressures on the Government to restrict and limit the exercise o f the
right to freedom o f association. Some o f the union leaders advanced the view
that employers theoretically accept the concept o f freedom o f association but do
not feel encouraged to negotiate with the trade unions specially in matters of
collective bargaining. It was argued by one union leader:
Employers support the right to freedom of association only to that 
extent which satisfy their interests and oppose implementation o f other 
aspects o f the right which would go against their interests.48
Further it was generally argued by some of the union leaders that apparently
many employers accept that workers should have the right to freedom of
association but in practice give no cooperation in the formation of Trade Unions
but rather use their influence to frustrate the activities o f the unions. However,
6% (3 out o f 50) o f union leaders could not ascertain employers' attitude. With
regard to Government, 72%, (36 out of 50) o f union leaders said that
48 Personal interview dated 8.10.92.
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Government maintains double standard while 12% (6 out o f 50) took the view 
that Government's attitude is anti-ILO and another 16% (8 out o f 50) reported 
that Government hold pro-ILO attitude.
Workers' views about the attitude o f the employers, union leaders and 
Government towards the ILO and its Conventions on freedom o f association are 
shown below in table No. 10.
TABLE NO. 10
ATTITUDE OF EMPLOYERS, UNION LEADERS AND GOVERNMENT 
TOWARDS THE ILO AND ITS CONVENTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO 
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: WORKERS' PERSPECTIVE
ATTITUDE OF 
EMPLOYERS, UNION 
LEADERS AND  
GOVERNMENT 
TOWARDS THE ILO 
AND ITS
WORKERS' PERSPECTIVE
EMPLOYERS UNION
LEADERS
GOVERNMENT
CONVENTIONS ON 
RIGHT TO FREEDOM 
OF ASSOCIATION
No. % No. % No. %
ANTI-ILO 12 12 0 0 10 10 |
PRO-ILO 0 0 24 24 5 5
MAINTAIN DOUBLE 
STANDARD
0 0 0 0 5 5
COULD NOT 
ASCERTAIN
12 12 0 0 4 4
NO RESPONSE 76 76 76 76 76 76
Table No. 10 shows that 76% o f workers indicated no response. This 
non-response is explained by the ignorance o f these workers about the ILO and 
its Conventions on freedom o f association as has been evident in table No. 1 
and 2 (see above, p. 252 and p. 253). However, the remaining 24% o f workers
who expressed their views, have all indicated that union leaders have a pro-ILO 
attitude. Regarding employers' attitude about the ILO and its Conventions on 
freedom o f association 12% of workers have said that employers hold anti-ILO 
attitude while another 12% could not ascertain employers' attitude. 
Government's attitude as perceived by the workers were as follows: 10% 
thought anti-ILO, 5% pro-ILO, 5% maintain double standard and 4% could not 
ascertain. None o f these workers advanced any argument in support o f their 
perceptions.
Employers' views about the attitude o f union leaders, workers and 
Government about the ILO and its Conventions on freedom o f association are 
shown below in table No. 11.
TABLE NO. 11
ATTITUDE OF UNION LEADERS, WORKERS AND GOVERNMENT
TOWARDS THE ILO AND ITS CONVENTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO 
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION. EMPLOYERS' PERSPECTIVE
ATTITUDE OF UNION 
LEADERS, WORKERS 
AND GOVERNMENT 
TOWARDS THE ILO 
AND ITS
CONVENTIONS ON 
RIGHT TO FREEDOM 
OF ASSOCIATION
EMPLOYERS' PERSPECTIVE
UNION
LEADERS
WORKERS GOVERNMENT
No. % No. % No. %
ANTI-ILO 0 0 0 0 0 0
PRO-ILO 50 100 31 62 29 58
MAINTAIN DOUBLE 
STANDARD
0 0 0 0 17 34
COULD NOT 
ASCERTAIN
0 0 19 38 4 8
NO RESPONSE 0 0 0 0 0 0
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It appears from table No. 11 that none o f the employers in the sample
considered that union leaders, workers and the Government hold anti-ILO
attitudes and all o f  them expressed the view that union leaders hold pro-ILO
attitudes. Regarding workers' attitude, 62% (31 out o f 50) o f employers replied
to be pro-ILO and 38% (19 out o f 50) could not ascertain. 58% (29 out o f 50)
o f employers took the view that Government's attitude is pro-ILO while 34%
(17 out o f  50) considered that Government maintain double standard and
another 8% (4 out o f 50) could not ascertain. One employer emphasised:
The Government being a member o f the ILO need to show pro-ILO 
attitude but in many cases rightly maintain that certain aspects o f one 
Convention or other is more suitable for developed countries and are 
not the actual concern o f the workers of Bangladesh.49
The field investigation on the attitudes towards the ILO and its Conventions,
however, on the whole has shown that an overwhelming majority o f the
respondents hold pro-ILO views.
6.5 SUMMING UP
In this chapter, following the method o f quantitative analysis and 
descriptive statistics - the awareness, opinion, attitude and views o f the 
respondents in the sample on various issues i.e., the ILO, the ILO Conventions 
on freedom o f association, and the domestic laws on freedom of association, 
have been presented so as to indicate the impact o f the ILO Conventions on 
freedom o f association upon the beneficiaries o f the right.
49 Personal interview dated 15.11.92.
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The survey shows that a majority o f the workers are not aware o f the 
ILO and its Conventions on freedom o f association (see, tables Nos.l and 2). 
All these workers possess primary level o f education (see, diagram No. 1) and 
lack o f education was given by the majority o f them as a reason for not 
knowing about the ILO Conventions on freedom o f association (see, table No. 
5). On the other hand employers and union leaders having possessed better 
education (see, diagram No. 1) than the workers, know about the existence o f 
the ILO and its Conventions on freedom o f association. Educational 
qualification may therefore be considered to be an important variable in this 
regard. It is more so as we see that majority o f employers and union leaders 
have given academic exercise as their source o f knowledge (see, tables Nos. 2 
and 4).
The knowledge o f union leaders about the existence o f the ILO and its 
Conventions on freedom o f association apparently exhibits a positive indication. 
Awareness o f the substantive provisions o f the Conventions enables them to 
compare and contrast the rights as provided in domestic legislation with that of 
the international standards. But practically this has not been the case as the field 
investigation shows that majority o f them either merely heard about the 
existence o f the Conventions or knew very little about the provisions o f the 
Conventions (see, diagram No. 2) and were not in a position to be able to 
compare and contrast the domestic law with that o f the ILO Conventions. 
Further, the workers provided a rather negative scenario as majority o f workers 
i.e. 76% (see, table No. 3) had no idea about the existence o f the Conventions.
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From the above data it can be concluded that the existence o f the Conventions 
has failed to exert any significant influence amongst the majority o f the union 
leaders and workers. Thus, there is a need to create more awareness of the 
existence o f the Conventions and o f their provisions amongst the workers and 
union leaders if the provisions o f the Conventions are to play an effective role 
in the promotion o f the workers' right to freedom of association.
However, respondents' awareness o f the existence o f the IRO, 1969 (see, 
table No. 7) and their extent o f knowledge o f the provisions o f the IRO, 1969, 
on freedom o f association (see, diagram No. 4) appears to be satisfactory 
considering their level o f education (see, diagram No. 1). The majority of the 
union leaders' satisfaction (i.e., 84%) on the provisions o f the IRO, 1969, (see, 
table No. 8) clearly indicates that the rights as detailed in the IRO have not 
fallen short o f their expectations. In this situation, it is suggested that a detailed 
knowledge o f the union leaders and workers about the ILO Conventions, 
coupled with their pro-ILO attitude (see, diagram No. 5) may play may an 
effective role as they will be able to demand and launch movement towards 
realisation o f the rights further more in line with the ILO Conventions which 
they would consider necessary. This would lead to the creation o f public 
opinion and thereby subject the Government to moral pressure to comply with 
its international commitment to bring the domestic laws further in conformity 
with that o f the ILO standards.
W hatever be the extent o f knowledge of the union leaders and workers
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about the ILO Conventions on freedom o f association, they were requested to 
give their views on various aspects o f the extent o f the right to exercise freedom 
o f association. Our findings in table No. 6 show that the respondents in the 
sample o f workers and union leaders overwhelmingly replied positively. Thus, 
they have inter alia indicated that workers should have the right to establish 
trade unions o f their own choosing; that they should have the right to establish 
trade unions without previous authorisation and should have the right to elect 
their representatives in full freedom. But at the same time a majority o f the 
union leaders (i.e., 84%, see, table No. 8) and o f those workers who expressed 
their satisfaction about the provisions o f the IRO, 1969, have on the other hand 
favoured the prohibition o f outsiders from becoming union executives and the 
regulation o f multiplicity o f unions in the interest o f healthy growth o f trade 
unions in the country.
Hence, it appears that even though the respondents agree in principle that 
the workers should have unfettered right of exercise o f right o f association, yet 
in view o f the circumstances prevailing in local industrial relations they support 
the restrictive provisions as provided in the IRO, 1969. This inevitably raises 
question about the prospect o f having as the ILO advocates, universality of 
standards in a socially diverse world. Further it is apparent that some aspects of 
the right o f association as specified in the Conventions and upheld by the 
supervisory bodies are not the actual concern o f the workers o f Bangladesh and 
as such have little relevance in the context o f  Bangladesh.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has been concerned with an examination o f the impact o f 
international labour standards on freedom o f association in Bangladesh. An 
account has been given o f the legislative developments since the establishment 
o f the ILO because, as detailed in chapter 2, the territory now comprising 
Bangladesh has been a member o f the ILO since the establishment o f the 
organisation in 1919. At that juncture, as has been shown in chapter 3, the 
status o f right o f association was in a state o f confusion. There was neither any 
legal bar in the formation o f associations nor did the workers have any positive 
guarantee o f the exercise o f the right o f association but were subject to the 
restrictive provisions o f the criminal and civil law. In such a situation, the 
establishment o f the ILO had an important bearing on the formation o f workers' 
associations. The All India Trade Union Congress, which came into existence 
in 1920, was founded not so much to coordinate trade union activities in the 
country at that period, but mainly in order to elect workers' representatives for 
nomination by the Governm ent1 for participation in the International Labour
1 In this chapter the use of the expression Government shall denote the Government 
of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh as appropriate. 'India' refers to undivided India 
under the British Empire until August 1947.
301
Conference at Geneva.2 It was rather labour's answer to the 
Government's claim that as no truly representative organisation o f the workers 
existed and accordingly the Government was free to nominate any labour 
representative to the International Labour Conference. The establishment o f  the 
ILO in 1919 thus brought out clearly the necessity not only o f establishing 
labour organisations, but also o f bringing about some sort o f  coordination 
amongst the workers in order that they should be able to make their 
recommendations with one voice.
Consequently, the Government realised that the existence o f workers' 
organisations were inevitable in domestic sphere. According to the report o f  the 
Royal Commission on Labour in India "since the need was acute it was bound 
to evoke a response and if that response did not take the form of a properly 
organised trade union movement, it could assume a more dangerous form".1 
Accordingly, by promulgating the Trade Unions Act 1926, which for the first 
time expressly recognised the workers' right o f association, the Government 
tried to direct the movement on to the 'right lines'.4 Thus, it can be said that the 
Act was passed by the Government in an attempt to anticipate and check forth­
coming developments. So it will not be incorrect to say that the right to form 
trade unions was achieved in the Trade Unions Act, 1926 "without much
2 Revri, C., The Indian Trade Union Movement, New Delhi 1972, p. 85.
1 Report o f the Royal Commission on Labour in India, 1931 London, p. 322.
4 Revri, C., above note 2, at p. 116.
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struggle"5 and as an indirect result o f the 'territory's'6 participation in the 
International Labour Conference at Geneva.
At that juncture the Trade Unions Act, 1926 did not include any 
provision which could be said to be in conflict with the obligations applicable 
to the 'territory' under the ILO Constitution and Convention No. 11. The 
Preamble o f the Constitution merely provided for recognition o f the right of 
association. Though the term 'freedom o f association' had not been used 
anywhere in the Act, yet it could be deduced from the provisions o f the Act that 
it accorded recognition o f such rights to the registered unions. Further, the Act 
did not contain any provision contrary to Convention No. 11. The Convention 
merely aimed to remove any discrimination between agricultural and industrial 
workers in respect o f the right o f association and combination. The Trade 
Unions Act, 1926 was consistent with the Convention in that, it did not 
discriminate between agricultural and industrial workers' right o f association.
The ratification o f Convention No. 11 by the Government in 1923 was 
o f little practical value as no legislative action was needed to enable the 
Government to bring its laws into conformity with the Convention as at that 
juncture no discriminatory laws existed. The ratification o f a Convention if 
accompanied or followed by the necessary legislation, the influence o f the
5 Khan, B. A., Trade Unionism and Industrial Relations in Pakistan. Karachi 1980, p. 
1 1 .
6 The expression 'territory' is used in this chapter to indicate Bangladesh as part of 
India under the British Empire and Pakistan.
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Convention on the consequential legislation is clear. The Convention provides 
the cause and the legislation the effect.
The ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 which were ratified by the 
Government in 1951 and 1952 respectively needed to be followed by enabling 
legislative action to bring the laws o f the land into conformity with the 
Conventions. But the ratification o f the Conventions did not result in any 
immediate 'cause and effect' as no enabling legislation was passed following the 
ratifications. Thus, the ratifications confirmed Government's commitment to 
apply the Conventions but did not give the Conventions any binding force as 
part o f local law. For this purpose the provisions o f the instruments had to be 
embodied in domestic law.7
The labour policy o f 1955 which was declared by the Government after 
ratification o f Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 did not make any reference o f the 
Government's intention to give effect to the provisions o f the ratified 
Conventions nor did the Government according to the declared policy amend 
the Trade Unions Act, 1926 to bring it in conformity with the Conventions in 
fulfilment o f its international obligations. Thus, the ratification o f Conventions
7 The first Constitution o f the 'territory' which was adopted in 1956 did not provide 
for automatic incorporation o f ratified Conventions in national legislation, with binding 
force for subjects o f the country. In this it followed the dualistic theory of 
international law, according to which treaties are merely source o f reciprocal 
obligations among the parties subject to international law, without any direct, intrinsic 
consequence for the internal law o f those states. Their provisions could not therefore 
be cited by citizens in their dealings with national authorities until such time as a 
specific enactment had given them force of law in the substantive sense, as binding 
requirements within the national legal system.
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Nos. 87 and 98 at that juncture turned out to be nothing but a mere increase in 
number o f ratifications o f the ILO Conventions by the Government.
Evidence o f the effect o f ratified Conventions emerged for the first time 
in 1959 when the Martial Law Government indicated in a formal declaration 
that the policy o f the Government in the field o f labour would be based on the 
Conventions ratified by the Government. Further, reference was made as to the 
desirability o f introducing collective negotiations and agreements in accordance 
with the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 
98). Thus, the promulgation o f the Trade Unions (Amendment) Ordinance, 
1960, following the declaration o f  the policy o f 1959 which incorporated 
partially the provisions o f Convention No. 98, can be regarded as a result o f 
influence o f the Convention. However, the said enactment did not contain any 
provision to give effect to Convention No. 87. On the other hand, contrary to 
the provisions o f Convention No. 87, the Government subsequently promulgated 
the Trade Unions (Amendment) Ordinance, 1961 which reduced the 
participation o f 'outsiders' in the formation o f union executives from 50% to 
25%. The ratification o f Convention No. 87 therefore, had hardly exerted any 
influence over the actions o f the Government. While the Government enacted 
the Trade Unions Act, 1965 it did not take any further consideration o f its 
obligations under the ratified Conventions on freedom o f association. It was not 
until the enactment o f the IRO, 1969 that any further initiative on the part o f  the 
Government was visible to give effect to the provisions o f the Conventions. The
305
said Ordinance, as it appears, subject to certain restrictive provisions, drew
heavily on the basis o f Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 and even took over some
o f their provisions en bloc. However, academics have argued that the enactment
o f the IRO, 1969 was as a result o f purely national developments rather than
fulfilment o f Governments' international obligations under the ILO Conventions.
To quote Dr. Abdul Awal Khan:8
The IRO, 1969 which upheld the right o f association did not spring 
from any spontaneous gesture o f goodwill or sympathy on the part of 
the regime for workers; but under compulsion pressed upon it by the 
weight o f the nation wide unrest at that tim e.9
According to Dr. Fashiul A lam :10
The Martial Law Government undertook this venture in order to win 
over popular support in general and the workers' support in particular 
after the grim political upheaval o f 1969.11
Although promulgation o f legislation is often necessary to bring domestic law
into conformity with the provisions o f ratified Conventions, it is sometimes
difficult to determine the precise extent to which a change in the law, effected
by the ordinary legislative process, may really be attributed to a given
Convention. We however, from our discourse in chapter 3 suggest that while the
enactment o f the IRO, 1969 may have been due to political unrest prevailing in
8 Professor, Department of Management, University o f Chittagong, Bangladesh.
9 Khan, A. A., Industrial Relations in Bangladesh: A Study in Trade Unionism. 
Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1986, University of Chittagong, Bangladesh, p. 52.
10 Professor, Department o f Management, University o f Chittagong, Bangladesh.
11 Alam, F., Collective Bargaining in Bangladesh's Jute Industry. Unpublished Ph.D. 
Thesis, 1982, Panjab University, India, p. 103.
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the country at that time, the Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 nevertheless exerted 
influence in formulation o f the Ordinance as the framers o f the Ordinance relied 
on the provisions o f the said Conventions which thus had served as source 
materials. It needs to be emphasised that such influence was only in matters of 
laying down the general principles o f the right o f association as the Ordinance 
contained some regulative provisions which aimed at limiting the scope o f the 
exercise o f right o f association as envisaged in the Conventions.
In chapter 4 it has been shown that, after emerging as an independent 
state in 1971, the workers o f the country have been subject to some form of 
limitation o f the right to freedom o f association in some way or other. One of 
the first actions in this direction was the Presidential Order No. 55 o f May, 
1972 which banned all strikes in and thereby denying to the workers the right 
to strike as an instrument o f collective bargaining. The labour policy o f 1972 
withdrew the right to strike and collective bargaining in an implicit manner. 
While declaring the healthy growth o f trade unionism, it recommended reducing 
the activities o f trade unions to that of welfare organisations. The legislative 
framework fabricated to deal with the principles o f management o f state-owned 
manufacturing industries i.e., the State-Owned Manufacturing Industries (Terms 
and Conditions o f Service) Act, 1974 can hardly be said to be consistent with 
the Government's professed faith in collective bargaining as it curtailed the 
rights o f the workers in the public sector of their right to collective bargaining 
in matters o f wages and fringe benefits.
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The proclamation o f the State o f Emergency on 28 December, 1974 
suspended the enforcement o f the right to freedom of association as guaranteed 
by Article 38 o f the Constitution. Further, the executive Order dated 6 January, 
1975, issued in pursuance o f Section 19 o f the Emergency Powers Rules, 1975, 
which banned strikes in all undertakings both private and public, was hardly 
calculated to encourage and promote trade unions and collective bargaining. The 
proclamation o f the Emergency was followed by a declaration o f Martial Law 
and change o f regime bringing to power General Ziaur Rahman, who imposed 
further restrictions on the right to freedom o f association, collective bargaining 
and strikes through the promulgation o f Industrial Relations (Regulation) 
Ordinance, 1975. The outright prohibition o f 'outsiders' from becoming the 
leaders o f the basic level unions was in clear violation o f Article 3 o f 
Convention No. 87. The same Ordinance, by prohibiting the registration o f new 
trade unions and the election o f collective bargaining agents attempted to arrest 
the growth o f union activities. The withdrawal o f Martial Law and Emergency 
in 1979, and subsequently the declaration o f labour policy in 1980, followed by 
the promulgation o f Industrial Relations (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980, did not 
improve the workers' right o f association as the Government re-enacted most of 
the earlier restrictions as provided in the Industrial Relations (Regulation) 
Ordinance, 1975.
Trade union activities came to a halt after the country having been 
subject to the Martial Law for the second time as the constitutional guarantee
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of the right to freedom of association was not only kept in abeyance, but with 
the introduction o f the Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinance, 1982, strikes 
were again declared illegal and no election o f collective bargaining agents could 
take place.
Prohibition o f all these lawful trade union activities impelled the workers 
to find extra legal ways to ventilate their grievances. In violation o f the 
provisions o f the Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinance, 1982, the workers 
united in one platform in the name o f Sramik Karmachari Oikya Parisad and 
organised a movement for the restoration o f their rights through meetings and 
strikes in mass defiance of the laws imposed by the regime. The outcome o f the 
movement was that the Martial Law Authority repealed the Industrial Relations 
(Regulation) Ordinance, 1982, as a result o f  which the workers regained the 
enjoyment o f rights that existed before the promulgation o f the Ordinance. In 
one respect, the situation was an improvement on the pre-ordinance position. 
The Martial Law Authority, by promulgating the Industrial Relations 
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1985 to some extent relaxed the previous ban on 
outsider leadership at the plant level unions allowing an ex-worker to be able 
to become union executive in the establishment where he had worked. But this 
relaxation did not continue for long and its scope was limited by the 
promulgation of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 1990.
An analysis o f the contents o f  the legislation thus reveals that, although 
the ILO freedom o f association standards were ratified by Bangladesh, the
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fundamental principles on which they are based have not been fully integrated 
into its labour legislation. The IRO, 1969 contains provisions similar to 
Conventions Nos. 87 and 98. However, the laws contained therein are not exact 
replicas o f the Conventions, there are various discrepancies between the national 
formulations o f the laws and the Conventions. The Conventions therefore, have 
only partially influenced the development o f legislation on freedom of 
association. The scrutiny o f the legislative developments further suggests that 
the legislation on right o f association in Bangladesh has been dictated more by 
expediency and convenience on the part o f  the Government than by the 
imperative needs o f the workers or in furtherance o f the fulfilment of 
international obligations o f the Government. As a result, some provisions are 
incompatible with the standards on freedom o f association as enshrined in the 
ILO Conventions and have been subject to the criticisms by the ILO supervisory 
body.12
The assessment in chapter 5 shows that the ILO supervisory procedure 
has generally failed to ensure compliance with the ratified Conventions by the 
successive Governments. However, the investigation into the Government's 
record o f compliance with the reporting procedure under Article 22 o f the ILO 
Constitution has shown that the Government o f undivided India, Pakistan and
12 Some o f the major discrepancies between the national laws and the Conventions 
concern: multiplicity o f unions, election o f union representatives, right to collective 
bargaining in public sector, acts o f interference in establishing, functioning and 
adm inistering unions, public servants' right o f association and the power of the 
Registrar over supervision o f the internal affairs o f trade unions.
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subsequently Bangladesh have all complied with this aspect o f supervision. By 
communicating regularly a set o f specified data, successive Governments have 
made it possible for the ILO to acquire essential information regarding 
compliance with the ratified Conventions. The reports have constituted the basis 
o f a regular system of ongoing supervision.
In discharging its supervisory role, the Committee o f Experts has on no 
occasion condemned the Government when it considered that certain provisions 
o f a Convention have been violated. Rather, it has directed questions and 
comments to the Government in restrained terms when it found that provisions 
o f the Convention were not being fully implemented. The Committee has stated 
in its report that it 'hopes' or 'trusts' that 'measures will be taken to ensure 
application o f the Convention' or has stated that it would be 'glad' or 'grateful' 
if  the Government 'would supply further information'. While the Committee's 
communication with the Government has always been polite, they have also 
been persistent when the Committee believed that a continued discrepancy 
existed. Comments have continued in consecutive years if the Committee has 
not been satisfied with the Government's response. Failure to bring laws into 
line with the Convention has led the Committee to express 'concern' or note 
'with regret'. Improvements in the implementation have been noted 'with interest' 
or 'with satisfaction'.
The Committee may thus be said to have developed a stylized 
understated language to express its views. When it notes with 'concern' or 'with
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regret', these phrases are meant to be understood as a serious criticism o f the 
Government's failure to implement a Convention. Although, Committee's 
circumspect language in referring to Government's noncompliance may 
sometimes be criticised as being excessively diplomatic, it must be emphasised 
that a report which gives the Government direction for further action may be of 
far more practical value than a formal condemnation o f past action or inaction. 
This is so because the fundamental purpose o f supervision is to secure effective 
implementation o f the ratified Conventions and not to apply sanctions against 
the offending state. This is an important feature which distinguishes the 
executive function o f the ILO from the executive function o f the national state 
where sanction is an important element in the enforcement o f legislative and 
executive decisions. The absence o f the punitive element in the implementation 
o f the decisions o f international organisations may be seen by some as a 
weakness, but it should be recognised that it is more difficult to apply sanctions 
against a State than an individual and what is important is to secure the 
effective application and implementation o f institutional decisions rather than 
to punish a State for non-compliance by the import o f sanctions.
The observations o f the Committee o f Experts and CFA analysed in 
chapter 5 clearly indicate that ILO standards have hardly exerted any influence 
upon the policies and behaviour o f the Government o f Bangladesh. Such 
apparent indifference to its international obligations on the part o f any 
Government must be subversive o f the integrity o f the entire international
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regime for the protection o f the principle o f freedom o f association. But this 
experience serves to emphasize the unpleasant but inescapable reality that 
international standards relating to freedom o f association can be efficacious only 
to the extent that national Governments are prepared to allow them to be so or 
to the extent that workers are able to push for them. In other words, the ILO 
can only be as effective an instrument for progress as its member states and 
other constituents want it to be and it can have no more influence on national 
legislation than its member states want it to have.
The mere fact o f recognising in law o f the principle of freedom o f 
association does not in itself suffice to realise such freedom in practice. The 
granting o f specific rights and safeguards to those for whom this freedom is 
intended is not enough to ensure that they avail themselves o f it. If  they are to 
be free to organise in accordance with their aspirations, they must be aware o f 
their rights and the ways o f ensuring respect for them and they must have the 
material means and the qualifications enabling them to establish well-organised 
occupational associations and to compare and contrast the domestic laws with 
that o f the ILO Conventions.
From the investigation in chapter 6 it is apparent that the union leaders' 
and workers' level o f awareness about the substantive provisions o f the 
Conventions is inadequate for the purpose o f comparing and contrasting the 
rights provided in domestic legislation with that o f the international standards. 
It must be emphasised that if the beneficiaries o f the Conventions are to derive
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benefits from the Conventions by going beyond what has been provided in the 
IRO, 1969, they need to know o f what rights they are being deprived despite 
Government's commitment to incorporate them in the domestic law. If they are 
unaware o f the Conventions then they are left at the will o f the State 
bureaucracy and will not be able to advance claims beyond that is which 
permitted by the state. Therefore there is a need to create awareness amongst 
them and to mobilise public opinion in order to derive benefits from the 
provisions o f the Conventions. Paradoxically, the majority o f the respondents 
in the study have indicated their satisfaction about the provisions o f the IRO, 
1969 dealing with the right o f association. Their response apparently undermines 
the relevance and existence o f the Conventions and suggests that the 
Conventions have not been able to exert influence amongst them in their 
exercise o f right o f  association. Moreover, it has been evident from the 
responses o f the respondents that some aspects o f the right o f association as 
specified in the Conventions and upheld by the supervisory bodies are not their 
actual concern in the exercise o f right o f association. They have on the contrary 
extended their support for legislative regulations on issues like multiplicity o f 
unions and prohibition o f participation o f outsiders in the union executive as 
envisaged in the IRO, 1969. The ILO Mission's report to the Government o f 
Pakistan on a comprehensive labour survey in 1953, advanced similar views. 
The Mission argued:
There are undue multiplicity o f registered trade unions in a number of
industries, and in the opinion o f the Mission this state of affairs
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conspires seriously against healthy development o f trade unionism in 
those industries.13
Accordingly, the Mission suggested:
Because o f the terrific complications which arise out o f mass illiteracy, 
there seems special necessity in this country for legislative guidance on 
the problems o f recognition and o f multiplicity. Illiteracy is not a 
sufficient ground for encroaching upon the principles o f freedom of 
association, yet in the interest o f workers at large the law must provide 
for machinery to secure effective recognition o f certain trade unions as 
representative organisations for the purpose o f negotiating and 
conducting collective agreem ents.14
It was further suggested by the Mission:
The percentage o f outsiders holding office in trade unions should be 
progressively reduced and ultimately elim inated.15
Therefore, it appears that in view o f local circumstances, successive
Governments have taken no measures to bring the laws in conformity with that
o f ILO standards, nor have demonstrated any intent to lift current restrictions.
Such a stand is clearly supported by the decision o f the Supreme Court o f
Bangladesh where their Lordships held:
"... a statute may provide for the manner o f organisation o f associations 
or unions (including trade unions), the nature of its composition, 
required minimum strength, requirements and conditions o f registration, 
supervision over the activities o f an association or union (including 
trade union) and so on. These legislative exercises, so long as they do 
not restrict "the right to form associations or unions", may provide for 
an orderly and rational basis for their functioning. The Ordinance, 1969 
is a piece o f legislation o f that sort. It provides for the manner and
13 ILO, Report to the Government o f Pakistan on a Comprehensive Labour Survey. 
Geneva 1953, p. 134.
14 Id.
15 Ibid, p. 133
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method o f organisation o f trade unions.16
Therefore, in finding out the relativity between the ILO standards and labour
legislation, it would be more appropriate not to emphasise the normative or
standard setting concerns. It would be more fruitful to talk o f methods of
adjustment rather than absolute norms. This is especially true since many
problems in this sphere are complex in character and are o f national rather than
global concern. But so far as the application o f the ILO Conventions are
concerned, there is no room for subjective appraisal o f factors not covered by
the Convention in question. Accordingly, in its evaluation o f national law and
practice in relation to the international labour Conventions, the ILO Committee
o f Experts maintains the following position:
Its function is to determine whether the requirements of a given 
Convention are being met, whatever the economic and social conditions 
existing in a given country. Subject only to the derogations which are 
expressly perm itted by the Convention itself, these requirements remain 
constant and uniform for all countries. In carrying out its work, the 
Committee is guided by the standards laid down by the Convention 
alone, mindful, however, o f the fact that the modes o f their 
implementation may be different in different states. These are 
international standards and the manner in which their implementation 
is evaluated must be uniform and must not be affected by concepts 
derived from any particular social or economic system .17
Thus, the Committee examines from a strictly legal point o f view, the extent to
which the Government o f Bangladesh having ratified the Conventions on
freedom o f association has given effect in its laws to the obligations that has
16 Aircraft Engineers v. Registrar, Trade Unions, Dhaka Law reports, (AD) Vol. 45, 
1993, p. 126.
17 ILO, Report o f the Committee o f Experts. 63rd Session, Geneva 1977, p. 12.
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derived therefrom, irrespective o f its social and economic condition. Hence, it
is apparent that one o f the most important reasons as to why it has not been
possible for the Government o f Bangladesh to comply with the provisions o f the
Conventions in full is that the ILO Conventions being intended to serve as
international standards, do not and can not take into account conditions peculiar
to any country. The Conventions are not at all flexible. Once ratified,
implementation has to be in full and to the last letter, in conformity with the
provisions o f the Conventions. This rigidity makes it difficult to secure complete
observance o f the Conventions.
The universal application o f standards, which the ILO advocates, has
been implicitly rejected by the Supreme Court o f Bangladesh in the Aircraft
Engineers case18 where the Court while indicting the source o f Section 3 o f the
IRO, 1969 observed:
This Section has its source in Article 2 o f Convention No. 87 adopted 
by the International Labour Organisation in 1948 and ratified by 
(former) Pakistan. But the Ordinance, 1969 follows its own method o f 
organisation o f trade unions, which may or may not be the same in 
other parts o f the w orld.19
Freedom o f association like other human rights is not an abstract concept. It is
closely bound up, within each society, with conditions o f social life, economic
conditions and historical development. Uniform implementation in a world-wide
framework seems therefore difficult to achieve and appear to be neither possible
18 See above, note 17.
19 Ibid, p. 126.
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nor desirable. Francis W olf thus rightly pointed out: "no one can expect these 
standards to provide a universal remedy, but in order to ensure that they fulfil 
their role, it is essential to examine their limitations and the ways to overcome 
those limitations".20 It should be borne in mind that a Convention has to gain 
acceptance from member countries if it is to be effective in achieving its 
purposes. A Convention which seeks to provide really high standards may fail 
to secure acceptance and those which succeed in securing acceptance may not 
be able to prescribe high labour standards. Thus Conventions, if they are to be 
o f real weight in the establishment o f  internationally uniform labour standards, 
must strike an appropriate balance between the ideal and the immediately 
practicable and between precision and flexibility. It needs to be emphasised that 
the ILO is not a global Ministry o f Labour. It can set guidelines for national 
action, but it can not substitute itself for Governments, or for trade unions, or 
for employers' organisations. The great value o f the organisation is the 
mobilisation o f public opinion. As a result, unless the labour movement is 
strong and alert and public opinion is sympathetic, the workers at the national 
level will not able to enjoy the benefits o f  the Conventions even after they are 
ratified.
It is thus apparent that a state cannot be impelled by the ILO to bring 
about changes in domestic law in harmony with the ratified Conventions or to 
act upon the views o f its supervisory bodies. From international viewpoint, it
20 Wolf, F., "Human Rights and the International Labour Organisation", in Human 
Rights in International Law. Meron, T., (ed.) New York 1984, p. 294.
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is not satisfactory either for the ILO or for the state concerned to leave the 
unresolved issues resulting delay in the implementation o f ratified Conventions. 
It can be said o f the ILO procedure, that it subsists with the issues for too long 
in an effort to secure compliance o f the Conventions. But this is perhaps the 
only way o f handling an intractable situation and does in fact result in keeping 
the situation open for reconsideration. The law's delays have been a legitimate 
grievance throughout history, but justice delayed is less justice denied than the 
hurried rough justice. It appears that only by taking this kind o f long view can 
we hope to make a lasting reality o f international action for the protection o f the 
right to freedom o f association at national level.
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A P P E N D IX  I
Q U ESTIO NN A IR E FOR TH E UNIO N  LEADERS
PART - A
Identification o f the respondent:
Education: (i) Primary
(ii) Secondary
(iii) Higher Secondary
(iv) Graduate and above
PART - B
1. Are you aware about the existence o f the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO)?
(i) Yes
(ii) No
1 .(a) If you are, what is the source o f your awareness?
(i) Own reading
(ii) Mass media
(iii) Local ILO Office
(iv) From political leader
(v) From trade union leader
(vi) From employer
(vii) From worker
2. Are you aware that the ILO has laid down some Conventions on 
freedom o f association?
(i) Yes
(ii) No
2.(a) If you are, then what is the source o f your awareness?
(0 Own reading
(ii) Mass media
(iii) Local ILO office
(iv) From political leader
(v) From union leader
(vi) From employer
(vii) From worker
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2.(b) If you are aware, then how much do you know about the provisions o f 
the Conventions?
(i) Fairly detailed
(ii) Basic contents
(iii) Very little
(iv) Heard that there are Conventions
2.(c) If you are not, then what is the main reason o f your lack o f knowledge?
(i) Lack o f education
(ii) Lack o f interest
(iii) Nobody told me
3. W hat is your response to the statement: "workers should have the right 
to establish trade unions"?
(i) Strongly agree
(••) Agree
(iii) Disagree
(iv) Strongly disagree
(v) Unable to answer
4. W hat is your response to the statement: "workers should have the right 
to establish and join trade unions o f their own choosing"?
(0 Strongly agree
(ii) Agree
(iii) Disagree
(iv) Strongly disagree
(v) Unable to answer
5. W hat is your response to the statement: "workers should have the right 
to establish trade unions without previous authorisation"?
6 . W hat is your response to the statement: "in order to establish trade
(i) Strongly agree
(ii) Agree
(iii) Disagree
(iv) Strongly disagree
(v) Unable to answer
unions workers should ht
freedom"?
(i) Strongly agree
(ii) Agree
(iii) Disagree
(iv) Strongly disagree
(v) Unable to answer
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7. W hat is your response to the statement: "trade unions should not be liable
to be dissolved or suspended by administrative authority"?
(i) Strongly agree
(ii) Agree
(iii) Disagree
(iv) Strongly disagree
(v) Unable to answer
8. W hat is your response to the statement: "trade unions should have the
right to establish and join federation and confederation"?
(i) Strongly agree
(ii) Agree
(iii) Disagree
(iv) Strongly disagree
(v) Unable to answer
9. Are aware that the IRO, 1969 contains provisions on right to
freedom o f association?
(i) Yes
(ii) No
9.(a) If you are aware, then how much do you know about the provisions o f 
the IRO, 1969?
(i) Fairly detailed
(ii) Basic contents
(iii) Very little
(iv) Heard that there are some provisions
9.(b) If you are not, then what is the main reason o f your lack o f knowledge?
(i) Lack o f education
(ii) Lack o f interest
(iv) Nobody told me
10. Are you satisfied with the provisions o f the IRO, 1969 regarding freedom 
o f association?
(i) Yes
(ii) No
(iii) Unable to answer
Please give reasons for your answer.
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11. W hat is your attitude towards the ILO and its Conventions on freedom 
o f association?
(i) Anti-ILO
(ii) Pro-ILO
(iii Maintain double standard
(iv) Difficult to ascertain
(v) Unable to answer
12. According to you what is the attitude o f Government towards the ILO 
and its Conventions on freedom o f association?
(0 Anti-ILO
( '0 Pro-ILO
(iii) Maintain double standard
(iv) Difficult to ascertain
(v) Unable to answer
13. According to you what is the attitude o f the workers in general towards 
the ILO and its Conventions on freedom o f association?
(0 Anti-ILO
(ii) Pro-ILO
(iii) Maintain double standard
(iv) Difficult to ascertain
(v) Unable to answer
14. According to you what is the attitude o f the employers in general towards 
the ILO and its Conventions on freedom o f association?
(i) Anti-ILO
(ii) Pro-ILO
(iii) Maintain double standard
(iv) Difficult to ascertain
(v) Unable to answer
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A P P E N D IX  II
Q U ESTIO N N A IR E FOR THE W O R K ER S
PART - A
Identification o f the respondent:
Education: (i) Primary
(ii) Secondary
(iii) Higher Secondary
(iv) Graduate and above
PART - B
1. Are you aware about the existence o f the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO)?
(i) Yes
(ii) No
1(a) If you are, what is the source o f your awareness?
(i) Own reading
(ii) Mass media
(iii) Local ILO Office
(iv) From political leader
(v) From trade union leader
(vi) From employer
(vii) From worker
2. Are you aware that the ILO has laid down some Conventions on 
freedom o f association?
(i) Yes
(ii) No
2.(a) If you are, then what is the source o f your awareness?
(0 Own reading
(ii) Mass media
(iii) Local ILO office
(iv) From political leader
(v) From union leader
(vi) From employer
(vii) From worker
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2.(b) If you are aware, then how much do you know about the provisions o f 
the Conventions?
(i) Fairly detailed
(ii) Basic contents
(iii) Very little
(iv) Heard that there are Conventions
2.(c) If you are not, then what is the main reason o f your lack o f knowledge?
(i) Lack o f education
(ii) Lack o f interest
(iii) Nobody told me
3. W hat is your response to the statement: "workers should have the right 
to establish trade unions"?
(i) Strongly agree
(ii) Agree
(iii) Disagree
(iv) Strongly disagree
(v) Unable to answer
4. W hat is your response to the statement: "workers should have the right 
to establish and join trade unions o f their own choosing"?
(0 Strongly agree
(ii) Agree
(iii) Disagree
(iv) Strongly disagree
(v) Unable to answer
5. W hat is your response to the statement: "workers should have the right 
to establish trade unions without previous authorisation"?
(0 Strongly agree
(ii) Agree
(iii) Disagree
(iv) Strongly disagree
(v) Unable to answer
W hat is your response6 .   to the statement: "in order to establish trade 
unions workers should have the right to elect their representatives in full 
freedom"?
(i) Strongly agree
(ii) Agree
(iii) Disagree
(iv) Strongly disagree
(v) Unable to answer
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7. W hat is your response to the statement: "trade unions should not be liable
to be dissolved or suspended by administrative authority"?
(i) Strongly agree
(ii) Agree
(iii) Disagree
(iv) Strongly disagree
(v) Unable to answer
8. W hat is your response to the statement: "trade unions should have the
right to establish and join federation and confederation"?
(i) Strongly agree
(ii) Agree
(iii) Disagree
(iv) Strongly disagree
(v) Unable to answer
9. Are aware that the IRO, 1969 contains provisions on right to
freedom o f association?
(i) Yes
(ii) No
9.(a) If you are aware, then how much do you know about the provisions o f 
the IRO, 1969?
(i) Fairly detailed
(ii) Basic contents
(iii) Very little
(iv) Heard that there are some provisions
9 (b) If you are not, then what is the main reason of your lack o f knowledge?
(i) Lack o f education
(ii) Lack o f interest
(iv) Nobody told me
10. Are you satisfied with the provisions o f the IRO, 1969 regarding freedom 
o f association?
(i) Yes
(ii) No
(iii) Unable to answer
Please give reasons for your answer.
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11. W hat is your attitude towards the ILO and its Conventions on freedom
o f association?
(i) Anti-ILO
(ii) Pro-ILO
(iii Maintain double standard
(iv) Difficult to ascertain
(v) Unable to answer
12. According to you what is the attitude o f Government towards the ILO 
and its Conventions on freedom o f association?
(0 Anti-ILO
(ii) Pro-ILO
(iii) Maintain double standard
(iv) Difficult to ascertain
(v) Unable to answer
13. According to you what is the attitude o f the employers in general towards 
the ILO and its Conventions on freedom o f association?
(i) Anti-ILO
(ii) Pro-ILO
(iii) Maintain double standard
(iv) Difficult to ascertain
(v) Unable to answer
14. According to you what is the attitude o f the trade union leaders in 
general towards the ILO and its Conventions on freedom o f association?
(i) Anti-ILO
(ii) Pro-ILO
(iii) Maintain double standard
(iv) Difficult to ascertain
(v) Unable to answer
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APPENDIX III
Q U ESTIO NN A IR E FO R TH E EM PLO Y ER S
PART - A
Identification o f the respondents:
Education: (i) Primary
(ii) Secondary
(iii) Higher Secondary
(iv) Graduate and above
PART - B
1. Are you aware about the existence o f the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO)?
(i) Yes
(ii) No
1 .(a) If you are, what is the source o f your awareness?
(i) Own reading
(ii) Mass media
(iii) Local ILO Office
(iv) From political leader
(v) From trade union leader
(vi) From employer
(vii) From worker
2. Are you aware that the ILO has laid down some Conventions on 
freedom o f association?
(i) Yes
(ii) No
2.(a) If you are, then what is the source o f your awareness?
(i) Own reading
(ii) Mass media
(iii) Local ILO office
(iv) From political leader
(v) From union leader
(vi) From employer
(vii) From worker
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2.(b) If you are aware, then how much do you know about the provisions of 
the Conventions?
(i) Fairly detailed
(ii) Basic contents
(iii) Very little
(iv) Heard that there are Conventions
2.(c) If you are not, then what is the main reason o f your lack o f knowledge?
(i) Lack o f education
(ii) Lack o f interest
(iii) Nobody told me
3. W hat is your response to the statement: "workers should have the right 
to establish trade unions"?
(i) Strongly agree
(ii) Agree
(iii) Disagree
(iv) Strongly disagree
(v) Unable to answer
4. W hat is your response to the statement: "workers should have the right 
to establish and join trade unions o f their own choosing"?
(i) Strongly agree
(ii) Agree
(iii) Disagree
(iv) Strongly disagree
(v) Unable to answer
5. What is your response to the statement: "workers should have the right 
to establish trade unions without previous authorisation"?
(0 Strongly agree
(ii) Agree
(iii) Disagree
(iv) Strongly disagree
(v) Unable to answer
W hat is your response6 .   to the statement: "in order to establish trade 
unions workers should have the right to elect their representatives in full 
freedom"?
(i) Strongly agree
(ii) Agree
(iii) Disagree
(iv) Strongly disagree
(v) Unable to answer
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7. W hat is your response to the statement: "trade unions should not be liable 
to be dissolved or suspended by administrative authority"?
(i) Strongly agree
(ii) Agree
(iii) Disagree
(iv) Strongly disagree
(v) Unable to answer
8. W hat is your response to the statement: "trade unions should have the 
right to establish and join federations and confederations"?
(i) Strongly agree
(ii) Agree
(iii) Disagree
(iv) Strongly disagree
(v) Unable to answer
9. Are you aware that the IRO, 1969 contains provisions on right to 
freedom o f association?
(i) Yes
(ii) No
9.(a) If  you are aware, then how much do you know about the provisions o f 
the IRO, 1969?
(i) Fairly detailed
(ii) Basic contents
(iii) Very little
(iv) Heard that there are some provisions
9 (b) If you are not, then what is the main reason o f your lack o f knowledge?
(i) Lack o f education
(ii) Lack o f interest
(iv) Nobody told me
10. Are you satisfied with the provisions o f the IRO, 1969 regarding freedom 
o f association?
(i) Yes
(ii) No
(iii) Unable to answer
Please give reasons for your answer.
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11. What is your attitude towards the ILO and its Conventions on freedom 
o f association?
(i) Anti-ILO
(ii) Pro-ILO
(iii Maintain double standard
(iv) Difficult to ascertain
(v) Unable to answer
12. According to you what is the attitude o f Government towards the ILO 
and its Conventions on freedom o f association?
(0 Anti-ILO
(ii) Pro-ILO
(iii) Maintain double standard
(iv) Difficult to ascertain
(v) Unable to answer
13. According to you what is the attitude o f the union union leaders in 
general towards the ILO and its Conventions on freedom o f association?
(i) Anti-ILO
(ii) Pro-ILO
(iii) Maintain double standard
(iv) Difficult to ascertain
(v) Unable to answer
14. According to you what is the attitude o f the workers in general towards 
the ILO and its Conventions on freedom o f association?
(i) Anti-ILO
(») Pro-ILO
(iii) Maintain double standard
(iv) Difficult to ascertain
(v) Unable to answer
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